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Abstract
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This thesis examines the decision process leading to conservation policies in the UK. 
Focusing on Sites of Special Scientific Interest (SSSIs), it explores the hypothesis of 
conventional economic theory that economic regulation is determined by interest groups 
competing for political influence (Becker, 1983). During the 1980s, increased public 
awareness of issues concerning nature conservation has resulted in a tightening of legislation. 
This resulted in substantial increases in budget allocation towards these measures to 
compensate for the transfer of private property rights from individual farmers and landowners 
to the public to internalise externalities arising from current agricultural practices.
In order to examine the above research issues an integrated survey was conducted which 
focused on three target populations: farmers; local organisations; and, policy-makers. It was 
found that the overall framework of national UK policy is determined at the European level. 
UK based interest groups then negotiate within this framework to determine the UK's 
interpretation and consequent implementation of EU Directives. The research illustrated that a 
purely economic approach, which focuses on the competition between interest groups over the 
redistribution of public resources, is insufficient because it abstracts from the complexity of 
the policy-making process itself. While interest groups were shown to provide the government 
with essential information, it was demonstrated that the government consists of individual 
decision-makers (civil servants) who have their own agendas.
Individual farmer concerns over SSSIs were shown to focus on the imposition on their private 
property rights and freedom to derive benefit streams from their land. These concerns were 
successfully expressed by farming and landowning organisations and resulted in the reform of 
legislation in 1990 which sought to devolve decisions over implementation of policy to local 
regions.
It was found that the policy-making process relies on a small number of key interest groups. 
The conflict between the private interests of farmers and landowners and the public interests 
of environmental and conservation groups was identified. The bias towards status quo private 
property rights in the UK limits the extent to which conservation and environmental interests 
can be secured in land use policy. However, the influence of the EU, which has a stronger 
commitment to enviromnental policy than the UK national government, will increasingly 
challenge this bias in favour of public conservation and environmental interests. Finally, it 
was found that a multi-disciplinary approach is required to secure a comprehensive 
understanding of policy for conservation of natural resources and thus successfiil policy 
implementation.
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policy-making;
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X Introduction to Economie 
Policies for Conservation of Nature
In 1979 the British government had no environment policy and there was little 
widespread understanding o f environmental issues. In the manifestos o f the major 
political parties it was low on the agenda and policy was not comprehensive. During 
the 1980s the environment was seen to rise on the policy-making agenda from being 
'humdrum', (Mrs Thatcher 1979), to 'one o f  the greatest challenges o f  the late 
twentieth century' (Mrs Thatcher September 1988, House o f Commons). In relation 
to defence, social security, education, industry and economic policy, the environment 
is still a minor issue on the British political agenda. However, environmental 
problems, particularly nature conservation, have experienced considerable attention 
which have resulted in substantial increases in Treasury budget allocation. The 
culmination o f this attention to environmental issues was the White Paper, o f  
September 1990, ’Our Common Inheritance' (HMSO, 1990).
The key question in this thesis is, given the lack o f expressed market demand by 
society, how does the government determine the supply o f conservation o f natural 
habitat to attain an optimal level o f societal welfare.
Natural heritage is characterised by public goods such as biodiversity, landscape, 
clean water etc. which are 'free' goods or have a zero price on economic markets. 
The level o f demand for such goods cannot therefore be expressed on the market in 
the usual way consumers express their demand for 'normal' goods such as cars. Thus 
demand remains unquantified. Public support is principally reflected in the substantial 
membership o f voluntary organisations such as the Royal Society for the Protection o f  
Birds (RSPB) and the World Wide Fund for Nature (WWF).1
1 Approximately five per cent of the British population were estimated to be members of 
environmental organisations in the early 1980s and this was estimated to have risen to approximately 
eight per cent by the end of the decade (McCormick, 1991). In addition, the Green Party enjoyed a 
three-fold increase in its membership and won a 15 per cent share of the European seats in the 1989 
EU election.
1
The Wildlife and Countryside Act (1981) embodies the principal regulation o f 
economic activity for the conservation o f nature, known as Sites o f Special Scientific 
Interest (SSSIs). During the 1980s there was extensive designation o f economically 
marginal areas o f the UK as SSSI. Local economic and agricultural interests were 
apparently being threatened by a national scientific or conservation/environmental 
interest. This lead to a conflict o f interests in which local interests competed with the 
conservation agency (representing the national interest) to minimise the economic 
impact o f the designation o f SSSIs. The perception that conservationists in the South 
East o f England (a minority interest) were driving the conservation movement 
increased the feeling o f local interests being over-ridden by a national (minority) 
interest and thus exacerbated conflict. This conflict was paralleled at the national 
level during the debate o f the Wildlife and Countryside Act in Parliament. The 
question as to whose welfare is being protected through such policies must be raised 
if conservation o f natural habitat is sought by a minority interest (that is, members o f  
environmental and conservation groups).
Conservation agencies work within a legal framework which is based on scientific 
criteria. Therefore it would appear that scientific criteria form the basis o f the supply 
o f conservation goods given that the agency submits a rolling three year request for 
funding based on their requirements. However, the actual budget allocated to 
conservation agencies does not allow them to meet scientific criteria fully and they are 
constrained within financial limits. Given that budget allocation is not totally based on 
the requirements to meet scientific guidelines and that society does not provide any 
clear guidelines as to the level o f demand (other than the pressure o f influential 
interest groups), on what basis does government allocate scare resources to 
conservation o f natural heritage?
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Many people in Britain associate the term 'environment' with the countryside and it is 
to this area o f environmental protection that they turn their support.
"[In Britain,] the most controversial and widely debated environmental issue o f the 
post war years has been the threat posed to the countryside by modern farming" 
(McCormick, 1991).
This has been particularly true since the passing o f the Wildlife and Countryside Act 
o f 1981. The focus o f debate on the disagreement between the agriculture and 
conservation and environmental lobbies not only highlighted the influence enjoyed by 
the agriculture lobby in the Ministry of Agriculture (MAFF) and the relative lack o f 
influence o f conservation groups (a subsection o f environmental groups concerned 
with wildlife and countryside issues) but also illustrated the conflict o f interests which 
is proposed in this thesis to be the driving force o f conservation and environmental 
policy in Britain. Throughout the thesis the term 'environmental group' will relate to 
groups with more general environmental interests and 'conservation group' will relate 
to groups with a specific interest in the countryside. With respect to agriculture 
interest groups, 'agriculture' and 'farming' are used interchangeably.
In exploring the rationale for allocating public resources to nature conservation 
objectives, this thesis brings together the rise o f environmental and conservation 
interests; the influence o f the agriculture lobby; and the significance o f the conflict of 
interests between agriculture and conservation to government decision-making and 
the outcome o f conservation policy.
This research also addresses the question of the shifting balance o f conservation 
interests with established agricultural interests in the policy community, the conflict o f 
interests at the local and national level, the linkages between the two levels, and the 
nature o f the actual interests in conflict. The lack o f formal information about 
conservation policy decision-making and the influence o f agriculture and conservation 
interest groups raises questions as to who is determining policy and in whose interests 
policy is being established. Society has no clear mechanism to signal the socially 
optimal level o f output of conservation 'goods' and distortions in agricultural markets 
caused by CAP have exacerbated some environmental problems. Economists describe 
the environment as a public good and environmental (and conservation) problems are 
considered to be a result of market failure. As a consequence o f this line o f reasoning 
government is increasingly pressurised by interested parties to intervene.
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It appears that a policy elite is determining conservation policy when one considers 
the following factors: firstly, the membership of environmental and conservation 
groups is greater than the membership of all the political parties added together; and 
secondly, that membership is dominated by the middle and upper income groups o f 
UK society. If  this policy elite is determining environmental and conservation policy, 
questions are raised as to whose economic and social well-being is being protected. It 
would appear that the national interest is therefore being determined by a conflict o f 
interest between key environmental, conservation, agriculture and landowning interest 
groups.
In Chapter Two the roots of the conservation movement and early regulation 
designed to address conservation problems are discussed. The issues which emerged 
during the debate o f and subsequent implementation o f the Wildlife and Countryside 
Act (1981) are then described. The development o f this economic regulation for 
nature conservation and particularly the designation o f Sites o f Special Scientific 
Interest (SSSIs) provides the entry point to the identification o f the key 
agriculture/conservation policy issues. These in turn, provide an essential basis from 
which to establish the research programme of the thesis which is presented as the final 
section in Chapter Two. Chapter Three explores economic regulation and the conflict 
o f interests in the theoretical framework o f Public Choice Theory. Beckers neo­
classical theory o f Competition Among Pressure Groups for Political Influence (1983) 
is described in which the competition between pressure groups is proposed as being 
the main determinant o f policy decisions. The limitations o f Beckers neo-classical 
theory are discussed and an alternative paradigm is proposed in Chapter Four. This 
sets forth what is considered to be a more appropriate and comprehensive framework 
within which decisions for regulation o f agricultural activities for the protection o f the 
natural environment can be understood. The methodology for the primary research 
conducted during this thesis is described in Chapter Five and in Chapter Six the 
results are presented. The alternative paradigm is validated in Chapter Seven by 
examining the theory in the light of the results. While it is recognised that in social 
science no hard and fast laws of policy-making can be established, some overall 
conclusions can be drawn in terms of the incremental nature o f decision-making for 
conservation, the difference between farmers/landowners and conservationists 
interests, and the competition over the re-allocation o f property rights amongst 
landowners and the public. The implications for future development o f economic 
policies for nature conservation drawn from the above conclusions are presented in 
Chapter Eight, with suggestions for future research.
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The Politics and Economics of 
Nature Conservation
2.1 Introduction to the politics and economics of nature conservation
The principal focus of this thesis is economic policy for the conservation o f nature. In 
particular, the research concentrates on the decision-making process involved in 
developing conservation regulation such as the 1981 Wildlife and Countryside Act 
which requires the designation o f Sites o f Special Scientific Interest (SSSIs). There 
is little formal knowledge of how policy decisions that address environmental issues 
(including conservation o f natural resources) in Britain are made. This thesis 
addresses the context and framework within which financial resources continue to be 
allocated to nature conservation and seeks to identify what or who is the driving force 
behind such policy decisions. Through the examination of marginal changes to the 
contemporary expenditure process it is possible to explore the relation between policy 
and expenditure and vice versa and thus make an attempt to account for continuity 
and change.
Heclo and Wildavsky (1977) propose the determinants of public expenditure to be 
changes o f or within governments, the economic climate (which 'shades into political 
climate' (Heclo and Wildavsky, 1977)), public fashion and the respectability o f the 
subject under consideration. The Political administration is a kind o f political 
community that is united by "ties o f kinship and culture". Private interests are 
included within the community and may also seek to influence from the outside. At 
the
"vortex o f all the confidences, calculations and climatic assessments...stands the 
Treasury... Under standing the expenditure process begins at the Treasury" (Heclo 
and Wildavsky, 1977).
Finances are an integral part of the substance of any policy because departments have 
to prioritise within a given expenditure total though there remains a fairly large and 
formal freedom in expenditure. The Treasury's examination o f the details of 
departments' budgets allows it to oversee general policy direction and it may also
5
"The search fo r  existing policy inevitably becomes entangled in questions o f  
interpreting money sums" (Heclo and Wildavsky, 1977) Heclo and Wildavsky 
continue to explain that,
"the link between expenditure and policy is complex and (largely) covert" (Heclo and 
Wildavsky 1977:pp346-347).
Within this chapter both expenditure and policy for nature conservation are examined 
and the research questions which consequently arise are described in the final section.
A brief account of the rise o f conservation and environmental interests and the 
development o f conservation legislation during the twentieth century is given and is 
discussed in relation to the farming lobby, past and present. This is followed by an 
examination o f contemporary conservation policy, its legislative framework and the 
financial provisions made for nature conservation. The Wildlife and Countryside Act 
o f 1981 is the main piece o f legislation which establishes nature conservation on the 
statute books. The conflict of interests during the debate o f the Wildlife and 
Countryside Bill and the subsequent implementation o f the Act provides the basis for 
the following discussion of the conservation and agricultural lobbies which sought, 
and continue to seek, representation of their interests at the policy-making level.
Existing property rights favour landowning and agricultural interests over and above 
the wider public interest. These include many facets such as protection o f the wider 
environment, conservation of nature, maintenance o f 'traditional' landscapes and rural 
recreation. It is proposed by the author that the conflict between these lobbies 
essentially centres on the view (held mainly by landowners and farmers) that the status 
quo property rights for agriculture should be maintained and the counter view that 
advocates a redistribution of property rights towards the wider public interest for 
environmental reasons. It is also proposed that this conflict has been the major factor 
shaping the construction, direction and extent of nature conservation policy in the 
UK. It is the purpose of this thesis to determine whether this is so and if it will 
continue to do so in the future. From the research undertaken in this study 
implications may be drawn as to the actual process o f decision-making for policy, the 
contemporary issues o f existing policy and the likely direction o f future policy for 
nature conservation with reference to agricultural land use.
choose to affect it by changing expenditure totals.
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2.1.1 Environmental policy
UK environmental policy not only reflects the government's environmental agenda, 
but also wider environmental concerns expressed through EU directives and 
international conventions and agreements. Within this framework nature conservation 
is an important, and to some extent increasing focus o f attention with, for example, 
the development of the international Rio Biodiversity Treaty, the EU Species and 
Elabitats Directive and the 1981 Wildlife and Countryside Act.
In 1990 the UK government produced a White Paper on "Britain's Environmental 
Strategy" entitled 'Our Common Inheritance'. In many respects the broad thrust of 
environmental conservation was encapsulated in the opening quote o f this publication, 
taken from John Stuart Mill's 'Principles of Political Economy':
"Is there not the Earth itself, its forests and waters, above and below the
surface?
These are the inheritance o f the human race...
What rights, under what conditions, a person shall be allowed to exercise 
over any portion o f this common inheritance cannot be left undecided.
No function o f government is less optional than the regulation o f these things, 
or more completely involved in the idea o f a civilised society."
(HMSO,1990:p. 1).
It is clear from the inclusion of Mill's quotation that 'property rights' and 'externalities' 
are essential elements o f environmental policy and it is these issues that form the basis 
o f economic policies for the conservation of nature. Following Mill's introductory 
quote the Government describe their White Paper as looking "at all levels o f  
environmental concern" and emphasise that it is intended to address "what the 
Government has done and proposes to do" with regard to protecting "our common 
[environmental] inheritance" (p.8).
7
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Figure 2.1 above illustrates the increase in government legislation during the period 
1800 to 1994. The passing of laws for nature conservation has gone through a series 
o f phases which have seen the gradual increase in numbers o f laws passed year on 
year. In the 17th and 18th centuries, law focused on the conservation o f game birds 
and wild birds, and the preservation of hares and prevention o f poaching. Between 
1900 and 1930 there were few laws passed and these focused on protection o f birds 
and the National Trust Act. During the period 1930 to 1980 laws dealt with land 
drainage, forestry, hill farming and agriculture. The final and current phase has dealt 
with conservation and enhancement of the natural heritage and a more holistic 
environmental protection.
There has been a steady increase in governmental intervention up to the second world 
war and this was followed by an exponential increase in the 1970s and 1980s. This 
rise over time may be correlated with the rise in UK economic activity. The increase 
in secondary impacts (negative externalities) on the environment is associated with a 
significant increase in production and consumption in the UK. In parallel with this 
there has occurred an expansion o f the affluent middle class who have had the time 
and influence to address environmental and conservation issues. This has manifested 
itself through a significant increase in the membership o f environmental interest 
groups and has provided the source of influence for those groups seeking to protect
1 Source: Reid, C., (1994)
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species and their habitats.
2.2 Rise of conservation interest and legislation for nature conservation
2.2.1 The governmental role
The origins o f the Wildlife and Countryside Act can be traced to the 1940s when the 
threat to the countryside from industrial development had been recognised. The 
Barlow Commission was appointed in 1937 and in 1940 it reported a concern to 
improve living standards and rectify the maldistribution o f industrial development with 
a rigid preservationist approach to the countryside. The Scott Report o f 1942 on 
Land Utilisation in Rural Areas reinforced Barlows recommendations. These reports 
enshrined two fundamental beliefs: i) that a town and country planning system could 
reconcile land ownership and resource exploitation with a well-managed countryside 
for the public good; and, ii) a prosperous farming industry would preserve both the 
rural landscape and rural communities. The result was the 1947 Town and Country 
Planning Act. Despite being one of the world's most comprehensive planning acts it 
accorded farming and forestry a pre-emptive claim over all other uses o f rural land. 
Farming and forestry were made exempt from planning control.
Sir Arthur Hobhouse chaired the committee set up by the Ministry o f Town and 
Country Planning to review the case for and against National Parks, and access to the 
countryside. The campaigns for National Parks and Nature Reserves ran separately 
but parallel during the 1940s and the division was in Hobhouses decision to establish 
two sub-committees: the Wild Life Conservation Special Committee, chaired by J. S. 
Huxley; and the Footpaths and Access sub-committee, chaired by Hobhouse himself. 
The latter committee sought to ensure the development o f the National Parks and was 
in response to the call for amenity and access (Evans, 1992, Chapter Four). The Wild 
Life Conservation Special Committee however, was set up to consider nature 
reserves. Naturalists and conservationists would not 'come together' with the amenity 
lobby and advocated that nature reserves could not prosper in conjunction with public 
access. Huxley's report, published in 1947, outlined the basis upon which present day 
nature conservation is founded.
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The series o f Nature Reserves were to,
"...preserve and maintain...places which can be regarded as reservoirs fo r  the main 
types o f  community and kinds o f plants and animals represented in this country, both 
common and rare, typical and unusual, as well as places which contain physical 
features o f  special or outstanding interest...Considered as a single system, the 
resen’es should comprise as large a sample as possible o f all the many different 
groups o f  living organisms, indigenous or established in this country as part o f  its 
natural flora and fauna"  (Huxley, cited in Evans, 1992:p76).
The Nature Conservancy (NC), established in 1949 as an executive and advisory 
body, was given the responsibility for administering nature reserves. In addition it had 
to notify the local planning authorities of Sites o f Special Scientific Interest (SSSIs) - 
areas apart from the nature reserves of high quality natural or semi-natural flora and 
fauna, or containing rare or endangered species or with key geological or 
physiographical features.
The NC was empowered to own and manage land, establish regional structures and 
conduct research. The result of the NC being established as a separate organisation 
from the planning authorities was that nature conservation became a scientific matter 
to be administered by scientists. The NC could notify the local planning authority of 
the designation o f a Site of Special Scientific Interest and in return the planning 
authority had only to notify the NC before determining a proposal for development 
affecting an SSSI. Landowners and occupiers were not even made aware o f the 
conservation value o f their land, their actions being assumed to be environmentally 
benign.
In 1973 the role o f the NC was split between two organisations. The Nature 
Conservancy Council (NCC) became the new government agency to deal with nature 
reserves and SSSIs and the Institute of Terrestrial Ecology (ITE) took on the research 
role o f the former NC. 1990 marked the further division o f the NCC into three 
country agencies for England, Scotland and Wales. In Scotland the NCC for Scotland 
has been amalgamated with the Countryside Commission for Scotland into a united 
body to deal with scientific and recreational countryside issues. This is known as 
Scottish Natural Heritage (SNH). This amalgamation has also occurred in Wales and 
is currently being proposed for England in order to achieve organisational 
consistency.
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2.2.2 The conservation and environment lobby
Conservation o f nature has evolved over a long period o f time and government has 
sporadically intervened and implemented varying degrees of economic regulation in a 
range o f markets that impact the environment. While it is not the purpose o f this 
thesis to give a history o f nature conservation in Britain it is necessary to identify the 
roots o f the conservation lobby, status quo property rights and governmental 
regulation as a response to the growing awareness o f the secondary impact o f 
economic activity on nature.
The work o f amateur field naturalists in the 16th, 17th and 18th centuries led to the 
development o f modern botany, zoology and other life sciences. For some individuals 
this marked the beginning of a rediscovery o f the place of the human race in nature 
and coupled with the increase in access to transport in the 19th century, made the 
countryside more accessible to the Victorians seeking education, leisure, self- 
improvement and escape from the horrors of urban life.
In the mid-18th century, the wildness of the Lake District became increasingly 
appreciated and an enthusiasm for mountain scenery and its relative desolation was 
growing. Prominent in the movement to protect the landscapes and nature o f the Lake 
District were Ruskin, William Morris, Thomas Carlyle and other contemporary social 
reformers, such as Octavia Hill and Cannon Raunsley who were later to become 
founders o f the National Trust (NT, 1894).2 Natural history societies grew as 
individuals became more interested in the study o f nature and as a result there 
developed an increased interest in the protection of nature. As naturalists learnt more 
about nature they also understood more about the threat to wild plants and animals 
from development, such as railways and increased public access.
The emergence o f nature trusts and conservation groups in the nineteenth century 
marked a shift in the public consciousness o f nature and the countryside, with a 
growing sense o f the vulnerability o f wildlife. The period o f industrialisation was seen 
as threatening and saw the formation of many small groups. The Society for the 
Protection o f Cruelty to Animals (SPCA) was founded in 1824 and given royal 
charter in 1840 (RSPCA). This illustrated a growing recognition o f the kinship o f 
humans and animals and it was from this crusade against cruelty to domestic animals
2 In contrast it is interesting to note that the National Trust for Scotland was established in 1931 by a 
number of Scottish lairds who felt that the National Trust was ignoring Scotland.
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that the movement to protect wildlife followed. Cruelty to animals was seen as an 
expression o f the most primitive and savage elements in human nature and so the 
movement to save wildlife was also seen as preserving the moral fabric o f society. In 
1889 the Society for the Protection of Birds (SPB) was established primarily to resist 
the killing o f wild birds to provide plumage for women's fashions. This was a most 
popular protectionist cause and was very significant in introducing the concept of 
'protection' into natural history. The SPB received royal charter in 1904 (RSPB) and 
was the first major voluntary organisation followed closely by the National Trust 
(NT). The Trust was reformed as a body corporate by Act o f Parliament in 1907 
which enabled it to declare land inalienable, thus safeguarding it in perpetuity. The 
concept o f the Trust had arisen from the worlds first national environmental group, 
The Commons, Open Spaces and Footpaths Preservation Society established in 1865 
which had found that its inability to buy land restricted its battle to save common 
lands. 1913 saw the establishment of the Society for the Promotion o f Nature 
Reserves followed by the British Ecological Society in 1914. It is evident, therefore, 
that landownership and particularly the establishment o f nature reserves were seen to 
be key instruments for nature conservation even at the turn o f the century.
The movement then took on a more political stance as the Council for the 
Preservation (now Protection) o f Rural England (CPRE) was founded (1926). The 
CPRE, a mainly urban based group, was made up o f a small number o f influential 
intellectuals which signalled the emergence of rural preservation as a significant force 
in British politics. By 1936 the Joint Standing Committee for National Parks along 
with the Friends of the Lake District, CPRE and the newly established Ramblers 
Association shared a breadth o f support from the general public.
Therefore, it can be seen that the gradual evolution o f groups developed from a 
number o f rather disparate ethical, aesthetic, scientific and utilitarian interests which 
came together in the "uneasy coalition o f the modern conservation movement" 
(Evans, 1992). The movement began with a middle-class interest in landscape 
followed by the study of natural history, and this evolved to include rural recreation 
and public access, species protection and protection of habitats. Although the 
foundations o f the British conservation movement lie in the period 1860 to 1910 it has 
only become an appreciable political force much more recently.
Cox (1988) identifies 1910 - 1970 as the 'Scientific period'. Naturalists were 
extending their interest from classification of plants and species to interrelationships
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between plants and species. Ecologists were concerned to develop and institutionalise 
their discipline through their involvement with nature conservation and their efforts 
had a major impact on the implementation of policy in the post-war period.
Following growing awareness of the destruction o f wildlife habitats there occurred 
heightened interest in nature conservation in the 1970's. During the period 1967 to 
1980 National Trust membership grew from 159,000 to almost one million. Between 
1971 and 1991 RSPB membership increased from 122,000 to 742,497 as shown in 
Figure 2.2 below.
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Interests were expanding from local to global with an increasing perception that the 
threat to wildlife and countryside were only symptoms of the wider economic and 
social questions that needed to be addressed.
Following the establishment o f Greenpeace in the US in 1969 and Friends o f the Earth 
(FoE) in Canada in 1972 the base of the conservation movement broadened to include 
a new kind o f environmental interest which advocated a more holistic approach to 
environmental protection. This new environmental lobby was characterised as radical 
and very active.
3 Source: D Gordon, pers comm, RSPB, Bedfordshire 1991
13
Today the differences in the approach of environmental groups and conservation 
groups remains though the extremes on the movement continuum are generally 
perceived to be less far apart.
Despite the size and extent o f the conservation movement since the 1970s its 
influence has been limited.
"Perhaps the greatest failing o f environmental groups in the 1970s was their 
inability to translate their massive numerical support into an appreciable political 
force" (Jordan and Richardson, 1987:pl87).
O'Riordan described groups as,
"politically active but only sporadically influential" (O'Riordan, 1979).
There are two main reasons for this lack of influence. The first relates to the 
heterogeneity o f the groups involved in the conservation movement and the variety of 
purposes, sizes and interests. Some groups have particularly specialised interests (for 
example, RSPB) and may have local and/or national offices. There are other groups 
known as preference groups whose members are united by common tastes, attitudes 
or pastimes (for example, the Ramblers Association). Finally, the conservation 
movement also includes 'promotional groups' (for example, Greenpeace) which 
promote causes involving social and/or political reform. Therefore, while 
conservationists and/or environmentalists tend to outwardly be closely associated with 
one another the movement is made up o f diverse and separate organisations pursuing 
a number o f similar and differing goals (Lowe and Goyder, 1983). Although, there 
are umbrella organisations such as the Environment Council and Wildlife and 
Countryside Link (WCL) who liaise and exchange information with other groups, the 
Link organisations tend to provide a network organisation rather than any uniting 
body as groups generally are unwilling to give up their authority to umbrella 
organisations. There is a separate Link organisation in Scotland known as Scottish 
Wildlife and Countryside Link (SWCL) and there is a limited but growing degree of 
liaison between Wildlife and Countryside Link and SWCL.
The second reason for groups 'lack of appreciable political force' is that environmental 
and conservation groups are not seen by the government as being integral to the 
working o f the economy in the same way as the National Farmers Union (NFU). The 
effective groups tend not to be radical or confrontational but more 'conservative' such 
as the National Trust (for Scotland) and the RSPB.
14
As a consequence o f the upswell of public support for environmental and 
conservation pressure groups in the 1980s, the environment has gained a higher 
profile in government legislation. That is not to say however, that this influence has 
yet been reflected in terms o f active environmental protection. It is arguable, 
therefore, that the real political influence o f environmental (and conservation) interest 
groups has resulted in little more than political rhetoric; this proposition is explored 
within the boundary o f this thesis.
2.2.3 The agriculture and landowning lobby
It is evident that the British countryside, as owned and managed by farmers and 
private landowners, has enjoyed and continues to enjoy a position o f particular esteem 
in the eyes o f the general public in the UK.
"The countryside and the rural ethic hold a place in the British psyche that is 
comparable to the position o f forests in Germany or wilderness in the US" 
(McCormick, 1991 :p70).
Cox, Lowe and Winter (1985) identify the 'exceptionalism' that agriculture 
experiences in its exemption from many of the laws that apply to other industries. 
Agriculture is the only industry exempt from paying rates and which has its own 
education system. Subsidy and trade protection for agriculture are proportionately 
greater than for any other industry and Grant argues that,
"all this assistance from the state has been provided without any real reduction in the 
farmer's autonomy in making decisions about the way in which his or her farm  is 
run” (Grant, 1989:pl35).
This 'exceptionalism' is based in the post-war settlement in agriculture established in 
the 1947 Agriculture Act which intended to secure a range o f objectives such as a 
reliable and cheap supply o f domestic food. The main new mechanism introduced in 
the Act was the setting o f guaranteed prices through an annual price review by the 
Ministry o f Agriculture, Fisheries and Food (MAFF) in consultation with the NFU. 
The agricultural policy community remains a relatively closed one which centres on 
the relationship between MAFF and the NFU and occasionally the Countryside 
Landowners Association (CLA).
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" The NFU has... been very sophisticated in its adjustment to changing circumstances. 
It has not clung to existing policies when it is apparent that they no longer command 
political support...Similarly, the NFU has been able to accommodate pressure fo r  
new environmental controls, although it is perhaps the CLA that has been 
remarkable fo r  its preparedness to countenance a major re-think o f the system o f  
agricultural support to achieve rural policies o f greater economic, environmental 
and political sustainability” (Cox, 1988).
"It should be noted, however, that the CLA's proposals seek to preserve 
'exceptionalism' by continuing to exclude planning controls over agricultural 
operations" (Grant, 1989:p 139).
In contrast to the wide ranging and disparate nature o f the conservation movement 
the farming lobby is essentially characterised by one organisation - the National 
Farmers Union (NFU) which was founded in 1908. Despite the apparent increase in 
influence o f the conservation lobby the NFU is still in an influential and privileged 
position today. There exists a close and continuous relationship between NFU, the 
CLA and MAFF. The NFU has been seen to be o f central importance to government 
and the performance o f the economy and the government has sought to engage its co­
operation in administering agriculture policy. Agriculture and landowning groups 
tend to be involved at the pre-public stage o f policy formulation, unlike conservation 
groups which often means an uphill struggle for them at a later stage. By the mid- 
1980s the NFU was one o f Britain's most powerful and efficient interest groups. With 
over 80% of British farmers being members it is considered to be more o f a trade 
union than an interest group. Furthermore, the influence o f the NFU has remained 
independent o f political parties enjoying a privileged and insider position with all post 
war governments.
In Scotland similar relationships exist between the sister organisations, the National 
Farmers Union for Scotland (NFUS), the Scottish Landowners Federation (SLF) and 
the Scottish Office Agriculture and Fisheries Department (SOAFD). This is not well 
documented in published literature and the relationships within the agri-conservation 
policy community in Scotland and across policy communities in England and Scotland 
will be examined in the research o f this thesis.
During the 1980s the NFU and CLA have emphasised the positive conservation 
measures o f their members rather than questioning the statistics on habitat 
destruction. Cox (1988) argues that the farming and landowning lobbies retained 
much ground in the Wildlife and Countryside Act 1981. The lobby established the
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choice o f 'a once and for all' or 'annual' compensation payments which has 
considerable implications for the public costs o f conservation. The lobby also 
established a three month period where owners could inform the NCC o f their 
intention to carry out a Potentially Damaging Operation (PDO). The basis o f the 
1981 legislation was still voluntary.
The Farming and Wildlife Advisory Group (FWAG) was set up in 1969 by MAFF, 
NFU, the Royal Society for Nature Conservation (RSNC) and the RSPB to promote 
a bridge between farming and conservation through regular conferences. This defined 
a moderate middle ground and gave more influence to the establishment oriented and 
more conservative conservation groups (e.g. RSPB and RSNC), while marginalising 
the more radical groups which had pressed for agriculture policy reform such as the 
Ramblers Association and CPRE. Contemporary membership o f FWAG continues to 
be o f the relatively conservative pressure groups.
The future influence o f the farming lobby is less certain than its past influence for a 
number o f reasons. European Union membership and the sectoralisation o f farming 
interests has provided the scope for potential future sub-factions being wooed by 
conservation groups (for example, crofters and hill farmers). There is also a new 
climate o f public opinion since 1981 which is more supportive o f a rational 
countryside policy. This change has come about because o f the increasing costs o f 
CAP; the success o f the conservation lobby in highlighting the changes occurring in 
the countryside; the increase o f populations in rural areas mainly because o f improved 
transport and communications linkages; and also because o f public health scares over 
food production. An example of the latter is egg production and salmonella infection, 
and Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE or mad cows disease). This has 
contributed to a general fall in public faith in farmers and farming. MAFF set up an 
Environment Co-ordinating Unit in 1984 and started to review the activities to which 
it may grant financial aid. This was described by Evans as more like "subtle foot- 
shuffling" (Evans, 1992:pl92) due to changing circumstances than any about turn by 
MAFF. However, despite this widespread fall in public support, financial assistance 
to agriculture continues and looks set to continue in some form or another. One 
particularly representative example o f the entrenchment o f agricultural interests over 
and above other interests illustrated is the debate over nature conservation, and more 
precisely the debate over and implementation o f the Wildlife and Countryside Act 
(1981) which is discussed in more detail in sections 2.3 - 2.6.
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Cox et al (1985) found MAFF to be the least accessible and most unreceptive 
government department to environmental groups.
"The [agriculture] policy community has remained closed to environmental interests, 
who have not been given consultative status. MAFF has responded to changes in 
public opinion with a combination o f apparent disregard and studied gradualism, 
consistently working to affirm the existing order, defending meanwhile its distinctive 
administrative territory" (NCC, 1986b:p 193).
In addition to MAFFs apparent 'disregard o f environmental interests' Cox points out 
that,
"the farming lobby has sought strenuously to maintain the integrity o f  the 
agricultural policy community by expanding the range o f issues covered by 
establishedcorporatist arrangements" (Cox, 1988:p336) 4
This supports the view o f the operation of FWAG "as an informal and consen’ation- 
minded version o f ADAS" (NCC, 1986b:pl99).
Traditionally the unity o f the farming lobby has generally left little scope for the 
effective deployment o f coalition tactics by conservation groups. However, this unity 
has been placed under considerable strain from a number o f quarters and this has 
helped to create a political space for conservationists. The increased specialisation 
following EU membership has had a profound impact on the NFUs internal politics 
('horn' (livestock) versus 'corn' (arable); the CAP system has favoured arable). 
Establishment o f FWAG is a good example of a coalition or bridging o f interests but 
even this has been confined to the middle ground o f conservation interests and has not 
expanded into wider environmental concerns of agricultural activities.
2.2.4 The conservation and farming lobbies in competition
The above discussion o f the conservation and the farming lobbies allows an 
assessment to be made o f the existing political market place. There is a notable 
distinction between the private interest (farming) group and the public interest 
(environmental or conservation) group. The former seek to advance the well being of 
their own members (trade unions and professional associations) and the latter appear 
more altruistic in motivation and aim to improve the collective condition o f society. 
O'Riordan (1979) identifies a middle ground lying between the two poles which is the
4 'Corporatist arrangements' mean pressure groups are involved in the making of economic policy 
and its implementation (Prentice, n.d.).
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group which organises to stop a development (road, airport etc.) which is seen as a 
threat to the general amenity o f its surroundings and to future property values. 
Motivation is likely to be made up of a combination o f selfish interest and a wider 
interest in environmental preservation.
Given that there is such a wide range o f groups in terms o f interest, size and influence 
this would suggest a great deal of competition. However, the 'exceptionalism' o f the 
farming lobby and disparity o f the environment and conservation lobbies suggests that
"as in economics 'perfect competition' [in the political market] rarely exists except in 
theory. In practice we have, at best, an oligopolistic situation and at worst a 
monopolistic situation. In other words groups attempt to manipulate the market in 
their favour. But they rarely succeed in achieving total control o f the market (or 
policy area) fo r  very long" (Richardson and Jordan, 1979:pl3 cited in Grant, 
1989:p26).
The rising influence of the environment and conservation lobby in the 1980ssuggests 
the influence o f agriculture interests of the political market is threatened and what 
may come in its place is a form of oligopoly in which a few key groups dominate the 
policy communities around government departments (MAFF and DoE). Although 
most groups enjoy reasonable access to the DoE, its participation in environmental 
matters does not equal MAFFs participation in agriculture. The two policy 
communities differ in a way which is generally beneficial to farming interests.
"The policy community fo r  rural conservation is characterised as large, diverse and 
pluralistic; that fo r  agriculture as small, tightly-knit and corporatist" (Cox, Lowe 
and Winter, 1986:pl6).
Outwardly it appears that the farming lobby has had to give some ground to the 
environmentalists. In practice, however, it has been able to ensure that a particular 
view o f environmental protection based on compensation for property rights has 
predominated. Despite the importance of the question o f interest group effectiveness 
it is probably the least adequately researched aspect o f the study o f pressure groups. 
The principal reason for this is the methodological problems which arise. There are 
no adequate means o f measuring power, influence and effectiveness.
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A further important point to note is that,
"The flaw  in the pluralist heaven is that the heavenly chorus sings with a strong 
upper-class accent" (Schattschneider, 1960 cited in Heclo and wildavsky, 1977:p35).
The dominance in policy communities o f upper income groups in farming, landowning 
and environmental and conservation groups, results in an active political elite 
representing the interests o f a wider societal base. Both the 'uncompetitiveness' o f the 
political market and within this, the dominance o f certain income groups are explored 
in this research. It is the purpose o f this thesis to offer an illustration o f the nature o f 
relationships in the political arena of nature conservation policy-making. A more 
detailed account o f how pressure groups actually influence the political agenda can be 
found in Grant (1989).
2.2.5 EU as a lobbying force
The influence o f the EU on UK policy-making is undoubtedly significant, particularly 
the impact o f the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) on UK agriculture and nature 
conservation. However, in order to analyse the competition of interests in the UK 
nature conservation policy-making process, the influence o f the EU can broadly be 
encapsulated by representing it as a powerful 'lobbying' organisation.5
The following discussion focuses not so much on the level o f the negative externalities 
arising from modern agriculture, but on the extent and nature o f government 
intervention to mitigate such externalities.
2.3 Regulation for nature conservation: the Wildlife and Countryside Act 1981
The essence and body of regulation for nature conservation in the UK lies in the 
Wildlife and Countryside Act (1981). Initially proposed in Parliament to meet an EU 
Directive on Wild Birds in 1979, the Wildlife and Countryside Act was passed 
following many debates and amendments. It was initially drafted in consultation with 
the farming lobby (Evans, 1992) and subsequently the government conservation 
agency (the NCC), and finally, the conservation interest groups became involved. The 
following section describes the actual mechanisms o f the bill: biological selection;
5 The existing and future influence of the EU, not just in policy-making but also enforcement, is an 
important and interesting area of study and would constitute an ideal follow-up research programme.
20
management agreements; and nature conservation orders. This is followed by a more 
detailed discussion o f the debate during the passing of the Act and its implementation.
Conservationists campaigned from the 1960s for increased protection o f the 
countryside from modern farming methods, methods which have been induced by the 
Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) of the European Union (EU). The CAP has 
encouraged farmers to 'improve' their land at what has been perceived by 
conservationists, and more recently the general public, as a great cost to the natural 
heritage o f Britain's countryside. Recognition o f the damage inflicted, and protection 
demanded by conservationists, finally came in the form o f the Wildlife and 
Countryside Act, a strengthening of earlier legislation (1947 Town and Countryside 
Planning Act) which set up the principle o f SSSIs but had failed to stop their damage 
and destruction.
The passing o f this bill aroused extensive conflict between farming and conservation 
interests. Conflict was essentially stimulated by the major difference o f the Bill to its 
predecessor (1947) which was the addition o f a requirement o f the statutory agency 
to notify not only the planning authority and the Secretary of State, but also every 
owner and occupier o f land of all sites that they intended to designate. The 
subsequent designations o f SSSIs were seen to threaten landowners freedom to make 
decisions over their own land and their previous presumptive entitlement as 'stewards 
o f the countryside'.
The most recent piece o f environmental legislation was the Environment Protection 
Act, 1990 which essentially addressed pollution matters. However, there was a 
section in this Act which made legislative provisions for the re-organisation o f the 
NCC into three individual agencies for England, Scotland and Wales. This 
reorganisation was criticised for its lack of forethought or consultation with 
conservation interests and for the hidden agenda which many conservation 
organisations believed was set to meet landowning interests. Conservationists 
perceived the reorganisation as a bid to weaken the conservation movement. The 
reorganisation of the NCC is discussed in more detail in subsequent sections. First, 
the procedures and costs associated with the NCC and SSSIs are described in sections
2.3.1 - 2.3.3.
21
2.3.1 Selection of biological reserves
The NCCs main function was to notify planning authorities o f any "area o f land 
[which] is o f special interest by reason o f any o f its flora, fauna, or geological or 
physiographicalfeatures" (Wildlife and Countryside Act, 1981), to be known as Sites 
o f Special Scientific Interest (SSSIs), in order that they may be aware o f the sites 
natural value when considering planning permission for a development.
The Guidelines for Selection o f Biological SSSIs (NCC, 1989b:p71) describe the 
general principles from which the evaluation and selection procedure has developed.
"The primary objective o f  nature conservation is to ensure that the national heritage 
o f wild flora and fauna and geological and physiographical features remains as 
large and diverse as possible, so that society may use and appreciate its value to the 
fullest extent" (NCC, 1984b:para 15.1). "Site safeguard, that is the protection and 
management o f  the most important areas fo r  wild flora and fauna and their habitat, 
is regarded as the cornerstone o f conservation practice and within this, SSSI 
notification is now the principal statutory means o f achieving this goal" (NCC 
1989b:p7).
"The biological SSSI series is intended to form a national network o f  areas 
representing in total those parts o f Great Britain in which the features o f  nature, and 
especially those o f  greatest value to wildlife conservation, are most highly 
concentrated or o f  highest quality... Each site represents a significant fragment o f  
the much-depleted resource o f wild nature now remaining in this country...The 
ecological interdependence o f the SSSIs and the wider environment is crucial and 
while designation necessitates drawing clear boundaries, it is important to integrate 
as fa r  as possible the conservation measures fo r  both elements in a total 
approach... [to ensure the] survival o f a necessary minimum "(NCC, 1989b:para
15.2.3).
The NCC suggest that while there is no overall target area,
"the total extent o f SSSI land will r e f  ect the consistent application o f  these 
principles, selection procedures and standards countrywide" (NCC, 1989b:para
15.2.4).
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Presently, about seven per cent of Great Britain is designated as SSSI. The extent o f 
SSSI designated land varies geographically according to the broad regional 
differences in the extent of natural and semi-natural features. The present range is 
from 22% in Orkney to 0.2% in West Yorkshire. Furthermore the,
'"Special Interest' in the features o f nature is not fixed in time. It is a combination o f  
the intrinsic attributes o f  nature and the values that people place upon these; and 
both o f  these parameters are prone to change in time. Particular examples o f  
habitats may lose value through deterioration, but the type in general may become 
more important through its increasing rarity. Some species may become more 
common and less threatened, whilst other decline and assume increased value. The 
numbers o f  people interested in a particular feature o f  nature may also increase or 
decrease, or their interests show a shift in perspective, so that the kind and weight o f  
public interest are also subject to change" (NCC, 1989b:para 2.6).
In the rationale, selection o f sites with 'special scientific interest' is described as "a 
matter o f informed best judgements rather than rigid application o f  objective 
rules"(NCC, 1989b:para 2.6).
While the guidelines are based on scientific judgement the above quotes display a 
degree o f flexibility over time and with respect to public values.
A comprehensive list o f Potentially Damaging Operations (PDOs) is given to every 
landowner on notification o f a site. This procedure has been amended to include only 
relevant activities for each site following difficulties arising from such a 
comprehensive list o f PDOs. Should the landowner wish to carry out a listed 
operation he/she has to inform the statutory agency and if they do not receive a reply 
from the NCC within four months they may go-ahead with the potentially damaging 
operation. However, what is more usual is for the NCC to consider the proposal and 
either give the landowner the go-ahead if the operation is considered benign or initiate 
negotiation o f a management agreement in which the landowner alters his/her 
proposed development or refrains altogether. The landowner may receive 
compensation for profits lost as a result of the restricted activity.
Section 15 o f the Countryside Act 1968 is the principal means by which management 
agreements are provided. Although it was available in 1968 only 12 low cost 
voluntary agreements had been negotiated in Scotland by this means prior to the 
changed status of SSSIs under the 1981 Act. The principal land use changes 
proposed have been agricultural (62%), and afforestation or woodland management 
(28%). The remainder were mainly mineral extraction for agricultural reasons.
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If the NCC failed to negotiate a voluntary agreement with a landowner on an SSSI 
they could appeal to the Secretary o f State for a Nature Conservation Order (NCO). 
A conservation order may be sought only
"for the purpose o f securing the survival o f particular kinds o f  plant or animal, 
complying with an international obligation or o f conserving species or features o f  
national importance" (Wildlife and Countryside Act, 1981).
Not all SSSIs are o f this standing and therefore the Secretary o f State may refuse to 
make an order which has been the usual result. The NCCs last opportunity to save a 
reserve is through compulsory purchase. This power has been used only in extreme 
cases and for the first time in 1990 to save part of the Westhay M oor SSSI in 
Somerset. In short therefore, protection o f SSSIs is generally secured through 
individual, voluntary management agreements with landowners and occupiers and it is 
the compensation of such individuals which comprises the single largest element of 
NCC costs.
2.3.2 The financial commitment
Following the passing o f the Wildlife and Countryside Act 1981 and the growing 
acceptance o f the place o f nature conservation within government policy-making there 
has been a real increase in the grant-in-aid commitment by government to the NCC.6 
This is reflected in Figure 2.3 which illustrates the increase in Grant-in-aid in real 
terms to the NCC since its inception in 1973 to its concluding financial year, 1990/91.
6 Since 1990 the NCC has been known as English Nature, Countryside Council for Wales and 
Scottish Natural Heritage.
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Figure 2.3 Grant-in-aid to the Nature Conservancy Council 19907
Year
As well as selecting and notifying sites considered o f special scientific importance the 
NCC also advised the government and others on matters affecting nature 
conservation, disseminated knowledge about nature conservation and supported and 
commissioned research.
Grant-in-aid to the NCC increased by over 200% in real terms since its inception in 
1973 and most o f this increase has occurred since 1984 when effective demand for 
management agreements increased. Before describing the system o f management 
agreements, it is necessary first to outline the system o f resource allocation to the 
NCC to illustrate the main determinants o f grant-in-aid.
Most NCC income was received as grant-in-aid from the Department o f the 
Environment (DoE) and a small amount of additional income came from bequests and 
receipts. Each year the agency prepared a corporate plan with details and costings for 
its preferred programme over the subsequent three years. It was then submitted to 
the DoE in the following spring, at the beginning of the annual Public Expenditure 
Survey (PES). The agency's resource requirements were assessed as part o f the PES, 
in which Departments prepare expenditure plans for discussion with the Treasury. 
The PES culminates in the Chancellor's Autumn Statement, when the government 
reveals its spending plans for the coming financial year.
7Source: NCC Annual Reports 1974 - 1991 Adjusted for inflation to 1990 prices.
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It is at this point that the DoE will inform each o f its grant aided bodies, how much 
they have been allocated for the forthcoming financial year, together with guideline 
planning estimates for the following two years. Following this both the DoE and the 
conservation agencies prepare the Main Estimates which are the detailed breakdown 
of expenditure in the next year. The estimates are submitted to the Treasury for 
laying before Parliament, usually in early March. Therefore, from the rapid increase in 
grant-in-aid during the 1980s rising in parallel with increasing demand for 
management agreements it would appear that the NCC grant-in-aid from the DoE was 
more or less demand-led from the NCC by submitting expenditure plans. From this it 
may be hypothesised that the main determinants of expenditure are associated with the 
implementation o f the Act. However, the issue is not clear cut and the reverse may 
also be argued that the budget allocation itself determined the extent o f nature 
conservation designations (Spash and Simpson, 1994). This is a complex question 
and will be addressed in more detail later in the thesis.
Following reorganisation o f the NCC the Secretary of State for the Environment is no 
longer responsible for grant-in-aid for the whole o f the UK but only the new agency in 
England: English Nature. The Secretaries o f State for Wales and Scotland are 
responsible to their respective country agencies for provision o f grant-in-aid. The 
same Public Expenditure Survey system operates.
To put the NCC grant-in-aid in the wider context of total DoE expenditure, the 
1990/91 grant-in-aid to the NCC of £45.8m was taken from the £ l l l m  budget for 
Countryside, Recreation and Environment. This was approximately 3.3% o f the total 
central government expenditure o f £l,394m by the DoE in the financial year 1990/91. 
The largest DoE expenditures are on housing and planning, local government and 
inner cities. In addition, the DoE funds Her Majesty's Inspectorate o f Pollution, the 
National Rivers Authority, the Building Research Establishment, the Historic Royal 
Palaces Agency, the Planning Inspectorate, and the Heritage and Royal Estate.
The 1990/91 Countryside, Recreation and Environment budget o f £ l l l m  included 
expenditure on the Countryside Commission, National Parks and the Broads, the 
Nature Conservancy Council, the Rural Development Commission and International 
Subscriptions, which is aimed to:
"create a framework which will protect and enhance the beauty and diversity o f the 
countryside and conserve its wildlife, while also encouraging the growth o f a healthy 
rural economy" (DoE, 1991 :p29).
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The following Table (Table 2.1) illustrates the breakdown of the NCCs expenditure 
over the three year period 1988 to 1991. Site safeguarding amounted to 
approximately one half o f the annual expenditure and only eight per cent was spent on 
the wider environment.
Table 2.1 Nature Conservancy Council expenditure by function 8
Area of expenditure Expenditure (£m)
1988-89 1989-90 1990-91
Site safeguarding 22.1 22.9 23.0
(55%) (56%) (50%)
Conservation in the 2.9 2.6 3.7
wider environment (7%) (6%) (8%)
Science base 8.8 9.1 10.1
(22%) (22%) (22%)
Publicity and 2.4 2.3 2.3
Education (6%) (6%) (5%)
Development and 1.4 0.9 1.9
Project Grants (3%) (2%) (4%)
Other 2.8 3.3 3.8
(7%) (8%) (8%)
Reorganisation - - 1.0
(3%)
Total 40.4 41.1 45.8
8Source: DoE Annual Report 1991: p35
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2.3.3 Area designated
The areas designated by the NCC as National Nature Reserves (NNRs) and Sites of 
Special Scientific Interest (SSSIs) have risen steadily over the period 1975 - 1991 and 
1981 - 1991 respectively. This is shown in Figures 2.4 and 2.5.
Figure 2.4 Increase in the number of nature reserves 1975 - 19919
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9 Source: NCC Annual Reports 1975 - 1991
10 Source: NCC Annual Reports 1981 - 1991
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Table 2.2 Distribution o f the area of SSSI designation in Scotland11
Local Authority Region Percentage of Region
Borders 5%
Central 7%











There are currently 1,350 SSSIs in Scotland (10% of the land area) and about 5,000 
in Britain (6% of the land area, i.e. 1,721,502 Ha). In Scotland, the designated area 
involves 8,365 owners and occupiers, over 816,596 Ha. Table 2.2 shows that there is 
not a uniform geographical distribution o f nature conservation interest. The 
proportion o f land designated SSSI varies from 4 per cent in Lothian, to 22 per cent 
in Orkney. The high concentration of designations in some areas has lead to 
confrontations between the local landowning and farming community and the NCC.
The approach to nature conservation up to the Wildlife and Countryside Act 1981 had 
been essentially negative and defensive, aiming to stop intrusive development, with 
little positive management or forms o f development considered appropriate. This 
approach to conservation did not essentially change after 1981. Although the 1981 
legislation on SSSIs gave the NCC widely extended powers, the basic philosophy 
remained that the future o f the countryside
"lies in the natural fee l fo r  it possessed by those who live and work in it" (Wildlife 
and Countryside Act, 1981).
11 Source: S Ward, pers comm, SNH, 1992
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2.4 Debate over the Wildlife and Countryside Act 1981
The points o f contention at the macro political level during the debate o f the Bill 
illustrate not only the resistance o f the agriculture lobby to regulation o f their 
members activities but also the divergence o f interests over land use and conservation 
and hence the essential differences between agriculture and conservation interests.
The real debate began when the conservation lobby sought increased protection via 
notification o f Potentially Damaging Operations (PDOs). The conservation lobby 
pushed for the statutory requirement for prior notice to be submitted by landowners 
and occupiers o f all deleterious change for all SSSIs designated and not just those 
particularly special sites agreed to by ministers. It was felt by the NCC that prior 
notification o f all sites would threaten existing goodwill among landowners and 
occupiers and would also result in an unacceptable burden on NCC staff. The 
agricultural and landowning lobbies reacted to prior notification by tabling 
amendments which required NCC not only to renotify all SSSIs but also to pay 
compensation where farming activities were consequently restricted. Parliament 
accepted these amendments which radically changed the role o f the NCC.
2.5 Implementation of the Wildlife and Countryside Act 1981
2.5.1 Local confrontations
This system o f serving formal notice with a long list o f damaging operations which 
varied in degrees of relevance, was perceived as confrontational and led to 
widespread and prolonged criticism o f the NCC for its implementation o f the Act. 
The impersonal nature o f the actual letters sent to farmers also caused offence. 
Critics have suggested the NCC ought to have consulted each owner or occupier first 
to discuss their proposals and as a result draw up a shortlist o f likely potential 
damaging operations before serving formal notice. If  Scotland had been legislated for 
separately it would have had a very different Wildlife Act because agriculture is the 
predominant land use and activity, with a higher and more extensive nature 
conservation value (J Morton Boyd, ex-NCC, pers comm, June 1993). As a result of 
agriculture's predominance almost every agricultural practice could be considered 
'damaging'. MacKay (ex-SOAFD, pers comm, 1993) draws on two other issues 
which exacerbated agricultural-conservation conflict. The first o f these was the term 
'consent', used when the NCC were allowing a landowner or occupier to proceed with
30
an activity, which conveyed a sense o f superiority.
The second was the 'necessary cultural rapport' which many NCC officers lacked 
when dealing with the highland and island communities
Orkney, an area already noted in Table 2.2 for its extensive system o f SSSIs, had 
particularly damaging confrontations between the local farming populations and the 
NCC, which reached their peak in 1984. Feelings rose so high that at one point two 
effigies o f the leading NCC figures responsible for notifications in Orkney were 
mounted in public places. One particular case of commercial peat extraction attracted 
substantial controversy and ill-feeling. The general essence o f the discord was the 
threat felt by local island farmers to their freedom in making choices over their land 
use activities by what appeared to be an unaccountable body with little, if any, local 
knowledge.
The focus o f the NCC in the latter half of the 1980s was the afforestation o f the Flow 
Country in Caithness and Sutherland which was described by the NCC, as the "most 
important nature conservation issue in the last 30years" (NCC, 1987).
These confrontations attracted a great deal o f media coverage and publicly 
undermined SSSIs as a system o f conservation in Scotland. Decisions for nature 
conservation in Scotland were still being made by the chief NCC scientists at the NCC 
headquarters, Peterborough, England. Widespread sentiment was that as a result of 
the political and geographical distance of the chief scientists from the focal points o f 
contention, conflicts in Scotland were not being dealt with in a sensitive manner.
The final public SSSI controversy before the re-organisation o f the NCC was that of 
John Cameron on the Glen Lochay Estate in Strathclyde. Cameron submitted an 
application for a forestry grant with respect to 640 hectares o f which only a part was 
SSSI. The application was widely opposed on scenic and nature conservation 
grounds. The Forestry Commission refused the grant for nature conservation reasons 
and thus the NCC were essentially liable for the loss o f profits over the whole 
proposed development. The NCC argued that they were only responsible for the 
SSSI section and conflict intensified between John Cameron and the NCC. The Land 
Tribunal awarded Mr Cameron £500,000 in compensation, which following interest 
and expenses meant a payment by the NCC of approximately £lm . The main issue to 
arise from this case was the fear that public funds were being used to compensate 
landowners as a result o f pre-emptive action. In other words, claims for
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compensation for lost grant payable were being made by the agriculture and forestry 
sectors when there may have been no intention to carry out the operations at all. This 
loophole was closed in 1989 following a ministerial decision that the forestry grant 
element would be excluded from the calculation o f compensation in management 
agreements. However, compensation for lost agriculture subsidy continues.
"The British people, through their government, were subsidising conservation fo r  the 
first time in its history. The real problem was not the fact that conservation had to 
pay its way but that the official government body was so severely limited in what it 
could do by lack o f funds. By fa r  the lions share o f  any compensation payments 
would go to the farming and forestry communities. Yet, while the Ministry o f  
Agriculture Improvement Grant in 1978 ran to £540m, the total budget from  which 
the NCC had to fund  all its work was £7m" (Evans, 1992:p 189).
Furthermore, despite the mandatory system of PDO notification and compensation 
damage to SSSIs has continued. Of the 1,721,502 hectares o f SSSI in Great Britain, 
1.63 per cent (28,01 lH a covering 48 sites) has suffered damage from agricultural 
activities and 2.1 per cent (36,164Ha covering 149 sites) from other activities.12 13 14
In Scotland agricultural damage in 1992 was approximately 14 per cent o f the total 
damage in Scotland. The 1992 figure covers 21 SSSIs over 2,852 hectares from a 
total o f 816,596.15
Local conflict, the high cost and continuing damage led to two attempts for reform. 
The first was an all-party House of Commons Environment Committee which 
reported recommendations for the amendment o f the 1981 Act in June 1985. Nine of 
the total eighteen recommendations related to agriculture.
They proposed that,
" consen>ation be given comparable status with food  production and that the Ministry 
o f Agriculture should act accordingly when awarding grants" (Evans, 1992:pl 89).
12 Source: NCC (1991)
13 'Other activities' included: forestry, activities given planning permission, activities of statutory 
undertakers and other public bodies not included in the above categories, recreational activities, 
insufficient management and miscellaneous (including pollution, unauthorised tipping and burning).
14 1989/90 was the only financial year in which a site was lost which means that the damage caused 
results in the loss of the special interest and the site will be denotified. Figures include 'long term 
damage' which means lasting damage to the special interest, 'short term damage' in which the special 
interest could recover and 'partial damage' in which the damage will result in the denotification of 
part of an SSSI.
15 Figures include sites notified under the 1949 National Parks and Access to the Countryside Act 
and not yet renotified. Source: S Ward, pers comm, SNH, 1992
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The second proposed reform was a Private Members Bill later that year which sought 
to strengthen the legislation. However, it met strong opposition from landowning 
interests and the amendment finally enacted in August 1985 did little but give the 
NCC an extra month (from 3 months to 4) to respond to PDO intentions. The Act 
also closed the three month loophole between the NCC informing the landowner o f 
the intention to designate and actually designating. During this period the site had 
been afforded no legal protection but following reform the site was protected from the 
outset.
2.5.2 Management agreements
Figure 2.6 Number of management agreements16
Figure 2.6 illustrates the increase in the number of management agreements during the 
period 1979 to 1990. The demand for management agreements became evident in 
1984 and has continued to increase at a slower rate. The area under agreement in 
Scotland increased from less than 5,000 Hectares in 1979 to over 40,000 Hectares in 
1990. The main reasons behind proposals for changes in land use were found to be 
agriculture and forestry policy, internal changes within the farm or holding and the 
influence o f the Wildlife and Countryside Act (Livingstone, Rowan-Robinson and 
Cunningham, 1990). Figure 2.7 below shows the substantial increase in cost of 
management agreements towards the latter half of the 1980s.
16 Source: NCC Annual Reports 1979-1990
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Figure 2.7 Cost of management agreements 1979 - 199117
Y ear
Although publicity has concentrated on a few large compensation payments (e.g. Glen 
Lochay), the majority o f settlements have been less than £10,000 including annual or 
lump sum payments.
Media coverage o f SSSIs focused on local conflict in the early part o f the 1980s and 
continuing damage to SSSIs and costly management agreements in the latter half of 
the 1980s. On the whole SSSIs were seen in a negative light, not just by the farming 
community who viewed then as intrusive and potentially devaluing their land but also 
by conservationists themselves who felt that their legal protection was bottomless and 
while SSSIs themselves were necessary they were not sufficient. The policy 
mechanisms failed to address the conservation issues o f the wider countryside. The 
farming lobby openly felt the system to be regulatory and legalistic while 
conservationists generally saw the system as dependent upon voluntary management 
agreements too weak and lacking in legal fibre.
17 Source: NCC Annual Reports figures adjusted for inflation to 1990 prices
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2.6 Reorganisation of the NCC: 1990
On the 11th July 1989 an unexpected announcement was made by Nicholas Ridley, 
the then Environment Minister, to the effect that due to inefficiency and insensitivity 
in the NCC organisation it would be split into three separate country agencies for 
England, Scotland and Wales. Essentially it appeared to be the high costs o f 
management agreements which induced Ridley's inquiry and subsequent decision to 
make Scotland responsible for the costs o f its own nature conservation. This 
occurred despite the fact that the sites had been designated on the basis o f a scientific 
rationale which itself was founded on the ecological continuum of Great Britain. 
Despite criticism o f the government for its apparent lack of commitment to nature 
conservation and political mishandling o f the announcement, the reception from Wales 
and Scotland was mixed - generally approving of the plans for devolution but wary o f 
the governments reasons.
Criticisms were centred on the organisational fragmentation o f nature conservation 
and the resulting implications this could have for the agencies supporting a 
satisfactory science base. In addition the ability to be able to maintain the ecological 
continuum and to follow consistent standards with respect to British and international 
conservation issues came under question.
There were calls for the establishment of a co-ordinating body for the three agencies 
to co-ordinate the science base and international matters. The proposed body, the 
Joint Nature Conservation Committee (JNCC) was subsequently established and is 
funded by the three individual agencies for England, Scotland and Wales.
Following Royal Assent of the Environment Protection Bill in 1990, the Natural 
Heritage (Scotland) Bill was introduced which amalgamated the new Scottish NCC 
with the Countryside Commission for Scotland in order to make a new agency which 
would take account o f a wider range o f conservation interests. The new agency, 
Scottish Natural Heritage (SNH) has a significantly broader remit in contrast to the 
narrow scientific remit o f the NCC. This includes nature conservation and enjoyment 
o f Scotland's natural heritage. Devolution of decisions was taken not only to the 
Scottish level but also to four regions within Scotland; South West, South East, North 
West and North East. The legislative provisions which SNH gained for management 
agreements were much broader than those which were available to the NCC. Under 
the NCC, management agreements had been restricted to land designated SSSI or
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land adjacent to an SSSI but following the reorganisation SNH could enter 
management agreements on any land. This meant that SNH, as the awarding agency, 
had significantly increased flexibility (SOEnD, 1993, Annex One: Schedule 10).
2.6.1 Debate over the Natural Heritage (Scotland) Act 1991
The initial provisions o f the Act were the subject o f a number o f proposed 
amendments which were strongly influenced by a sub-committee chaired by Field 
Marshal Lord Carver, o f the House o f Lords Select Committee on Science and 
Technology.
In January 1991 the main and most controversial amendment, described by Simon 
Pepper (WWF) as a "parliamentary botch-up" (Focal Point, BBC1) was introduced 
during the Lord's passage o f the Bill by Lord Pearson of Rannoch. This amendment 
would have required a statutory review by SNH of all 1,350 Scottish SSSIs and the 
introduction o f a mechanism to enable a non-scientific appeal against SSSI 
notification. Its aim, according to Lady Saltoun of Abernethy, was to take account o f 
local community's interests in decisions. Robert MacLennan of the Liberal Democrats, 
in support, highlighted the problem of large tracts o f Northern Scotland being 
designated as SSSI stopping development without regard for the social and economic 
consequences.
The debate led to Brian Wilson, Labour's rural affairs spokesman describing the Lords 
as a
"self-interested gaggle o f Scottish landowners" ('Sites of Special Parliamentary 
Interest', Scotsman, 1991).
Counter to the perceived landowning interests, representatives of the NCC declared 
that the system o f review and appeals would be "catastrophic" and would set SNH 
back 5 years. The RSPB pointed out that since 95 per cent o f SSSIs underwent a full 
review following the 1981 Wildlife and Countryside Act with boundaries being 
checked and some altered, that a further review would turn the clock back 10 years 
and waste millions o f pounds of taxpayers' money. Albery Manning, Chairman of 
Scottish Wildlife Trust (SWT), criticised the process of appeal suggested by Pearson 
as, "top hea\y, wasteful and costly" in a discussion with David Wright (Radio 4, 
1991, 20th February).
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Alternative appeals procedures were proposed, such as that by Lady Saltoun and the 
National Farmers Union who called for an appeals procedure against any new 
designations. Patrick Gordon Duff Pennington, ex-convenor o f the Scottish 
Landowners Federation, suggested making the 5 per cent o f sites still waiting for 
notification from the 1981 Act, subject to some kind o f appeal.
The controversial decision to set up an appeals procedure when designating new 
SSSIs was backed by the Lords with a majority of 152 votes to 6 on the 6th June 
1991 despite fierce opposition from the conservation lobby and opposition MPs. The 
Scottish Office minister, Lord Strathclyde, in a bid to achieve a compromise between 
peers and the environment lobby, convinced peers of the benefits o f the clause to set 
up an independent advisory committee appointed by the Scottish Secretary, Ian Lang. 
Its puropse was to review the scientific importance of new sites only in the last resort 
and not to "secondguess SNH" (Lang, Focal Point, BBC1 21 November 1991). Lord 
Strathclyde claimed the governments intention was to build bridges between the 
conservationists and land users. Brian Wilson attacked the governments amendment, 
saying that it was,
"a complete capitulation to the landowning lobby, and a body blow fo r  
environmental interests in Scotland" ('Sites o f Special Parliamentary Interest' 
Scotsman, 1991).
During the immediate years following reorganisation the farming and landowning 
community have accepted the new conservation agency with several o f their members 
taking seats on SNH's four regional boards. Furthermore, the appeals committee has 
yet to meet over an appeal. Anecdotal evidence from the conservation groups reflects 
a degree o f scepticism as to the potential success in terms o f nature conservation o f an 




The discussion above highlights the complexity of integrating nature conservation 
objectives into agriculture activities and leads to the core question o f this thesis: that 
o f government allocation o f financial resources to nature conservation. The limited 
budget o f the NCC means site selection is determined by budget allocation as opposed 
to a superior system o f conservation worth defined in terms o f rarity and diversity.18
Spash and Simpson (1994) describe the present system of nature conservation in 
terms o f a Utilitarian model which means that the conservation agency considers both 
the designation o f sites and the extension o f existing sites within the parameters o f its 
existing budget. The size o f 'rent' (compensation) that can be extracted by the 
landowners from the agency is dependent upon the outcome o f the bargaining process 
(in determining a management agreement), which in turn depends on the agency's 
budget, the price at which the land is offered to the agency, and the informational 
asymmetries between the landowner and the agency. This is an 'implicit utilitarian 
ethic' (Spash and Simpson, 1994) on site preservation and contradicts the fact that 
certain sites o f a high conservation value should be preserved irrespective o f the cost. 
Precisely because the agency is budget constrained there is a clash o f ethics and 
practice.
As shown in Table 2.1 management agreements comprised the greatest proportion of 
grant-in-aid to the NCC. This is the compensation (or 'rent') paid to landowners and 
occupiers for lost income as a result of the designation. Why compensation is paid to 
agricultural landowners and occupiers and not any other type o f industry subject to 
economic regulation is in part explained by the fact that agriculture produces a public 
good,
"which society should recognise by providing the financial resources to permit it to 
fu lfil its task" (Commission of the European Communities, 1985:(COM (85) 333 EC 
Commission, Brussels, cited in Hodge, 1989).
This statement reflects the 'exceptional' attitude the EU has toward agriculture. The 
case o f compensation may be further explained by the common distinction made 
between pollution (particularly the introduction of chemicals and waste products into 
the environment) which is regarded as an external cost (a public 'bad') and the loss of
18 As encompassed in the 1977 Nature Conservation Review and subsequently bound by law (1981).
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conservation and amenity values in rural areas which is regarded as the failure to 
produce an external benefit (a public 'good') (Hodge, 1989). Conventional 
economic analysis o f efficiency indicates that the producers who are prevented from 
causing an external cost should not be compensated, but that those whose actions are 
constrained so as to provide an external benefit should receive compensation. 
Therefore, if nature is regarded as an external benefit (a public 'good'), the 
government may restrict the farmer's actions so as to ensure its provision. This then 
imposes a cost on the farmer in the form of lost opportunities for land development, 
and it is therefore appropriate to pay compensation.
Hodge takes his analysis a step further in discussing the 'right' that is implicitly 
allocated to agriculture within this system.
"The payment o f  compensation implicitly rests the rights to alter the environment in 
favour o f the farmer...In having this option [o f land improvement or landscape 
destruction] curtailed by government intervention, the farmer is having something 
taken away. Non-payment o f  compensation on the other hand would imply that the 
farmer does not have such a right, so that when a change is made to the countryside 
he or she is breaking the law, in the same way as i f  pesticide was being dumped into 
a water course " (Hodge, 1989:pl028).
A reference point exists which defines the level o f responsibility which farmers are 
expected to take towards the rural environment. The position o f the reference point 
reflects the existing status quo between conservation and environmental interests and 
agriculture interests in society, or alternatively, the existing distribution o f property 
rights, and therefore a change in the reference point reflects a change in the ethical 
perspective o f what farmers should or should not be expected to do as a moral 
responsibility.
Because o f CAP subsidies to farmers the compensation paid to farmers reflects the 
financial opportunity cost rather than the social opportunity cost. The net opportunity 
cost to society as a whole for designating Sites of Special Scientific Interest may not 
be equal to the social opportunity cost. This is because the reduction in agricultural 
production will create some saving in the agriculture department but if there is not an 
intra-governmental transfer this will not be the relevant cost to the nature 
conservation agency. This money 'illusion' may influence political decisions in relation 
to the level of conservation provided. If the compensation paid is greater than the
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social cost19, but not the financial opportunity cost this might create political 
pressures for a less than socially optimal level o f conservation, that is, a reduction in 
conservation agency budget.
"The issue is concerned with the public perception o f the location o f  the reference 
point... There are likely to be pressures on the reference point towards expecting a 
higher level o f  environmental management from farmers. These pressures will be 
supported by the growing concern fo r  the environment and the declining emphasis on 
fo o d  production in agricultural policy" (Hodge, 1989:p 1034).
In the introduction the rise of the conservation and agriculture interests and their 
participation in the political community whose 'vortex' is the Treasury were discussed. 
The 'reference point' as described by Hodge has been and continues to be an integral 
parameter in determining the ground rules for nature conservation policy-making and 
relevant budget allocation. It is this reference point which the conservation groups 
seek to change through lobbying decision-makers, campaigning to the public and 
engaging in competition with the agricultural lobby. The agriculture lobby itself seeks 
to maintain the status quo 'reference point' or distribution o f property rights.
Therefore, the supply o f nature conservation does not appear to be determined on 
economic grounds but is more the result o f a political process emerging from some 
kind o f bargaining within a political community. At the heart o f the debate on 
conservation and environmental policy lies two o f the most fundamental and recurring 
dilemmas faced by policy makers. The first is the struggle between those who want to 
exploit natural resources for short run economic gain and those who want to use the 
resources sustainably to maintain long run productivity. This struggle, particularly in 
agriculture, is determined by the enduring political influence the landowning and 
agriculture lobbies have maintained. The second is the priority that economic 
interests have over conservation and environmental interests in the policy consultation 
process.
The evolution o f regulation over time to meet public demands reflects a reactive 
approach by the UK government to the externalities arising from contemporary 
economic activities, in particular agricultural activities. The reactive approach of 
government to environmental policy-making implies that they are allowing the 
national interest to be determined by a conflict o f interest between key interest 
groups.
19 Willis. Benson and Saunders. 1988
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SSSIs have provided the entry point to the understanding o f the political conflicts 
from which 'policy' emerges and therefore are seen to be a central example to the 
whole issue o f what determines government expenditure on nature conservation.
There are four main propositions:
(i) the rise o f the conservation and environmental lobbies have lead to the gradual and 
incremental development of economic policies for conservation o f nature;
(ii) the competition between agriculture and conservation interest groups determines 
policy;
(iii) the costs o f policy provide an overriding constraint to the influence o f interest 
groups; and
(iv) entrenched property rights establish a bias to private property ownership and 
therefore agriculture interests.
The above four propositions are addressed within a theoretical framework in Chapter 
Three.
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' Economic Theory of 
Environmental Regulation
3.1 Introduction
Generations o f economists have attempted to address the question o f changes in 
government expenditure and as a result, an economic theory has evolved, particularly 
in the latter half o f the 20th century. There are two main strands to the development 
o f economic theory o f government expenditure: (i) Public Choice Theory and (ii) 
Public Interest theory. At the broadest level Public Choice theory is defined as, "the 
economic study o f non market decision-making, or simply the application o f  
economics to political science" (Meuller, 1989 cited in Caparaso and Levine, 1992). 
The theory is the same as that of political science but the methodology o f public 
choice is that o f economics. Public Interest Theory relates back to early political 
scientists and Marx's view that big business controls institutions. Current literature on 
the theory o f government expenditure derives in part from the literature on public 
finance during the 1950s and in part from the seminal contributions o f Kenneth 
Arrow's Social Choice and Individual Values (1951) and Anthony Downs An 
Economic Theory o f Democracy (1957). These analytical foundations were built 
upon by several eminent economists during the 1970s and 1980s, culminating in 
Beckers model o f Competition Among Pressure Groups in 1983. Beckers model is 
essentially neo-classical, describing public policy as the outcome o f competition 
between interest groups to either maximise members pay-offs (that is, to maximise 
subsidies to members or minimise members taxes). The purpose o f this chapter, is to 
understand the relevance, and the limitations, o f this approach to the field o f 
environmental regulation, with specific emphasis on regulation o f agricultural 
activities for nature conservation.
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3.2 Environmental externalities, regulation and economic theory
Since the 1960s, rising public concern for the environment has lead to increased 
awareness o f the externalities arising from economic activities such as agriculture, 
forestry, housing development etc., and as a result, economic regulation for nature 
conservation and protection o f the rural environment has been developed. Existing 
regulation is in the form o f public policies such as Site o f Special Scientific Interest 
(SSSI), National Nature Reserve (NNR) and Environmentally Sensitive Area (ESA) 
designation, which seek voluntary management agreements with landowners, and/or 
employ monitoring and fines.
According to Baumol and Oates (1988) externalities must have two principal 
conditions to be present. Firstly that an individual's utility, say A's, must be affected 
by anothers activities (say B, who may be an individual, a corporation or a 
government) without particular attention to the effects on A's welfare. And secondly, 
the decision-maker, whose activity affects A's utility levels, does not pay (receive in 
compensation) for this activity an amount equal in value to the resulting benefits (or 
costs) to others. In short therefore, certain agriculture and forestry activities 
negatively affect the welfare o f some individuals and that loss in welfare goes 
uncompensated.
The costs and benefits to society o f externalities which affect the natural environment 
are comparatively unknown, although environmental economists have attempted to 
develop valuation techniques (contingent valuation, hedonic pricing, etc.) to measure 
these. It is only possible to acquire a good appreciation o f the costs o f environmental 
degradation if the value o f the environment to society is known, that is the total 
economic value made up o f use and non-use values. Since adequate valuation 
techniques have eluded economists to date a generally acceptable economic 
framework for decision-making for nature conservation has yet to be established. 
Pearce (1989) suggests that an improvement in environmental quality is also an 
economic improvement if it increases social welfare. This however, raises questions 
about whose welfare is involved and to what extent should future generations be 
considered?
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Pearces' (1989) economic approach to valuation of the environment does offend some 
economists such as Jacobs (1991) and Daly and Cobb (1990) and it must be conceded 
that measuring the gains and losses using money as a measuring rod is technically 
difficult and ethically contentious (Lowe, Clark and Cox, 1993).1
The rising quantity and quality of information via the media has increased pressure on 
the government to address the issues. The government must now allocate an 
environmental budget without an adequate ex-ante assessment. That is, to determine 
the 'optimal' level of nature conservation to maximise societal welfare requires 
measurement o f a number of variables, including the 'value' of nature conservation to 
society, which are not readily quantifiable. In addition to this the time span in which 
decision makers must operate, and the breadth of society that should be considered 
(e.g. local, national, global etc.) are also parameters within which decisions must be 
considered. The optimum level of nature conservation however, is an elusive goal, if 
it exists at all.
This study aims to address the question of why the UK government chose to spend 
£45.1 million in 1990/91 o f public funds on nature conservation and why this 
allocation has increased over time? That is, what forces determine and/or bring about 
a change in the governments allocation o f resources.
3.3 Economic Theory
Several theories have been advanced to explain the pattern o f government 
intervention and economic regulation o f the market. Within this context economic 
regulation should be viewed in its widest perspective as
"taxes and subsidies o f all sorts as well as explicit legislative and administrative 
controls over rates, entry and other facets o f economic activity" Posner (1974).
The economic theory of regulation was formally presented by Stigler (1971). The 
principal focus was the integration of political behaviour analysis with the larger body 
o f economic analysis. Stigler recognised that interest groups influenced the 
regulatory process by providing financial and/or information support to government 
agents. Following the work two main theories of economic regulation have been
1 For a more full discussion of non-market valuation techniques see Lipsey (1983) and Pearce
(1989).
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proposed. The first o f these theories, the Public Interest Theory, initially received the 
support o f economists and subsequently lawyers. This theory suggests that regulation 
is supplied in response to the demand of the public for the correction o f inefficient or 
inequitable market practices. The second theory, the Capture Theory, espoused by 
what Posner (1974) describes as an, "odd mixture o f welfare state liberals, 
muckrakers, Marxists and free-market economists" states that regulation is supplied 
in response to the demands of interest groups competing amongst themselves to 
maximise the 'income' o f their members.
Capture theorists have important differences in their thinking and Posner suggests the 
economists' version is the most promising.
The Public Interest Theory o f Regulation relies upon two main assumptions. Firstly, 
that economic markets are fragile and apt to operate inefficiently or inequitably if left 
alone; and, secondly, that government regulation is virtually costless. Thus, for 
example, farm subsidies, the minimum wage, trade union protection etc. are simply 
responses o f government to public demands for the rectification of remediable 
inefficiencies and inequities in the free market; and, behind every intervention is a 
market imperfection, the existence o f which gives a complete justification for some 
regulation (which is assumed to operate efficiently and without cost).
Theoretical revision has been both stimulated and substantiated by a growing number 
o f case studies demonstrating that many contemporary public policies cannot be 
explained on the grounds that they increase wealth or equity in society and also that 
they are not cost-free. A further problem with the Public Interest Theory is it does 
not provide any mechanism or linkage by which a perception o f public interest is 
translated into legislative action.
Capture theory perceives that regulation comes from institutions and therefore 
capitalists control economic regulation. However, on closer examination it is found a 
great deal of regulation is beneficial to small business or non-business groups such as 
dairy farmers and unionised labour and therefore these forms o f regulation remain 
unexplained in capture theory.
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The formulations o f capture theory by political scientists derive from the work o f 
Bentley and Truman (1908, cited in Becker 1983) in which they emphasised the 
importance o f interest groups in the formation of public policy. This is adopted by 
pluralists who believe that interest group organisation is the natural expression of 
collectively held interests. Posner (1974) criticises this approach for its lack o f theory 
or explanation o f why some interests are effectively represented in the political 
process and others not, or the conditions under which interest groups succeed or fail 
in obtaining favourable legislation.
Stigler (1971) discards the assumption of 'pristine (that is, untainted) legislative 
purpose’ and admits the possibility o f institutions being 'captured by interest groups in 
addition to regulated firms. He also replaces the militaristic flavour o f 'capture' with 
the "more neutral terminology" (Peltzman, 1989) o f supply and demand. Thus, 
Stigler (1971) agrees with political scientists that economic regulation serves the 
private interests o f politically effective groups although his economic theory is more 
precise and open to testing than political theory.2 Stiglers theory is also 
commensurate with the strong assumption of neo-classical theory that people are self- 
interested rational beings.
Becker (1983) develops a link between Capture Theory and Public Interest Theory in 
which economic efficiency is emphasised. Becker (1983) describes how groups 
organise to exert pressure on the political process in order for them to be granted 
benefits or made exempt from paying for others benefits. The equilibrium represents 
a balancing o f marginal pressure exerted by winners and losers. Beckers central 
argument is that under these conditions, dead-weight costs are a constraint on the 
efficiency o f regulatory policies. Deadweight costs are defined as
"a loss in social welfare deriving from a policy or action that has no corresponding 
gain. Deadweight losses represent economic inefficiency and result when there is 
some flaw  in the price-setting mechanism" (Bannock et al, 1992).
The gains and losses for producers and consumers provide the motivating forces 
behind the competing pressures on the political process. It is this competition, Becker 
argues, that results in the political process being drawn toward a more efficiency- 
enhancing regulation. That is, neither winners nor losers would oppose (rationally) a 
change that eliminated some dead-weight loss. This is important for two reasons.
2Posner points out the weakness rafher than ihe strength in a theory that can fit any body of data.
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Firstly, payers and payees o f taxes and subsidies will incur costs to generate pressure 
and to alter their behaviour so as to maximise the benefits (subsidies) or minimise the 
costs (taxes) meted out by the political process. In theory, both winners and losers 
would press for change if regulatory redistribution isn't the cheapest. Secondly, 
market failure creates incentives for regulation. If regulation reduces inefficiency then 
wealth will rise. The extra wealth will induce greater pressure for regulation from 
winners and may attenuate the opposition o f losers.
Posners (1974) observation that,
"the general assumption o f economics, that human behaviour can be understood as 
the response o f rational self-interested beings to their environment, must have 
extensive application to the political process"
provides the basis for Becker's (1983) model o f 'Competition Among Pressure 
Groups for Political Influence'. In commenting on Beckers model, Peltzman 
emphasised its important role in developing the link between the theories o f 'Public 
Interest Theory (Efficiency Theory)' and 'Capture Theory'. Given the importance o f 
this link, the role of interest groups in the environmental movement and the 
unchallenged strength of landowning and agriculture interests, Beckers model would 
appear to offer a valuable insight into the development of a theory o f environmental 
policy-making.
3.4 A Theory of Competition Among Pressure Groups for Political Influence.
3.4.1 Introduction to the theory
Becker (1983) proposes that private interest groups, whose members are either 
producers or consumers, compete in the political market to alter the outcome o f 
policy to meet their own ends (interests). Groups are assumed to use political 
influence to enhance the well-being of their members. Homo economicus is the 
central driving force o f competition and seeks to maximise members utility (usually 
measured in terms o f individuals income) by eliminating inefficiencies (dead-weight 
costs) in the distribution o f taxes and subsidies associated with economic regulation. 
Becker (1983) models groups influence functions, their pressure production functions 
and group competition through a series of differential equations. A groups influence 
is a function o f pressure generated by itself, pressure generated by other groups and 
other variables which he includes in the analysis as 'x', a 'catch-all' variable. Influence
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can be expanded by expenditure o f time and money on campaigns, contributions, 
political advertising and other ways that exert political pressure.
Becker (1983) quotes Bentley (1908) as someone who even as early as 1908 
identified the role o f pressure groups in policy-making.
"Pressure ...is always a group phenomenon. It indicates the push and resistance 
betM'een groups. The balance o f this group pressure is the existing state o f society."
Becker (1983) goes on to illustrate that the competition among pressure groups for 
political influence determines the 'socially optimal' equilibrium structure o f taxes and 
subsidies and other political favours. Following competition, a political equilibrium 
results which has the property that all groups maximise their incomes by spending 
their optimum amount on political pressure, given the productivity o f other groups. 
For analytical convenience Becker assumes each group acts as if expenditure by other 
groups is unaffected by changes in its own expenditure.
Stimulated by the atmosphere created by Stigler (1971), Posner (1974) and Peltzman 
(1976), Beckers (1983) principal aim of modelling political competition among 
pressure groups was to
"unify the view that governments correct market failures with the view that they 
fcn’our the politically powerful" (Becker, 1983 :p371).
3.4.2 A Theory of Competition Among Pressure Groups for Political Influence.
The basic assumption of the analysis is that taxes, subsidies and other political 
instruments are used to raise the welfare of the more influential pressure groups. 
Groups compete within the context of rules that translate expenditures on political 
pressure into political influence and access to political resources.
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The theory begins with the greatly simplifying assumption that there are only two 
homogeneous groups in society 5 and t. (This is relaxed later as the model becomes 
more detailed.) Since identical members of the groups must have the same incomes 
(utility),3 Z° t and Z°s can measure the full income o f each member o f 5 and t prior to 
government redistribution, and Zs and Z< can measure their incomes (utilities) after 
redistribution, so that
R s -  Z s -Z °s  and Rt = Z ° t- Z t  (1)
are the redistributions to each 5 and away from each /.
All political activities that raise the income of a group will be considered a subsidy to 
that group, and all activities that lower incomes will be considered a tax. The amount 
raised by all taxes on t can be written as,
5  = nJ?{Ri), (2)
where /?/ is the number o f members o f t, and R( is the taxes paid by each member. 
The function F  is the revenue from a tax of R( and incorporates the dead-weight costs 
that result from the distorting effects o f taxes on hours worked, investments, and 
other taxpayer choices or the collection costs of the tax. Since these costs tend to 
increase as the rate o f taxation increases
F i R ^ R . ^ ' ^ ^ F " ^  04 (3)
The subsidy to each member o f 5 is determined from
HsG{R,) = S  = hF (R 1), (4)
where ns is the number of members and Rs is the subsidy to each member. G is the 
cost o f providing Rs and incorporates the dead-weight costs from the distorting 
effects on hours worked, investments, and other choices by recipients.
Assum ption: the utility of each person is measured by his real full income and full incomes can be 
aggregated to measure aggregate income or aggregate output.
F ' = 1 ,F "  = 0 when taxes do not distort behavior, i.e. w'hen 'lump sum' taxes are
used.
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The properties o f G are
G(Rs) > R S,G ' > 1,G" > 0 . 5 (5)
Equation (4) gives the budget equation between the amount paid in taxes and the 
amount received as subsidies, a relation that has a major effect on the competition for 
political influence. It is important to note that the budget equation does not state that 
subsidies (nsRg) equal taxes (ntR() because dead-weight costs reduce subsidies below 
taxes.
Becker (1983) does not address the issue of how the influence o f interest groups 
translates in different political systems although he does recognise that all systems, 
including dictatorial and democratic, are subject to pressures from special interest 
groups.
Becker deals with the end product of this translation called 'influence functions' and
suggests the weak restrictions placed on these functions will enable application to
many different systems. In this thesis, influence functions are assumed to be system 
determined (that is, endogenously determined within the existing system) and 
therefore no attempt will be made to extend analysis across systems, thus focusing 
on the UK only.
The amount raised in taxes on t is determined by an influence function (I) that 
depends on the pressure (/;) exerted by 5 and / and other variables (x):
ntF(R,) = -I ,(ps,p, ,x) .  (6)
Similarly, the amount available to subsidise 5 is determined by an influence function 
that also depends on political pressures and other variables.
risG(Rs) -  J s(p*,pt,x). (7)
The political budget equation in (4) implies influence functions (6) and (7) are 
interdependent. Increased influence o f s that raises its subsidy must be financed by 
increased taxes on /, and hence lower the influence of I.




ntF{R,) = - / ‘ = nsG{Rs) = J s (8)
or
r + r = o.
This equality between the amount raised in taxes and the amount spent on subsidies 
implies that the aggregate influence is zero: that increased influence o f some groups 
decreases the influence of others by equal amounts. 6
Differentiation o f equation (8) with respect to any variable^ gives
I s = - 5 L .  = - / '  (9)
dy ■ dy ■
Therefore, if, for instance, increased pressure by t raises its influence (and thereby 
lowers its taxes), the influence (and subsidy) of 5 would be lowered
/ ; > o = > / ; < o .  (io )
Furthermore, since i : = i :  , if an increase in pf raises the marginal product o f p s (if 
J  t >0) ,  then an increase in p s  would lower the absolute value o f the marginal effect 
o f p^ on Is (for then J s < 0  and J* > 0). Also, if some characteristics o f a group,
such as the occupation or ages of members, raise its influence, these characteristics 
would lower the influence of the other group.
Following his description of the influence function o f a group Becker proceeds to 
consider the effects of competition among pressure groups. If Rt>  0 and R*> 0, 5 
would be considered the winner and t the loser from the political 'game1 because the 
redistribution's to those subsidised, s, has increased and the redistribution's away from 
those taxed, t, has increased.7
6Therefore, the political game in this model is zero-sum in influence and negative-sum in taxes and 
subsidies because of deadweight costs.
7 The identity of winners and losers and the amount won and lost are not rigidly determined by the 
nature of the political system because they are also affected by the political activities of each group. 
Losers need not passively accept their fate but can trim their losses and the gains to winners by
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Groups compete for political influence by spending time, energy, and money on the 
production o f political pressure. To model this competition Becker assumes that each 
group has a function relating its production of pressure to various inputs:
p  = p(m ,n), where m = an, (11)
where a are the resources spent per member on maintaining a lobby, attracting 
favourable votes, issuing pamphlets, contributing to campaign expenditures, 
cultivating bureaucrats and politicians etc. and,
n is the number o f members o f the group.
Becker (1983) suggests pressure cannot decrease and generally increases when 
expenditures (m) increase.
Pressure is a function of total resources spent on maintaining a lobby and o f the total 
membership. This suggests that even if no money is spent on political resources the 
number o f members alone can have an influence.
The total effect o f an increase in the number o f members on the marginal product of 
political expenditures, with the amount spent per member held constant, is
The sign o f the first term is determined by whether there are increasing or decreasing 
returns to the scale of expenditures. The second term tends to be negative because of 
free riding: each person wants to shirk his obligations and impose the cost o f 
producing pressure on other members. If the incentive to free ride rises as the number 
o f members rise the pressure produced by a given total expenditure (m) would fall as 
the number o f members rises because the cost of collecting would rise. The 
requirement that p n < 0 in equation (11) captures the effect of numbers on free riding 
and the cost of producing pressure. Free riding can be partially controlled by policing 
behaviour etc.8 Basically, free riding raises the cost o f producing pressure.
lobbying, threats, disobedience, migration, and other kinds of political pressure to raise their 
influence.
8 Also, punishing deviant members with ostracism, intimidation, and fines, and by implementing
(12)
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Therefore, total expenditures on the production o f pressure equals the sum of 
expenditures on direct political activity and on the control o f free riding.
The full incomes o f each member o f s and t net of expenditures on political activities, 
including expenditures to control free riding are defined by,
Zs = Z s + R*-Os, and Zt = Z ,- R t - c h .  (13)
Income per member of a politically active group (a > 0) is maximised when,
¿Rs dRt
5 ’ (14)(Xh (Xlt
and these conditions take account of all expenditures to control free riding.
A group would be politically active only if additional pressure raises its influence. 
The inequalities in (10) imply that pressure by each group reduces the influence o f 
the other group, and thereby partially or fully offsets the effect o f pressure by the 
other group.
The influence and pressure production functions permit a straight forward translation 
o f the optimality conditions for 5 and / given by equation (14) into political market 
equilibrium conditions determining expenditures and pressure by both groups. Becker 
simplifies the analysis by assuming each group acts as if the pressure exerted by the 
other group is unaffected by its behaviour. (There exists a wealth o f literature on 
group behaviour and whether or not other groups operating in the same market is a 
relevant determining factor (see for example, Kreps, 1990:pp328-330 and Varian, 
1992:pp295-298). The above assumption is often used but generally recognised to be 
a gross simplification.)
âRs = 1 â f  dp, chis = L p m = }
dcu n.sG ' cps ân , ¿h G'
rules for sharing benefits and costs that reduce the incentive to shirk. Basically, free riding raises the 
cost of producing pressure. Therefore, total expenditures on the production of pressure equals the 
sum of expenditures on direct political activity and on the control of free riding.
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dRt _  1 d j '  ôpt âvt _ I t  P
and using equation (9),
da ntF’ dpt dmt da F '
t
= -1 . (16)
These conditions can be solved for equilibrium values o f as and rq, and p s and /q. 
They can also be used to derive the effect on the optimum pressure by one group o f a 
given change in the pressure by the other group. Rising dead-weight losses from 
taxes and subsidies (F " < 0 and G" > 0) cause the optimal pressure by one group to 
increase when pressure by the other is raised. 'Complementarity' in the influence 
function o f 5 between s and t ( J s > 0) also increases the optimal pressure by 5 when
pressure by t is raised because additional pressure by s would then be more effective. 
However, Becker (1983) continues to point out that such 'complementarity' reduces 
the optimal pressure by t when pressure by s is raised because the negative effect on 
/ ' o f  additional pressure by t is reduced.9 This is shown graphically in Figure 3.1
below.
9 Second-order conditions ensuring that (15) provides an optimal value of as, and (16) an optimal 
value of at are considered in the mathematical appendix of Becker's article 1983. Sufficient
conditions are J s < 0, V  > 0, H and p  < 0, G" > 0, and F" < 0..
-*-55  x  11 i  mm l  mm
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Figure 3.1 Reaction curves of t and s
P ressu re  
b y  s
P ressure  
by t
Becker assumes that the reaction curves of both s and t are positively sloped because 
dead-weight costs rise sufficiently rapidly as taxes and subsidies increase to dominate 
any offsetting effects from 'substitutability' in the influence functions. Stable 
equilibrium is implied in this example by the assumption that t's reaction curve is 
steeper than s's curve.10
If a group became more efficient at producing pressure its optimal production o f 
pressure would be raised for any level of pressure by the other group. This would be 
illustrated by a shift upwards of the reaction curve of 5 in Figure 3.1 from s0s0 to sIsI 
and the equilibrium position changed from <?0 to e, p ressure by 5 would increase and 
pressure by / would also increase if its reaction curve were positively sloped. 
Regardless o f the induced effect on pressure by t, the subsidy to s and the tax on t 
would be increased by an upward shift in s's reaction curve.
10 This assumption is strongly satisfied when J  =  J  =  F "  -  G "  =  0 because then s's reaction 
curve would be horizontal and t's would be vertical.
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Taking the above modelling o f the effects of groups competition for political influence 
on each others taxes and subsidies and also on the overall taxes and subsidies 
associated with a policy o f economic regulation Becker goes on to make some 
propositions about how the overall system operates.
Proposition One
A group that becomes more efficient at producing political pressure would be able to 
reduce its taxes or raise its subsidy.
The political budget equation (8) implies that both groups cannot increase their 
influence because aggregate influence is zero, this illustrates an important corollary to 
proposition one.
Corollary to Proposition One
The political effectiveness o f a group is mainly determined not by its absolute 
efficiency - e.g., its absolute skill at controlling free riding - but by its efficiency 
relative to the efficiency o f  other groups.
Since economies of scale are important at low levels o f expenditure on producing 
pressure, and since free riding is usually more easily controlled in small groups, a 
modest increase in the size o f small groups would usually raise the marginal product 
o f their expenditures because the benefit from a larger scale would exceed the cost 
from greater free riding. Continued expansion in size would eventually cause a 
decline in marginal products because free riding would become troublesome and scale 
economies less important. Beyond some point, Becker adds, marginal products may 
stabilise because further increases in size induce little additional effects or free riding 
(per member).
An increase in the size o f a group lowers marginal dead-weight costs o f subsidies or 
taxes (G1 or F') because the subsidy or tax on each member o f the group would be 
reduced. Therefore, the total effect of an increase in the size o f a group on its 
influence depends on the effects on efficiency, subsidies, and dead-weight costs. To 
show this it is necessary to consider how dead-weight costs affect pressure, taxes and 
subsidies.
56
An increase in the marginal dead-weight cost o f taxes (a reduction in F' in (16)) raises 
the pressure exerted by taxpayers essentially because a reduction in taxes then has a 
smaller effect on the revenue from taxation. On the other hand, an increase in the 
marginal dead-weight cost of subsidies (an increase in G' in (15)) reduces the pressure 
exerted by recipients because a given increase in the subsidy then requires a larger 
increase in tax revenue. Hence an exogenous increase in the dead-weight cost o f both 
taxes and subsidies would shift the reaction curves o f t and 5 to the right and 
downward, respectively, and change the equilibrium position from ea to e3 in Figure 
3.1. Either the equilibrium pressure of t must increase, or the pressure o f 5 must 
decrease, or both. However, the following proposition holds, regardless o f the exact 
effects on pressure.
Proposition Two.
An increase in dead-weight cost reduces the equilibrium subsidy.
The cost o f many programs, such as agricultural price supports has often been seen as 
unacceptably large. Yet proposition two implies that politically successful programs 
are 'cheap' relative to the millions of programs that are too costly to gather sufficient 
political support, where 'cheap' and 'expensive' refer to marginal dead-weight costs, 
not to the size o f taxes and subsidies.
Since dead-weight costs encourage pressure by tax-payers and discourage pressure by 
recipients, tax-payers have an 'intrinsic' advantage in influencing political outcomes.
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Combine equations (15) and (16) to get,
à R J â g ,  I ' , P .  FJ_
* R l * a .  I \ p m v
If  5 and / were the same size (ns = nt), equally efficient at producing pressure
S t
( p  = p  , when ms = mt and ns = nt) and equally important in the influence function 
( J s = -  /  'w henp s = Pi), then (17) would imply that,
- d R  I f in  F ’
„hen  p , - p t (18)
s R J d a ,  G '
The intrinsic advantage o f tax-payers is measured by the right-hand side o f (18) and 
increases as dead-weight costs of taxes and subsidies increase, as F  falls and G' rises. 
Subsidised groups can overcome their intrinsic disadvantage with an optimal size, 
efficiency at producing pressure, success at converting pressure into influence, or with 
characteristics that raise their influence. The presumption must be that heavily 
subsidised groups, such as farmers in the EU, not only can redistribute with relatively 
low dead-weight cost but also can overcome their intrinsic disadvantage with political 
appeal and efficiency.
Proposition two implies some tyranny o f the status quo because the political sector 
would not interfere much with the private distribution of income even when groups 
benefiting from interference are better organised politically than groups harmed, as 
long as they are not much better organised. Consequently, the importance o f the 
private status quo does not imply that politicians are lackeys o f the rich, and is even 
consistent with the poor being more effective politically. However, this may not be 
the case where the politically strong are 'wealthy' landowners and the environmental 
lobby is represented by mainly middle class membership.
This tyranny o f the status quo is not the same as laissez faire because the political 
sector would protect the status quo against many shocks and changes in the private 
sector.
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Economists have traditionally explained political behaviour not by the power of 
interest groups but by market failure. Governments produce public goods, reduce 
externalities and overcome other failures. Becker suggests that although these 
political activities raise rather than lower aggregate efficiency, they can be readily 
incorporated into the previous analysis o f competition among pressure groups for 
political influence.
Activities that benefit all groups are opposed by none and may be actively supported
by pressure from some o f the groups. More challenging to the analysis are activities
that also raise efficiency but harm some groups (say /) who may exert pressure in
opposition. The 'tax' on 1 would still finance the 'subsidy' to s according to the
political budget equation in (4) except that now efficiency would be raised because 
" A  > n,Rr If  efficiency were also raised at the margin, that is, if jy d  > n, d R ,
subsidised groups have the intrinsic advantage in influencing political outcomes, for 
equation (18) implies that 5 has the intrinsic advantage when F' > G\ which is the 
necessary and sufficient condition for an increase in the subsidy to raise efficiency.
Subsidised groups with an intrinsic advantage exert more pressure than taxed groups 
o f the same size, efficiency, and political appeal. Since political policies strongly 
supported by pressure from subsidised groups are likely to win out in the competition 
against other policies, those policies raising efficiency are likely to win, unless the 
groups harmed offset their intrinsic disadvantage with efficient production o f pressure 
or in other ways. This result is stated as a corollary to proposition two.
Corollary to Proposition Two.
Political policies that raise efficiency are more likely to be adopted than policies that 
lower efficiency (because they lower the dead-weight costs).
This corollary indicates that the model of competition among political pressure groups 
to advance their own welfare does not neglect market failures. Becker explains that 
the model does not emphasise political redistribution o f income at the expense of 
political increases in efficiency, even though groups do not co-operate and side 
payments are not permitted. So, an analysis of non-co-operative competition among 
pressure groups can unify the view that governments correct market failures and what 
has seemed to be a contrary view that governments favour the politically powerful.
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Since an increase in nt reduces the tax required on each person to obtain a given 
revenue (when the assumption o f marginal gains is held) an increase in nt would 
reduce their production o f pressure (less o f a stimulus for nt). So a group would 
prefer its subsidy to be financed by small taxes on many persons even when that does 
not increase the efficiency o f taxed groups. The optimum size o f a subsidised group 
is less than its most efficient size because an increase in the number o f members 
reduces the net income per member if efficiency does not significantly increase. This 
is stated as proposition three.
Proposition 3.
Politically successful groups tend to be small relative to the size o f the groups taxed 
to pay their subsidies.
This is simply because it is easier to organise small groups receiving large subsidies, 
than large groups (taxpayers) losing relatively small sums. A good example o f a well- 
organised, politically successful but small organisation in terms o f the proportion of 
the UK population it represents is the National Farmers Union.
Both t and s would lobby and otherwise exert political pressure in favour o f the most 
efficient method o f taxing t (assuming that the method of subsidising is unaffected) 
because both groups are better off with the efficient method. Therefore:
Proposition Four.
Competition among pressure groups favours efficient methods o f taxation.
Proposition four means that if all subsidy methods also yield the same tax revenue 
when pressure is given, replacement o f a less efficient by a more efficient subsidy 
would raise the subsidy to 5 at the initial equilibrium. If the marginal loss at the initial 
equilibrium were larger with the more efficient than with the less efficient method, 
the optimal pressure by 5 would be reduced, and t as well as s would be made better 
off by the more efficient method. Both groups then favour more efficient methods of 
subsidising s. However t would be made worse off by more efficient subsidies if they 
induced greater pressure by s.
Consequently, non-co-operative competition among pressure groups for political 
influence sometimes, but not always, favours efficient subsidies.
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I f  the above is true then direct subsidies to farmers would not necessarily be 
considered to be more efficient than restrictions on acreage. Direct subsidies to 
farmers may encourage entry by new farmers (producers) that can dissipate the gain 
to existing farmers. Becker (1983) refers to Gardner (1987) who shows that acreage 
restrictions are more efficient than output subsidies at raising the incomes of 
established farmers when the supply o f farmers is elastic.
Becker (1983) makes the point that what would seem a more efficient policy may in 
fact be less efficient when one considers overall efficiency or overall welfare. 
Alternatively, a seemingly inefficient public policy may be more efficient than a 
seemingly efficient private company policy because intentional subsidies by 
government are not included in the definition of'output'. For example a public policy 
can support more workers, restrict entry etc. This o f course depends on how output 
is defined and what the criterion of efficiency is.
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Figure 3.2 Influence indifference curves
The influence indifference curves are positively inclined since greater influence by one 
group reduces the influence by the other so reduced pressure by both could maintain 
their influence and hence raise both their net incomes by economising on political 
expenditure.
Expenditures on the production o f pressure are not Pareto optimal because all groups 
could be made better off by reduced expenditures. Since the influence indifference 
curves shown in Figure 3.2 are positively inclined because greater pressure by one 
group lowers the influence of the other group, reduced pressure by both groups could 
maintain their influence, and hence would raise both their net incomes by economising 
on political expenditures. As point e* in this figure indicates, Pareto optimality is 
attained when one group (/ in the figure) does not produce any pressure.
Co-operation among pressure groups is necessary to prevent the wasteful 
expenditures on political pressure that result from the competition for influence. Co­
operation is difficult, however, because each group wants other groups to reduce their 
pressure and tries to evade restrictions on its own efforts.
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Beckers theory of multi pressure group influence.
The previous analysis considers competition between two homogeneous pressure 
groups where each person might be taxed or subsidised but not both. In reality, 
however, most persons are both taxed and subsidised in various ways, and are 
members o f several, sometimes overlapping, pressure groups that lobby to reduce 
different taxes, and/or lobby to raise different subsidies.
Subsidising and taxing the same person is socially inefficient as their welfare could be 
maintained by equal reductions in both, with a consequent increase in aggregate 
output as a result of the saving in dead-weight costs. Therefore, if everyone were 
both taxed and subsidised, equal reductions in all taxes and subsidies would benefit all 
involved through a reduction in inefficient cross-hauling. 11
Becker (1983) modelled the effect o f many pressure groups on the individual group's 
'pressure production functions' and influence functions. A brief resume is given 
below. (The comparative static's are similar to those derived earlier for two groups, 
therefore the detail is not necessary within the context of this chapter.)
According to Becker (1983) the net influence o f many pressure groups tends to be 
greater when there are,
• More efficient groups;
• Subsidised groups with smaller dead-weight costs (smaller G');
• Taxed groups with larger dead-weight costs (larger F');
• Groups with intrinsically more influence;
• Subsidised groups whose benefits are financed by a small tax on many persons.
11 Cross-hauling is when those individuals being taxed are simultaneously being subsidised and 
overall efficiency decreases.
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Beckers (1983) model implies extensive political general equilibrium reactions to 
changes in the behaviour o f any group.12 This suggests that there exists a set o f 
prices (taxes and subsidies) that would ensure that equilibrium exists in the market 
and that if disruptions occur there is a tendency to return to equilibrium. The process 
continues until a new political general equilibrium is reached with the possibility of 
quite different pressures and gains by many groups. As a consequence o f the political 
budget constraint, tisG(Rs) = S = mF(Ri), increased pressure by one group may set in
motion reactions through the political system.
Voting and Influence
The neglect by Becker (1983) o f voting preferences is deliberate because he perceives 
them to not be a crucial independent force in political behaviour. Voter preferences 
can be manipulated and created through the information and misinformation provided 
by interested pressure groups, who raise their political influence by changing the 
revealed preferences o f enough voters and politicians. There is, however, only a 
weak incentive to become informed about political issues because each individual has 
only a minor effect on political outcomes decided by the majority.
Members o f pressure groups have incentives to free ride that are similar to the 
incentives o f the voter to remain uninformed. Relatively small and homogenous 
pressure groups do not reach decisions by a simple majority vote, and can therefore 
limit free riding by permitting more informed or affected members greater influence 
with the group. Becker (1983) goes on to say that it is evident only groups that are 
relatively efficient at limiting free riding become politically powerful.
12 General equilibrium analysis being the study of the behaviour of economic - or political - variables 
taking full account of the interaction between those variables and the rest of the economy.
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Becker's (1983) approach departs from what is termed the 'co-operative game 
trad ition '13 by
• not explicitly modelling coalition formation;
• by dropping the unrealistic assumptions that the preferences o f voters are fixed 
and that all votes have the same 'price'; and,
• by emphasising the importance of the following: dead-weight costs o f taxes and 
subsidies; free riding; and other costs of organising pressure groups and the 
capacity o f losers to limit the political gains of winners.
Implicitly, coalitions are formed by the expenditures o f pressure groups on influencing 
the revealed preference o f voters. However, the cost of a vote is not equal to all 
pressure groups or for all voters as some groups are more efficient at 'buying' votes 
and some voters are more easily persuaded. Becker (1983) suggests explicit 
modelling o f coalition formation would surely add to the power o f the approach.
3.4.3 Summary and conclusions of Beckers theory
To summarise therefore, there are six main elements to Beckers theory o f public 
policy which is built on competition among pressure groups for political favours.
1. The influence of pressure groups is determined by pressure produced by all 
groups.
2. Each group is assumed to maximise the income o f its members under the 
assumption that additional pressure does not affect the political expenditures of 
other groups. Equilibrium expenditure on pressures and equilibrium incomes of 
all groups are determined from these maximising conditions and from the political 
budget equation.
13 Cooperative game theory first introduced by J von Neumenn and O Morgenstern in 'A Theory of 
Games and Economic Behavior' (1944). This is the application of the theory of games to economics 
and is concerned with the study of the optimal strategies to maximise pay-offs, given the risks 
involved in judging the responses of adversaries. Games are classified into zero-sum, in which one 
players loss is anothers gain, non-zero, in which one player's decision may benefit all players; co­
operative in which collusion is possible and non-co-operative in which it is not.
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3. Political equilibrium depends on (i) the efficiency o f each group in producing 
pressure, (ii) the effect o f additional pressure on their influence, (iii) the number o f 
persons in different groups and (iv) the dead-weight costs o f taxes and subsidies.
4. Efficiency o f a group is determined by its size and its ability to control free-riding.
5. According to Becker (1983), one o f the most important variables in his analysis is 
dead-weight costs of taxes and subsidies. From this he makes a number of 
observations:
(i) dead-weight costs generally rise at an increasing rate as taxes and subsidies 
increase.
(ii) An increase in the dead-weight cost of a subsidy discourages pressure by 
the subsidised group because a given revenue then yields a smaller subsidy. An 
increase in the dead-weight cost of a tax encourages pressure by taxpayers 
because a given reduction in their taxes then has a smaller effect on the amount 
available as a subsidy. Therefore, dead-weight costs give taxpayers an intrinsic 
advantage in the competition for influence.
(iii) Groups that receive large subsidies presumably have managed to offset 
their intrinsic disadvantage by efficiency, an optimal size or easy access to political 
influence.
(iv) As dead-weight costs to taxpayers fall as the tax per person falls the 
opposition o f taxpayers to subsidies decreases as the number o f taxpayers 
increases. Therefore, groups can more readily obtain subsidies when they are 
small relative to the number of taxpayers (this explains the political success of 
farmers in rich countries).
6. Becker (1983) points out that his paper is relevant not only to taxes and subsidies 
that redistribute income but also to policies that raise efficiency by the production 
o f public goods and the curtailment of other market failures. Policies which raise 
efficiency are likely to win out in the competition for influence because they 
produce gains rather than dead-weight costs.
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3.5 Critique of the theory
There has been no empirical application o f this aspect o f Becker's work and so there 
are no indications as to its applicability in real-world cases. This lack o f empirical 
evidence and the inappropriate methodological approach, that is, mathematical 
modelling inherent in neo-classical theory, abstracts from reality to a degree which 
results in important theoretical elements being excluded. Mathematical modelling is 
proposed in this thesis to be unsuitable for understanding and exploring determinants 
o f government expenditure because from the outset it presupposes a sharp restriction 
o f vision and requires abstraction and reduction beyond any useful means. A further 
consequence o f Beckers methodological approach results in a lack o f many explicit 
definitions in his model and Becker leaves the reader having to draw implications 
from his theory.
The centrality o f 'homo economicus' and consequently rational behaviour in 
determining political outcomes narrows the analysis to a point where it is impossible 
to include altruistic behaviour, in any practical sense. Altrusitic behavior is proposed 
in this thesis to be demonstrated by environmental and conservation interest groups. 
While the use o f rational economic man may be sufficient in a two dimensional model 
in which only producers and consumers compete for promotion o f their economic 
interests, in a more complex theory in which the 'game' is multi-dimensional and 
multi-interest, ’homo economicus' is only one element in a broader range o f interests. 
Beckers (1983) use o f dead-weight costs of policies as the pivotal variable in group 
competition is therefore also considered simplistic. Non-monetary variables which 
initiate group competition should be included. It is proposed in this thesis that a 
property rights argument (Bromley, 1991) broadens the analysis and contributes more 
to the understanding o f land use policy-making. This is discussed in detail in the 
following chapter.
The 'supply side' o f the political market is defined, in this thesis, as the existing 
political/institutional structure (civil service, departmental and non-departmental 
government bodies) which makes policy decisions and administers policy. In other 
words, the supply side is considered to be the public arena which 'supplies' policy to 
the private arena. Becker treats this 'supply side' as a 'black box'. The 'black box' 
includes influences other than pressure groups (external influences) and Becker does 
not differentiate or distinguish between each external influence but rather 
amalgamates them into a single variable 'x'. The 'black box' treatment o f external
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influences (such as the EU, international political markets, the media and public 
opinion) results in a gross oversimplification which hinders rather than aids 
understanding o f political influences and policy-making. Becker implicitly assumes 
that government simply mediates the interests of all-powerful pressure groups and has 
no agenda o f its own.
The final general criticism o f Beckers (1983) model is the use o f equilibrium analysis 
which in neo-classical economic theory assumes that the 'technical' efficiency inherent 
in market transactions results in a socially optimum outcome (social efficiency). That 
is to say that by allowing interest groups to compete on the political market in an 
attempt to minimise technical inefficiencies (dead-weight costs) and because the 
market tends towards equilibrium in the long run, a socially optimal outcome will 
inevitably be achieved. 'Optimal' in this sense is defined in terms o f social efficiency 
and does not make reference to the redistributive effects o f policies. Equilibrium 
analysis, while being a 'tidy' methodology, does not prove to be robust when the 
essence o f group competition (dead-weight costs) is questioned and shows itself to be 
a theoretical tool with extremely limited practical use. In addition to this, even if 
equilibrium analysis were theoretically realistic, data collection in order to empirically 
test the model would prove to be impossible. For example, political scientists 
recognise the difficulty in quantification o f variables such as power and influence.
The following discussion explores the main areas to be addressed in the thesis. The 
discussion is divided into three main areas: (i) interests o f pressure groups and
individuals; (ii) the role o f government; and, (iii) and the importance of the 'supply- 
side' o f the political market (Becker's 'black box').
3.5.1 Interests of pressure groups and individuals
It is questionable whether the motivations o f interest groups, or the stimulus of 
political activity, is centred on technical efficiency o f policy. Beckers (1983) focus 
on economic efficiency leads him to emphasise correction of market failure as an 
important motive for regulation. Although the costs of policy are recognised to be an 
important variable in the determination of policy choices, rather than focusing a 
theory o f policy choice on the dead-weight costs of policy, these costs will be 
included in the proposed theory as one of a number o f determinants. That is to say, 
the hypothesis is that it is influential bureaucrats working directly with budget 
allocation who, in recognising the size and extent o f dead-weight costs associated
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with a policy, are likely to be receptive to pressure groups advocating a more 
'efficient' (and less expensive) policy alternative. Proposed motivations o f press” re 
groups and individuals are discussed in the following chapter.
Becker assumes that all pressure groups compete to maximise their members' utility. 
Utility in its broadest sense may be dependent upon non-monetary benefits such as 
altruism (pleasure from protecting the natural environment for future generations), 
enjoyment o f the natural environment (Jacobs, 1991) or income maximisation 
(maximising subsidies or minimising taxes). Becker recognises this broad definition of 
utility and while conceptually this appears to be the case the utility o f different groups 
or individuals will not necessarily be open to quantification and therefore the use o f 
income as a measure of utility is not suitable for a general application. Furthermore, 
Beckers (1983) assumption that utility functions are additive and that each group 
chooses to maximise the utility of its members (where optimal expenditures are 
conditional on the political budget equation and pressure production function) 
embodies his analysis with a false impression of accuracy and in fact, "those effects 
that happen not to have the aura o f scientific respectability are disregarded in a 
process that commits the fallacy o f  misplaced concreteness" Daly et al (1990:p224). 
This is what Viner (1961, cited in Bromley, 1991 :p230) describes as the "fallacy o f  
the unexplored remainder" and this point is further emphasised by Hutchison
"...the majority o f economists are not necessarily completely devoted to exclusively 
materialist goals but rather [that] they are inevitably tempted to focus on 
measurable, quantitative objectives rather than qualitative non-measurable ones, 
and measurable goals inevitably tend to be somewhat materialistically conceived. 
As is well known, qualitative elements...largely elude indices o f production or 
consumption" (Hutchison, 1964 cited in Bromley, 1991:p224).
Becker (1983) implicitly assumes 'symmetry of information and objectives' between 
members and interest groups leaders. That is, it assumes that a groups aims are 
representative o f members. However, while the pressure group relies on subscriptions 
there is not necessarily an asymmetry between groups and their leaders and hence 
maximisation o f members' utility is not necessarily a basic determinant o f all groups 
levels o f competition. It seems reasonable to propose that the level o f pressure 
exerted by a group is also determined by resources available and the political climate 
within which they operate. It is necessary for a successful group to have a strategic 
decision-making policy in order for it to respond to the dynamic nature o f politics and 
this strategic policy is likely to be relatively independent o f members whose
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involvement in group activities is generally dormant, particularly groups such as 
Greenpeace or RSPB who are relatively autonomous. Also large interest groups such 
as NFU can not be representative o f all their members, all o f the time.
The final element to be discussed in this section addresses Beckers proposition that 
policy determination is centred on the failure o f economic markets and the resulting 
struggle between pressure groups for efficiency in the distribution o f subsidies and 
taxes. Although obviously there is a market for regulatory decision, it is considered to 
be more helpful within the context o f this study to explicitly analyse policy-making in 
terms o f 'political markets'. Hence the 'efficiency' of political markets focuses not 
on the dead-weight losses associated with given policy options but the degree of 
information asymmetry between the regulated industry (agriculture), other interested 
parties (environmental and conservation pressure groups) and the political principal 
(government). The asymmetries are proposed to be a result o f 'policy entitlements' 
(Bromley 1991, Hodge 1989) historically established by the farming and landowning 
community in the UK and who have, as a result, enjoyed 'insider' status in policy­
making (Grant, 1989). 'Policy entitlements' are what have maintained the status quo 
property rights and mean that the market for land use policy is not 'perfectly 
competitive'. This is discussed in more detail in the following chapter.
3.5.2 The role of government
Becker (1983) openly resists the notion that governments might have their own 
agenda. This is illustrated in the following quote,
"Redistribution in democracies would not be guided by social welfare functions or 
other measures o f  social fairness, but mainly by the altruism, selfishness, envy, and 
morality o f  the more powerful interest groups" (Becker, 1985).
Therefore, Becker is simply saying that policies are determined by the political 
influence o f powerful interest groups. Government seeks to maximise its own 
support by meeting the policy demands o f the most powerful interest groups. 
Borcherding (1985) points out that this new cynicism 'of government as selfishly 
redistributive' neglects the role of productive expenditure by governments. 
Empirical evidence from policy analysis (Rausser 1990) illustrates that the state can 
be and is active, with its own agenda and social welfare objectives. Rausser and 
Foster's model o f Political Preference Functions and Public Policy Reform (1990) 
suggests that government seeks to maximise its support from social groups through a
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combination o f two types o f policy. The first is increasing social welfare by what is 
described as, Political Economic Resource Transaction Policies (PERTs), and the 
second is concerned with redistributing social welfare, Political Economic-seeking 
Transfer Policies, (PESTs). Traditionally, analysis o f public policy reform tends to 
focus on PESTs. Rausser and Foster (1990) assume policies are in place in part 
because they serve the interests o f those with relative political power and influence 
but also to serve a welfare function. This latter function indicates the possibility of 
governments being active with their own agenda.
Whilst PESTs redistribute wealth and are not directly concerned with efficiency, 
PERTs directly affect efficiency by reducing transaction costs in the private sector by, 
for example, correcting market failures by providing public goods. This joint product 
approach to public policy avoids the extreme view found in much o f the literature 
that focuses on government failures or on market failures corrected by benign 
governments.
The market-exchange effects o f PERT in equilibrium reduces producers benefits, but 
increases total wealth. That is to say, the distribution o f benefits change to the 
detriment o f producers. Producers acting as a coalition may obstruct the 
implementation o f a PERT unless they receive adequate compensation. Rausser and 
Foster (1990) suggest compensation could be achieved by introducing a PEST to 
transfer some wealth resulting from the new PERT equilibrium to producers. Despite 
this apparent transfer of wealth it may be a means of securing the PERT as an 
inefficient rent-seeking based policy. In other words the PEST acts as a form o f 
compensation to producers in order to implement the PERT which reduces the 
producers rents (profits). It is therefore important that the social costs o f PESTs are 
not judged in isolation reinforcing Beckers (1983) claim that inefficient public policy 
may be more socially efficient than an apparently more efficient private policy. There 
are a range o f possible balances between PERT and PEST for securing political 
power. Consequently the Rausser and Foster (1990) framework has three main 
dimensions which include (i) the level o f PEST intervention, (ii) the level o f PERT 
intervention and (iii) the choice of the policy instrument mix.
The policies accomplishing wealth transfer cannot be isolated from the policies 
providing public goods. What may appear to be socially wasteful and incoherent 
agricultural programmes (known as 'socially inefficient transfer schemes') may in 
reality be rationally designed schemes of compensation for larger, longer-term policies
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which expand total societal welfare. Therefore, the social costs o f PESTs should not 
be judged in isolation. To ensure the political viability o f some PERTs a degree of 
social cost may be incurred in the implementation of'inefficient transfer schemes'.
Beckers focus on the efficiency of policies as being a major determinant o f taxes and 
subsidies appears too simplistic. What he appears to be referring to is technical 
efficiency leading, by default through equilibrium analysis, to social efficiency. 
However, Rausser and Fosters' attention on the social efficiency o f policies draws on 
Beckers recognition o f the potential societal contribution o f policies and thus, enable 
the concept o f efficiency to not only be more intelligible but also to be a more 
plausible determinant o f policy choice. In short therefore, their model addresses the 
redistributive effects o f some policies and contributes to the understanding o f 
efficiency. Rausser and Fosters concept of the achievement o f social optimality 
through the mix o f policies clarifies the use of 'efficiency' - there are two levels o f 
efficiency: technical and social. Furthermore, their model marries the efficiency and 
redistribution (or equity) implications of policy choice.
Gardner (1987) proposes the idea, in support of Rausser and Foster (1990), that 
agricultural programmes are essentially income redistributional measures or in 
Rausser and Fosters terminology a PEST. Gardner (1987) emphasises the importance 
o f the cost to producers of generating political pressure and the social cost of 
redistribution in his attempt to explain variations in producer protection afforded by 
farm price support programs since the 1930s.
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These variables influence the extent of intervention consistent with the economic view 
o f politics according to which policy results are basically analogous to the supply and 
demand equilibrium of a competitive market.
The governments choice problem is reflected through the effects o f its actions on a 
government support function, S, where S = S(SC, Sj-) and Sc represents the consumers 
support and Sf  represents the producers support. Politicians institute policies to 
maximise popular support from the two groups. Government realises its actions 
affect economic welfare of the two groups and their welfare is directly related to their 
political support. Given government actions the levels o f surpluses are determined by 
the group's individual members consuming and producing in response to market 
incentives and government policies. So government has to decide on the combination 
o f policy that optimally trades-off consumer and producer support through 
manipulation o f their welfare. Therefore it is these groups that set the political 
environment in which the government allocates society's total welfare between 
consumers and producers.
Figure 3.3 Society's total welfare
The governments choice of PESTs and PERTs is constrained by: (i) the current state 
o f technology; (ii) the state of managerial ability of politicians; and (iii) the state of 
theoretical and conceptual foundations on which to build policy.
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These constraints place limits on the total available economic surplus possible and 
create a social cost of transfers between groups. Furthermore they provide 
boundaries within which interest groups can operate and suggest such groups are not 
all-powerful. This latter point is substantiated by the current existence within the UK 
of a weak environment policy and a well subsidised agricultural policy. The supply- 
side critique requires a more explicit definition of the role o f government in policy 
determination. The third constraint provides scope for the introduction o f an 
environmental ethic into the equation of determinants of government expenditure.
Rausser and Foster (1990) endeavour to model the governments' policy choice 
problem. The government chooses a level of consumer and producer surpluses within 
the constraints described above which also seeks to optimise public support. 
Governments allocation o f surpluses is dependent on the degree o f rewards (rise in 
support) and penalties (fall in support) offered by each group; and each group offering 
more rewards and penalties as they become more responsive to changes in their 
collective welfare.
Distribution of resources
Economics is generally defined as the allocation o f scarce resources between 
competing social objectives. Given an initial distribution o f resources how would 
economic agents behave so as to improve their welfare? According to Pareto the 
agents would exchange commodities until no agent could be made better off without 
making at least one other agent worse off. Provided that the initial distribution of 
property rights is equitable allocative efficiency gives rise to the best o f all possible 
worlds.
Many economists have maintained though that allocative efficiency is insufficient to 
maximise social welfare and a social welfare function is required to discriminate a 
social optimum from the array o f efficient allocations that correspond to alternative 
assignments o f property rights. Because a satisfactory form for a social welfare 
function has remained elusive to economists, a sharp line of demarcation has been 
drawn between questions of efficiency and equity.
Daly and Cobb (1990) argue that in resource economics the line is often crossed: 
'optimal depletion' may be used where in fact 'efficient' depletion is meant. This 
overlooks potential improvements in social welfare achievable through the
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reassignment o f property rights across generations (i.e. time preference).
Baumol and Oates (1988) describe Pareto Optimality as a "weak criterion which 
sweeps under the rug the issue o f distribution".
Allocative efficiency generally receives most attention from economists while 
distributional issues attract relatively little attention. That is, the redistribution of 
public resources in the political market to powerful interest groups is determined by 
market forces and not addressed as an issue for which planning decisions could be 
made.
Becker (1983) discusses the outcome of political competition as achieving a socially 
optimal equilibrium consistent with the Pareto criterion. In addition to the point that 
using the Pareto rule, though efficient does not necessarily achieve the socially 
optimal distribution o f resources, there are two further points. Firstly, the 
Compensation Principle, though included in the theoretical model is rarely applied,14 
and secondly, the initial distribution of property rights is generally such that the 
balance o f interests represented on the political market are skewed thus interests do 
not compete on a 'perfect market' but rather one which has asymmetries o f 
information, barriers to entry (into policy-making) and differences in the numbers of 
groups representing interests (for example agriculture has one large group, the NFU, 
and conservation interests are made up of a large number o f various sized groups). 
The centrality o f the perfectly informed, rational economic man, 'homo economicus' 
implies the maximisation of utility (measured in terms o f income) and the rationality 
o f pressure groups behaviour omits the complexities associated with altruistic 
behaviour.
The impacts (costs and benefits) o f nature conservation policy can not readily be 
quantified in economic terms and thus the actual contribution o f nature conservation 
to society's welfare is recognised as elusive. Therefore, although Harberger (1971) 
offers a framework 15 for evaluating social welfare there remain difficulties associated
14 The compensation principle: the principle that total economic welfare increases from a change in 
the economy, if those who gain from the change could compensate those who lose from it to their 
mutual satisfaction. It is not necessary for money transfers to actually take place. The principle has 
been criticised in this respect because without actual transfers, inter-personal comparisons of utility 
of money are implied. Actual transfers are required if individuals are to reveal the total worth they 
place on their gains and losses.
15 Harberger offers three basic postulates to provide a conventional framework for applied welfare 
economics (or Cost Benefit Analysis). 1. The price for a given unit measures the value of that unit to 
the demander; 2. The supply price for a given unit measures the value of that unit to the supplier; 3.
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with quantification o f the social welfare function. Essentially this is because the 
impacts have not been traded in a market, although recent SSSI settlements could be 
inferred as quasi-market conditions with a willing buyer and a willing seller.
Rausser and Foster remain within the framework o f neo-classical economics which 
seeks equilibrium outcomes and maintains a two dimensional model. One o f the 
fundamental drawbacks of Rausser and Fosters model (in common with Beckers 
theory (1983)) is the two dimensional approach. This approach suggests only the two 
opposing interests o f consumers versus producers and taxpayers versus those 
subsidised and all those taxed would come under one interest (for example, in a land 
use dispute, recreationists, conservationists, economic developers could all be 
taxpayers) and all those subsidised (farmers, landowners, foresters) would also come 
under one interest in such a model. In reality, interests are likely to be 
multidimensional with a significant degree of overlap. In addition to the spectrum of 
interests o f pressure groups, the interests of public officials within government 
(department and quango) also must be recognised as having influence on policy­
making.
3.5.3 The importance of the 'supply-side' of the political market:
(Becker's 'black box')
Discussion o f Rausser and Foster's theory leads on to the second supply side issue 
concerning the lack of explicit definition by Becker (1983) o f what V means and as a 
result the over simplification o f the political market. While the integral nature of 
special interest groups to the political process is accepted in this thesis, what is also 
proposed is that policy choice is not solely defined by their activities and 
redistribution o f government resources is considered to be affected by many factors, 
including the orientation o f public officials. In addition to including the influences of 
other agents (government officials, EU officials, media) and not just powerful 
pressure groups, it is also crucial to illustrate how influence functions are generated 
from the competition among interests for the distribution of property rights at the 
local community level which then filters up through the political process to the
When evaluating the costs and benefits of a given action the costs and benefits accruing to each 
member of the relevant group should normally be added without regard to the individuals to whom 
they accrue. Harbergers methodology fails to address the conflict of social connotations with a 
market orientated account of externalities. So although we need some recognition of a more active 
state the inclusion of Harbergers 'social welfare function' is not satisfactory. Use of the technique is 
contentious and is still based on the orthodox 'rational economic man'.
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national policy-making level and the resulting determination o f policy. 
Figure 3.4 An extended framework
The above system is one element of an extended construct. It is proposed within this 
thesis that there exists a wider framework which includes external influences such as 
the EU, international policy, media, public opinion and civil servants on decision 
making by government. (This may be the 'black box' which Becker (1983) refers to 
but does not define.)
In Becker's model (1983) the area between 'Pressure production functions' and 
'Decisions by government' (Area 'A') up to now has excluded a wide range o f other 
actors (e.g. public officials). However, in this thesis the theoretical net is cast to 
include a wider range of individuals and organisations which are considered influential 
in the process. Furthermore, the direct translation of pressure production by pressure 
groups into decisions by government is not explained and considered to be too 
simplistic. Institutional factors are often among the most formidable obstacles to the 
development and implementation of policies according to Ingram (1984). Ingram 
recognises the importance o f institutional factors in the success o f water resource 
planning and evaluation and as a result provides guidelines for gathering and analysing 
relevant information on institutional factors. Ingrams (1984) rationale (in support of
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the above critique) for including factors such as orientation o f public officials and the 
resources actors have available to pursue their interests provide sufficient reason to 
include them in the alternative theory being proposed in this thesis.
It is obviously necessary in real life to consider a model with multidimensional 
interests and not simply two in diametric opposition such as consumers versus 
producers. Within the context of this thesis there are two factors: (i) the multi­
dimensional nature of land use interest generally (includes agriculture, landowning, 
landscape, development, recreation and nature conservation interests) and, (ii) within 
the environment and conservation movements themselves. There is not always 
consensus within the conservation movement adding to the complexity o f political 
competition.
Furthermore, the landowing and farming lobbies face a reduction in financial support 
o f the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) and a move towards a more free market, 
they are beginning to form alliances with the conservation lobby, perceiving future 
land incomes may rest in grants for conservation activities. The taxpayers bill for the 
CAP subsidies may decrease in the future but it is probable that subsidies for 
environmental payments will rise. Therefore, overall support to landowners and 
farmers as an 'exceptional' industry is likely to remain constant but the forms of 
support and raison d'etre will move from being production oriented to being more 
environmentally sustainable and directly supportive of rural communities. In terms of 
understanding the political market for policy choice the trend towards increasing 
overlap o f land interests adds to the overall complexity o f the system.
Finally, although Becker (1983) accepts the size of groups might change as those that 
are politically successful expand, he does not take account o f this within the model. 
He makes an explicit assumption that active pressure groups have stable influence 
functions and that the size of each group is fixed. Also, although in reality taxes are 
annual or semi-annual, the government actually makes some long-term decisions 
particularly those associated with the natural environment. Long-term decision­
making will come about as a result of an extended period of consultation with 
relevant interests and discussion with policy-making arenas. As groups gain public 
support and influence over time, so their impact on decisions will increase. This time 
dimension is crucial to the understanding o f policy choice.
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The above discussion outlines the main theoretical and methodological problems with 
Beckers theory. This review highlights two basic methodological flaws; (i) it assumes 
groups pursue self-interest; and, (ii) that all decisions at all levels are based on 
economic rationality. In pursuit o f a theory o f environmental policy-making a move 
away from this mathematically, reductionist method is proposed towards a broader 
approach which addresses the complexities o f the political system identified above.
3.6 Discussion
The movement towards regulation o f agricultural economic activity for protection o f 
the environment has evolved and to some extent consolidated its position with acts o f 
parliament in 1949, 1968, 1981, 1985 and 1990. Public Choice theory has derived 
from Economic Theory which was bom in a wave o f enthusiasm for the notion that 
regulatory agencies are 'captured' by producers. Since then, Economic Theory has 
evolved towards an emphasis on the coalitional aspects o f politics where the need to 
balance pressure emanating from competing interests plays a central role. The 
essential points o f contemporary Public Choice theory are the following: (i) that 
compact well organised groups (i.e. producer groups) tend to benefit more from 
regulation than broad diffuse groups; (ii) regulatory policy will seek to preserve a 
politically optimal distribution o f rents across the board. Thus, over time the policy 
will tend to offset changes in this optimum distribution arising from shifts in demand 
or cost conditions; and, (iii) because the political payoff to regulation arises from 
distributing wealth, the regulatory process is sensitive to dead-weight losses. 
Expensive policies, that is, with high dead-weight costs and therefore which reduce 
the total wealth available for distribution will be avoided because they reduce the 
political payoff.
Beckers theory o f Competition Among Interest Groups for Political Influence 
represents the neo-classical approach by economists to political economy (policy 
science with an economic methodology). While there exist a number o f 
methodological and theoretical difficulties in adopting Beckers Public Choice model 
in a real world case, there are several key concepts which contribute to the overall 
understanding and are thus carried forward into the alternative paradigm in the 
following chapter.
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The central concept o f Beckers theory, the importance o f interest groups and the 
competition o f interests in the political market for the distribution o f government 
resources, are essential to the formulation o f an alternative paradigm. There are also 
a number o f intuitive propositions which are key to the understanding o f government 
decision-making. These include:
• government intervenes to correct market failure;
• the importance o f the costs o f policy in determining government intervention;
• government favours the politically powerful (and influence is determined by the 
level o f pressure production (political expenditures) plus their intrinsic influence);
• the tyranny o f the status quo. The political sector will not interfere much with the 
private distribution o f income even when groups benefiting from interference are 
better organised politically then groups harmed as long as they are not much 
better organised;
• the relative influence o f interest groups and the interdependence o f their influence 
functions are important determinants o f government decision-making.
The above propositions are carried forward and incorporated into the alternative 
paradigm. Having identified the importance o f the competition o f interests, the actual 
interests will be explored in more detail with a more explicit illustration o f how 
property rights are redefined on the political market. National and local policy arenas 
are linked through competition over property rights and information exchange.
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Public Choice theory is considered in this thesis to be "an important piece o f  
intellectual capital that is not yet fully depreciated" (Levine, 1989 in Peltzman, 
1989).
In reference to the political element of the analysis, Levine suggests that we need a 
meta theory which examines the areas left unexplored. To answer the question o f how 
the government allocates budget or what motivates them towards making provisions 
for economic regulation we must broaden our horizons and look outwith the 
discipline o f economics. It is evident that the theories of Stigler, Posner, Peltzman 
and Becker are developed by neo-classical economists and thus emerge from a 
typically reductionist framework. In order to correct some misconceptions and fill the 
theoretical gaps discussed above, the framework for a comprehensive theory of 
economic policies for conservation o f nature must be broadened to envelope a 





"Theory is as indispensable to political analysis as a map or compass is to a 
traveller crossing unknown terrain. A theory serves to direct one's attention to 
particular features o f the world, thus performing the essential task o f  distinguishing 
the significant from the irrelevant" (Brooks, 1989:p41).
The analysis o f the Public Choice theory in chapter three has identified several key 
issues that have been shown to reduce to four main themes. These include the 
methodological approach; the interests of individuals; the nature o f influence and 
competition; and; and finally, the nature of policy-making and the role of government 
in policy choice. The four main themes are addressed and integrated into the 
alternative paradigm below. A definitive summary of an alternative paradigm is 
offered below and this is followed by a systematic discussion of the constituent 
elements.
4.2 An alternative paradigm
i. The methodology adopted in this thesis is best described as a 'soft systems' 
approach which models real world situations as they exist rather than a hard 
systems, modelling approach which requires abstraction and restrictive 
assumptions (MacAdam, 1989). The complexity o f political decisions necessitates 
the adoption of a multi-disciplinary approach that includes economics, politics, 
environmentalism and culture.
ii. Private and public interest groups are considered to be the central agents of 
policy-making in the regulation of land use for nature conservation. Interest 
group member's are either producers, consumers or individuals with a public 
interest (moral or altruistic). Interest groups are assumed to use political influence 
to enhance the well-being o f their members or to pursue the attainment of a wider 
goal (e.g. environmental protection) not just for the benefit o f their members but 
for society as a whole. Therefore, in the present context the motivations of
82
interest groups are assumed to include economic, political, social, environmental 
and conservation interests. Furthermore, it is proposed that a competition of 
interests stimulates political activity that focuses on the present distribution of 
property rights (benefits streams) within the market for policy. Interests are 
assumed to be multi-dimensional (as described above), overlapping and 
continuously competing over an undefined time period.
Becker (1983) assumed that competition among groups is stimulated in the 
pursuit of efficiency. This neo-classical approach assumes that in the pursuit of 
micro efficiency the optimal outcome for society will be secured (a Pareto optimal 
outcome that is by definition a social optimum). However, while interest groups 
do seek micro (or technical) efficiency to maximise their influence on the political 
process, (i) it is not assumed to be the prime motivating factor in the competition 
among groups; and (ii) social efficiency in terms of a pareto optimum solution is 
not assumed in the alternative paradigm to be the outcome o f competition among 
groups. Furthermore, within the alternative paradigm social (macro) efficiency is 
considered in a wider sense and includes allocation and distribution issues
iii. The influence o f pressure groups is assumed in the alternative paradigm to not 
be fixed and can be expanded by expenditure of time and money on campaigns, 
political advertising and other ways that exert political pressure. The relative 
pressure of interest groups creates change. Absolute influence is constrained 
within the limits determined by prevailing social ideology. Interest groups, and 
particularly environmental groups, must ensure their members keep up with the 
group's ideas for continued support. That is, ensure the interests o f group 
leaders are commensurate with members interests. Groups maximise their 'pay­
offs' by spending a given amount on political pressure which is determined by the 
productivity of their expenditures and the behaviour of other groups. There 
exists a strong network (formal and informal) in the policy community with 
groups becoming increasingly aware of each other. In his theory Becker (1983) 
assumes pressure groups to be the only influence on policy-making. However, it 
is proposed in this thesis that the range of influences includes not only influential 
pressure groups but also: (i) 'government1 in the sense that it may have its own 
agenda; (ii) policy-makers, including civil servants and ministers who may have 
their own individual interests that they could represent; (iii) external influences 
from the EU or international political markets; and finally, (iv) public opinion 
(generally expressed through the media);
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iv. The outcome o f competition then is not an 'optimum equilibrium outcome' as 
described by Becker (1983) but rather a dis-equilibrium outcome characterised by 
the satisficing of players' interests. Policy outcome is dependent upon the micro 
variables of (i) efficiency o f groups in producing pressure; (ii) the effect of 
additional pressure on their influence; (iii) the number of persons in different 
groups; and, (iv) the dead-weight costs of certain taxes and subsidies associated 
with given policy solutions. In addition, policy outcome is also dependent upon 
the macro variables such as the absolute costs of a policy and the economic and 
political climate. These are, in turn, dependent upon government ideology and 
how recent the last policy reform was. Competition o f interests affect the 
decision-making process and thus policy-making is perceived to be an iterative 
and fragmented process.
4.3 An alternative methodology
There are two principle reasons why a mathematical approach, as adopted by Becker 
(1983) does not contribute to the understanding of government regulation for 
environmental protection.
The first is the "misplaced concreteness" (Daly and Cobb, 1990) that such a model 
implies and secondly, the complex and interdisciplinary nature of environmental 
problems, means any abstraction from the real world results in a potentially important 
unexplored remainder as discussed in chapter three. The advantages o f a tightly 
bound theory, such as, conciseness and simplicity are recognised. However, a more 
descriptive and comprehensive presentation of the alternative theory precludes 
important decisions being taken from an abstract model and also facilitates the 
understanding of a wider audience than just those familiar with mathematics. 
Therefore, in this thesis the first and most important step is to establish the theoretical 
construct and test its empirical validity.
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The second reason for adopting a descriptive approach is the inherent diversity o f 
environmental issues. The nature o f environmental issues are considered to be:
(i) Multidimensional and multi-disciplinary,
(ii) non-monetary and monetary,
(iii) degradation is often irreversible,
(iv) multisectoral across society or economy,
(v) problems often extend beyond the actors involved in market
transactions. That is, the issues impinge on the interests (such 
as the property rights) o f other parties,
(vi) there is considerable spatial extension so issues are not 
necessarily limited to one county or country,
(vii) there exists uncertainty and risk; and, finally,
(viii) environmental problems involve conflicts between different
interests and ideologies in society. (Soderbaum, 1987)
Many o f these broad ranging characteristics are incompatible with the reductionism o f 
Beckers approach to public choice theory. Therefore, assuming environmental issues 
are inherently complex in nature, the conflict and debate (policy choice) surrounding 
resolution is also going to be complex. To reduce the debate to two dimensions 
(producer versus consumer), based on individualistic competition o f interests, is over 
simplistic and unhelpful in attaining a full understanding of the policy-making process.
A soft systems approach is assumed to be a more appropriate tool for analysis o f the 
research questions as defined in chapter owo. It is chosen rather than a hard systems 
approach on the basis o f the critique given in Section 3.5. o f chapter three which are 
summarised in the following quote.
"Maths provides a general language which has been widely applied to 'hard' 
problems. The abstract constructs o f calculus and statistics have been found to be 
useful when the elements o f  the situation can be assumed to behave in accordance 
with physical laws. When the elements o f  a 'soft' problem include such features as 
conflicting objectives, unclear or complex information flows, people with differing 
perceptions and attitude, etc. it is difficult to see how a mathematically-based 
language can be appropriate” (Wilson, 1984).
It is proposed in this thesis that studying the issues o f policy-making should start with 
the whole situation before its reduction to constituent components. As noted above 
(Soderbaum, 1987) environmental problems are almost always concerned with things
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which are interacting with other things. Furthermore, these things and the way in 
which they interact are under the influence of changeable environmental conditions 
and evolutionary forces. It is convenient to think o f these interrelationships as 
'systems o f interactions'. This is associated with the fact that totally different 
situations have the same general characteristics o f boundaries, inputs, outputs, 
transformations processes, and an environment (physical or social). Within this 
concept o f 'systems of interactions' there are two main types o f system: (i) those 
which have clear goals and/or predictable outcomes (purposive or hard 'systems' 
which include natural systems, designed physical systems and designed abstract 
systems); and, (ii) those where goals may be unrecognisable and outcomes ambiguous 
and uncertain (purposeful or 'soft' systems which include human activity systems1).
The various methodologies and techniques used for analysing sets of issues or 
problems are therefore contingent upon the nature of the system(s) involved. Given 
the critique o f Beckers 'hard' system in Section 3.5 (chapter three) a 'soft1 system 
dealing with a human activity system is more appropriate in this thesis.
Checklands work began by trying to use systems ideas in ill-defined problem 
situations. Its outcome is a systems-based methodology for tackling real-world 
problems, and for exploring social reality. It gives support to the view that social 
reality is not a 'given' but is a process in which an ever-changing social world is 
continuously re-created by its members. Taking a systems approach to investigating 
this research question provides a more useful paradigm for learning about policy­
making than a reductionist, discipline based approach.
The soft systems methodology, when regarded as a whole, is defined as a learning 
system which uses systems ideas to formulate four 'mental acts': perceiving, 
predicating, comparing and deciding on action. Therefore, the output o f the soft 
systems methodology is very different from the output of hard systems modelling: "it 
is learning which leads to a decision to take certain actions, knowing that this will 
lead not to 'the problem' being 'solved' but to a changed situation and new learning" 
(Checkland, 1993).
1 Human activity systems are less tanglible than natural and designed systems although they remain 
clearly observable in the world. They include at one extreme one man yielding a hammer and at the 
other, international political systems.
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There is a cycle o f interaction between the formulation o f theory relevant to the set of 
issues and the testing o f that theory by the application o f methodology appropriate to 
the subject matter (in this case a combination o f qualitative and quantitative 
methodologies). From that focus it is possible to formulate two kinds of theory: the 
first, is substantive theory about the subject matter; and the second is methodological 
theory about how to investigate the subject matter. The appropriate methodology can 
be used to test the theory and the results from this test which itself involves action in 
the real world (for example, observation) will provide what Checkland (1993) calls 
'case records'. These are records o f happenings under certain conditions. These 
provide 'the crucial source o f criticism which enables better theory to be formulated, 
better models, techniques and methodology to be developed" (Checkland, 1993).
There is no theoretical basis for the set o f generalised concepts in soft-systems but 
they are derived from the experience o f real-world problem solving and are important 
aspects o f real-world activity. It is important to note that the analyst is not modelling 
what exists but rather is modelling a view of what exists.
Therefore the approach adopted in this thesis is soft-systems which allows a wider 
economic, social, cultural and political basis for analysis o f decisions on economic 
regulation rather than the narrow base o f allocative efficiency o f neo-classical 
economics. Other practical applications o f soft systems which offer a detailed 
account o f the methodology are given in Checkland (1993) and MacAdam (1989).
4.4 Interests of individuals and the nature of competition
The neo-classical theory o f human motives assumes rent-seeking behaviour by all 
individuals whether they are entrepreneurs, politicians, bureaucrats, farmers or 
conservationists. This is useful in terms o f hard systems modelling but it fails to 
recognise the diversity o f human behaviour. Humans are complex and can be studied 
from a number o f views. What is proposed in this thesis is that individuals essentially 
have a dual nature: people are prone to greed and self-interest but they are also 
motivated at times by a desire to help and co-operate with one another to promote the 
common good above their own self-interest (Daly and Cobb, 1990). People remain 
individuals in Smith's traditional sense (Wealth o f Nations, 1776) and the individual 
elements o f their behaviour (such as market transactions that generally express the 
rational self-interest attributed to Homo economicus in dominant economic doctrine) 
are considered to be present. However, Homo economicus only covers the individual
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as a consumer and neglects the 'other-regarding' behaviour which promotes the public 
interest. This is commonly found, for example, in those individuals displaying
altruistic behaviour such as community work, writing letters for Amnesty 
International or environmental campaigning. Therefore, assuming individuals have 
this dual nature (of which the balance between the two aspects will vary between 
individuals) this can be translated to interest groups. These individual interests are 
translated from local communities to policy communities by interest groups. The 
'mission' o f interest groups ranges from those interested in maximising the benefits to 
their members (for example, trade unions and economic interest groups, such as the 
NFU) to those groups interested in promoting the common good (Amnesty 
International, Friends o f the Earth, Greenpeace). In between these two types there 
are groups who are interested in both (for example, the RSPB, WWF).
Some individuals will translate their economic, social or environmental interest into 
membership o f a certain group in order to maximise their utility (which may be 
dependent upon income or non-monetary benefits such as altruism). Groups therefore 
compete at a local, national or international level to promote the interest they 
represent. In this way local, individual interests are translated into influences in 
political markets.
The fact that regulation for environmental protection exists shows that individuals are 
not simply consumers bent on satisfying every subjective preference and that they 
insist on their role as citizens as well (Jacobs, 1991). This role as 'citizen' may be 
expressed through the membership o f an interest group that competes in the political 
market to advance or consolidate environmental legislation.
It may be argued that 'citizen-type' behaviour towards environmental protection is in 
fact displaying rational economic behaviour in the traditional sense. It may follow the 
realisation that current methods of resource exploitation are leading to a situation 
which in the short to medium term may impact upon society's production possibilities 
set. While this may be true for some environmental problems such as ozone depletion 
and the depletion of natural, non-renewable energy sources, the drive for protection 
o f natural habitats in remote geographical areas in the UK must come from behaviour 
not explained by the concept of homo economicus. Many individuals (taxpayers) do 
not visit Sites of Special Scientific Interest and may even not know they exist. 
Therefore, not only are the benefits to society as a whole (present and future) not well 
understood but the necessity of National Nature Reserves and SSSIs for human
survival is even less certain. It is therefore hypothesised in this thesis that human 
motivations for protection of the natural environment are based upon deriving non­
monetary benefits and on altruistic behaviour to protect the interests o f future 
generations. These interests are translated into influence and 'meet' at a policy 
community where policy decisions are made. The policy decision-making process is 
shaped by the competition o f private and public interests. The competition of 
interests is best understood by adopting a property rights approach.
"Property... is a benefit (or income) stream and a properly right is a claim to a 
benefit stream that the slate will agree to protect through the assignment o f  duty to 
others who may covet, or somehow interfere with the, the benefit stream...Property is 
not an object but rather a social relation that defines the property holder with 
respect to something o f value (the benefit stream) against all others. Thus property 
is a triadic social relation involving benefit streams, rights holders and duty bearers" 
(Bromley, 1991 :pl).
Therefore, regulation for nature conservation is determined by the conflict over the 
benefit streams o f landowners and farmers (duty bearers) and the benefit streams of 
the public (rights holders). Traditionally property rights theory advocated that 
existing property rights reflected a natural order of things for law to help allocate in 
efficient and equitable ways. (Locke, 1632-1704) While this is appealingly simple, it 
is more likely to be the case that,
"Property rights result from a congery o f statutes, ...precedents, reasonable 
expectations and social practices that as a whole need serve no one purpose" 
(Sagoff, 1988).
Hence, without a statutory framework and a well-ordered society there are no 
property rights. The legal systems determine whether there are any property rights 
and what they are, for example, rights over land ownership or public access to private 
land.
Transfer rules are the key rules (legal, administrative and fiscal mechanisms) which 
define contemporary property rights and play a regulatory and legitimising function 
associated with statutory land use planning decisions which cover the ownership, 
exchange and development of landed assets.
It is the benefit streams (from land) and the claims to benefit streams over which 
conflict in regulation for nature conservation arises. Regulation is the set of transfer 
rules which protect or alter the benefit streams of duty bearers (landowners and
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farmers) and rights holders (the public).
Environmental and conservation groups lobby for a redistribution of rights away from 
the individual landowner to society (the public) at large. Economists tend to see 
property rights as factors of production and, therefore, firms can buy or sell property 
rights just as they can other factors of production. Thus, property rights can be used 
as policy instruments because they can be altered (through transfer rules) to meet 
certain desired ends. The choice o f transfer rules highlights the debate on market 
versus non-market processes in the determination of environment policy. A number 
of individuals would allow the total management of natural resources through markets 
while others, accepting that markets may work for a number of commodities, feel they 
may be quite unhelpful in the management of natural resources (Daly and Cobb, 1990; 
Jacobs, 1991). This is because a pareto optimal outcome which maximises allocative 
efficiency does not necessarily result in an efficient distribution of resources for 
society as a whole.
Landowners with full private property rights may choose to follow market trends that 
result in a lowering o f environmental quality and public pressure may rise to such a 
level (i.e. a change in socio-cultural values) that government has to alter private 
property rights with some specific public policy.
Conflict arises from the fact that property rights o f public-consumption goods (such 
as beautiful landscapes, natural flora and fauna, clean air) are ill-defined. Status quo 
property rights indicate landowners and occupiers have private property rights over 
their land but the fact that natural flora and fauna are public goods indicates that their 
property rights are characterised by a common resource property rights regime. If the 
environment (natural flora and fauna) is treated as a common property resource (by 
individuals who believe they have private property rights over the use o f the resource) 
and if this resource becomes scarce, the property regime has to be changed by 
introducing scarcity prices or altering the transfer rules. Therefore, property rights 
can be redefined through the political market.
The redistribution of transfer rules (and hence property rights) is a result of,
"culturally mediated societal redefinition o f the countryside with its demand that the 
transfer rules between sectors be amended...agriculture [is] no longer the 
unquestioned apex o f a rural land-use hierarchy, pressure has emerged fo r  an 
overhaul o f the rural land development process and its transfer rules, as well as 
efforts to forge new justifications to support and protect particular interests in land" 
(Marsden et al, 1993 :p 156).
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Regulating land use by designating Sites o f Special Scientific Interests directly 
threatens the landowners benefit stream while, in effect, protecting the benefit stream 
of the nature conservationist or the public. Some form of compensation has to be 
calculated in order to maintain the landowners benefit stream and make the public 
policy implementable. The competition of interests at the national level between 
environmental and conservation groups, and landowning and agriculture groups 
largely determines the extent o f the redistribution of property rights over public 
environmental goods, away from land and farming interests towards the public as a 
whole. The willingness of government to legitimise and protect different property 
regimes is partly explained by the state's perception of the importance of the 
individuals holding the different types of property right, that is, their political sway.2
4.5 The role of government
According to public choice theorists, the major policy decisions of government 
emerge from a set o f pressures from competing interest groups in society. This 
suggests that the conflict over the redistribution o f the property rights associated with 
environmental public goods is solely determined by interest groups, and government 
simply acts as a mediator. These pressure groups set both the political agenda prior 
to competition and are a major channel of communication from individuals to 
government during it which implies interest groups play,
" The role o f  the proverbial 800 pound gorilla - they go where they want, sit where 
they want, and they lake what they want" (Rausser, 1990).
This is an extremely cynical view of the political process. The government-welfare- 
maximising paradigm at the other end of the theoretical spectrum, which indicates 
governments only engage in the improvement o f allocative efficiency through 
collective action, is equally unrealistic. Governments do more than just serve political 
rent-seekers and the politically powerful or concentrate on maximising social welfare. 
Actual policy outcomes are likely to be superior to the purely predatory outcome and 
worse than the purely productive outcome.
2This relates directly in this thesis to the 'exceptionalism' of the agriculture industry in the UK 
discussed in chapter two.
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"An appropriate political economic model is needed to conceptualise the bargains, 
pacts, compromises and efforts that are undertaken to shape policies acceptable not 
only to those that have the greatest capacity to obstruct the process but also to others 
who stand to benefit from the policies" (Rausser, 1990).
The role of government has classically been seen to intervene in market failure that 
typically occurs in the supply o f public goods such as education, health and the 
environment. Market failure is a socially non-optimum supply of the public good and 
government intervention thus seeks to alter the supply of public goods to a socially 
optimum level. However, it is proposed that government does not just correct market 
failure but also has its own agenda. The extent to which government has its own 
agenda varies (across policies, over time and among political parties) and therefore it 
is impossible to generalise about the role of the state across sectors. Even within 
environmental policy the UK government has taken a significantly advanced lead over 
other EU member states in legislation on animal rights and nature conservation but it 
has been slower on pollution matters (Weale, 1992).
Some policy decisions may reflect neither pressure groups1 activities on the state nor 
the pursuit of public interest by the government. The 'broker state' in pluralist theory 
interprets public policy as the aggregation of pressure groups' activities going on 
inside and outside the state apparatus (Dunleavy and O'Leary, 1987). There is no 
reason why the competition of interests should remain only within the domain of the 
private market and it is more realistic to extend this competition to the public sector 
as well. State officials and state agencies as well as the elected officials have their 
own altruistic and non-altruistic preferences, and policy is as much the outcome of 
self-interested contests within the state apparatus as it is of contests outside. A 
broker state does not neutrally follow public interest or 'mirror society' and that 
"whatever steering capacity it possesses is a product o f the strength o f the dominant 
coalitions inside and outside the state" (Dunleavy and O'Leary, 1987).
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"[A Broker state] consists o f  multiple formal and informal pressure group activities, 
o f coalitions and bargains struck, and extends into the interactions which take place 
amidst the equally multiple activities, coalitions and bargains amongst non-state
pressure groups The boundaries between public and private sectors disappear in a
haze o f fringe organisations and quasi-government agencies" (Dunleavy and 
O'Leary, 1987:p48).
This public-private interaction and multi-dimensional nature of interests is illustrated 
in Figure 4.1.
Figure 4.1 Multi-dimensional interests
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The large, outer circle represents a flow of information which is the advice or 
feedback loop which includes contacts, phonecalls, letters, reports etc. Each 
individual agent or player has a two-way flow between themselves and the 
advice/feedback loop. This flow of information is what influences government to 
develop policies, which are represented by the inner circle. Each agent attempts to 
influence development of policy to meet their own interest. Local and central 
government have a two-way arrow indicating an iterative relation between decision­
making and policy development. Policy goes into all actors, including quangos, 
landowners, interest groups and business. All the actors impact policy in some way 
and abide, to a certain extent, by policy. The broken lines represent the action which 
all agents have to take to meet policy requirements.
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The key points to note are that:
(i) all actors are also action groups;
(ii) because the actors in the policy community are also action groups all interests 
(public and private) including local and central government are interconnected;
(iii) the 'supply side' of the political market (that is, local and central government) is 
active in policy decisions.
(iv) the system is ongoing and therefore dynamic;
This complexity of policy communities illustrates the integration of public and private 
policy communities which means it is extremely difficult to untangle the influences in 
the policy community and determine the catalysts for policy change.
Figure 4.2 The overall system of policy-making
The overall policy-making system is characterised by Figure 4.3 which illustrates the 
three main arenas of influence 1. the central political arena; 2. the media; and, 3. 
public opinion. It is assumed that the basis for interaction or competition among 
different agents is the redistribution of property rights.
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4.6 The overall system
The three large circles in Figure 4.2 represent three layers of interconnected activity. 
In the core there are key pressure groups which form a system of 'interest' 
representation. Individual interests (such as farming, landowning and conservation) 
are collectively represented by their respective interest groups which subsequently 
make representations to policy-makers and hence influence policy. Interest groups 
may direct their representations at all levels of policy-making (local, national, 
european or international) although many concentrate on one level. There is also a 
system o f direct representation between policy-makers and individual interest as it is 
assumed policy-makers are made up o f individuals with their own interests and a 
number of key individuals are influential in decision-making.
The most likely point for initiation of policy reform is the interest group who are 
generally proactive in seeking to maximise the benefits (political rents) to their 
members or to society as a whole. Environmental and conservation groups are 
particularly characterised as being proactive. Nature conservation policy reform is 
basically motivated by three main factors: the costs o f policy; a major change in the 
(economic) environment; and, the emergence o f new political factions or major 
institutional changes e.g. the rise of an interest group. The political market is 
recognised as imperfect. While the organisation of interests is theoretically open to 
all, some parts of society are more likely to mobilise in a concerted effort to influence 
state actions therefore, there exists a dominance of some interests (agricultural and 
business) and political conflict is seen as a shifting constellation of actors that vary 
from issue to issue. The political sector is reluctant to interfere with the private 
distribution o f income due to the dominance of marketeers in decision-making. This 
is not the same as laissez-faire, as the government does protect agricultural interests 
against many shocks and changes in the private sector. The government may use 
laissez faire arguments to restrict intervention in environmental matters when in fact 
they are just protecting the status quo. Major policy trends are explained in terms of 
the political elite which may at times represent national values.
The chief watchdogs guarding the general 'public interest' against governments are 
thought to be the news media (Bagehot, 1992). The national and local newspapers 
play an important role in the mechanism by which environmental problems come into 
the public attention and subsequently mobilise public opinion. The interaction and 
influence of the media and public opinion are complex and dynamic variables which
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often escape observation and Dunleavy and O'Leary (1987) points out that the 
combination of a free press, increasing journalistic professionalism and countervailing 
powers in the media creates a system which generates the information necessary for 
translation o f public opinion into an effective influence on policy-makers and 
politicians.
The media is considered to be a background and a focal expression for public opinion 
with continual information flows. The media reflects cultural change over a longer 
period o f time and contributes more directly in a day to day comment or report on 
events. Therefore the media is part o f an influential backdrop and is considered to be 
one of the actors on the political stage. The two roles are complementary. Illustrating 
the system with three overlapping circles represents the integrated nature o f those 




Chapter five is divided into two parts, research aims and objectives, and methodology.
5.1 Research aims and objectives
There are four main themes in the alternative paradigm which are: (i) methodological;
(ii) interests of individuals and translation o f these interests into influence; (iii) the 
nature o f influence and competition; and, (iv) the nature of policy-making and the role 
o f government.
As described in Chapter Four, a 'soft systems' approach has been adopted in this 
thesis. This involves describing real world situations as they exist rather than 
abstracting from them. This method underpins the whole approach adopted in the 
research and its contribution to meeting the aims o f the thesis are discussed in the 
conclusions in Chapter Seven.
The remaining three themes are interlinked and were simultaneously researched 
through a comprehensive survey which consisted o f three questionnaires developed 
for the following target populations: 'farmer/landowner'; 'local organisations'; and, 
'policy-maker'.
The overall aim of the surveys was to explore the above three main themes through 
the implementation o f SSSI regulation in Orkney and the 1990 policy reform. The 
Orkney Islands were chosen as the area o f study for three principal reasons. The first 
is that it is important to illustrate how influence functions are generated from the 
competition among interests for the (re)distribution o f property rights at the local 
community level which then filters up through the political process to the national 
policy-making level and the resulting determination of policy. The second reason, 
related to the first, is that Orkney is a suitably remote (politically and geographically) 
area to demonstrate the linkages between local and national policy arenas. Orkney is 
also generally perceived to be remote from the locus o f support for the environmental 
and conservation movements. The linkages and potential conflict between local
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farming communities and national support for conservation interests could thus be 
examined. Finally, the choice o f Orkney enabled the proposition to be explored that 
individuals do not necessarily pursue single objective interests. Farming in Orkney is 
perceived as a way o f life and less oriented towards agri-business than areas such as, 
for example, East Anglia.1
In addition to the above rationale for the choice o f Orkney as a study area, Orkney 
was the focus o f a great deal of SSSI controversy in the early 1980s which polarised 
the agriculture/conservation debate, they are an easily defined geographical unit and 
the researcher has considerable first hand knowledge o f the islands and farming 
community.
The three main research themes are broken down in the following discussion into 
objectives for the surveys.
1. To determine the interests of individuals and the translation of their interests 
to policy arenas.
The interests o f individuals and the translation o f their interests is explored primarily 
through the farmer questionnaire. This was done through a three pronged approach. 
The first two approaches were indirect deriving farmer interests from:
(i) their attitudes to SSSIs; and,
(ii) their future nature conservation policy preferences.
The third was a direct method deriving interests from:
(iii) farmers expressed farming objectives and membership o f interest groups.
1 It would be interesting to conduct a comparative study with, for example, East Anglian farmers 
who are considered to be more business oriented and therefore perhaps less multi-objective in their 
interests.
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These are described in more detail below.
i. The principle issues arising from the designation of SSSIs in Orkney were covered 
in the local newspaper during 1983 and 1984. A list o f the titles of articles is 
given in Appendix I. These issues generally fell into three broad groups: 
economic; property rights; and socio-political. This framework served two 
purposes: the first was to illustrate the principle issues relevant to individual 
farmers interests in land use; and, the second provided an opportunity to measure 
for any change in attitudes over the ten year period.
ii. The second approach to determining individual farmers interests was to establish 
what farmers preferences were with respect to future nature conservation policy 
options.
iii. The third approach was direct and sought to determine individual farmer interests 
from their expressed farming objectives and membership of interest groups.
Two main types o f comparison were made: between early media coverage and survey 
results for a general impression of any changes in attitudes; and, between SSSI and 
Non-SSSI respondents to determine whether or not SSSIs had an impact on attitudes. 
These results were also cross referenced with results from more general questions in 
order to achieve a profile of farmer interests in Orkney.
One of the main propositions o f this thesis is that it is the competition between 
agriculture and conservation groups which determines national UK policy for nature 
conservation. As a geographically and politically remote area it was important to 
understand how farming interests in Orkney were represented in policy arenas. In 
support o f this, it was necessary to determine how interest groups kept in touch with 
their members and what members perceptions were of the role and effectiveness of 
their interest groups in representing their interests. From these areas of research it 
was possible to establish to what degree farming interest groups were representative 
of their interests.
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2. The second objective was to illustrate the networks, influence and 
competition among players in policy arenas. This objective broadened the analysis 
out from the focus on individual interests and used results from all three 
questionnaires to build on the concept o f the translation of interests into policy arenas 
through networks based on information exchange. Information is assumed to be a 
resource which contributes to a groups influence and therefore the concept of 
information networks was explored in order to identify which groups had influence 
and which groups were key groups. Respondents of all questionnaires were asked 
which organisations they relied upon in order to conduct their business. What made a 
group a 'key' group was explored and thus the determinants o f a group's influence 
were identified. Income and membership data o f key interest groups were also 
collated independently from the three surveys as supporting evidence of their 
influence. The perception of a small number o f key groups with influence leads into 
the final concept o f competition o f interests as the main policy determinant. Policy­
maker respondents were asked about their perceptions of groups' roles with respect to 
their members and what they considered the balance of power to be between 
competing interests.
3. To identify the nature of policy-making and the role of government. The
principle objectives were to determine whether policy-making is driven by the 
competition o f the most influential interest groups; to map out the competition of 
interests and explore the concept that competition over policy is an attempt to 
maintain or redistribute property rights; to determine important external influences on 
policy-making; to determine the nature of policy-making (fragmented, iterative); and, 
finally to understand the outcome o f policy.
These objectives were met through an appraisal o f the 1990 reform of the NCC which 
involved direct questioning of key policy-makers. By examining the reform in detail, 
the debate and negotiation over the regulation and the role of government was 
identified. This case o f reform was chosen because it is the most recent reform in 





Three questionnaires were developed to enable primary research on the three target 
populations described below. The subject areas of each of the questionnaires were 
dovetailed as shown in Table 5.1.









Interest groups relations 
with government
Wider nature conservation issues
Nature conservation policy 
reform
Involvement o f Orkney Islands Council in 
_______ farming and conservation________
Balance o f power between conservation and agriculture interests
Role of pressure groups
Contact with local 
community; contact 
with head office.




The three questionnaires were based on a set of core questions shown in Table 5.1 to 
span across all three target populations. The set of core questions was supplemented 
by additional questions which allowed specific issues to be pursued relevant to the 
particular population being surveyed, such as, the socio-economic profile of farmer 
respondents and contact with the local community and contact with head office for 
local organisations. The use of'core ' and 'supplementary' questions allows a degree 
of flexibility while maintaining the integration of subject matter being researched. The 
'policy-maker1 questionnaire was shorter than the 'farmer/landowner1 as shown in 
Table 5.1 because (i) the policy-maker respondents were assumed to be more familiar 
with the subject area and therefore fewer, but more concise questions could be asked, 
and (ii) their time constraints meant that shorter interviews were preferable. All 
interviews were conducted face-to-face.
The three populations are defined by their geographical, demographic and institutional 
boundaries.
Farmer sample
The target population in this survey was taken from the 536 full-time farmers in 
Orkney. The individual making the majority o f decisions on the farm was selected as 
the respondent and in every instance was available. It was thought that this individual 
was the most likely to be the best informed and aware o f local and policy issues.
From the population of 536 full time agriculture holdings in Orkney, 80 respondents 
were drawn, based on a two-stage stratification (Moser and Kalton, 1986)2. The total 
sample of 80 farmers was allocated between the strata by proportionate allocation and 
subsequently randomly sampled within the second strata.3
2 Only full-time farmers were included in the farmer sample. This is based on the fact that the 
farming population in Orkney principally involves full-time farmers and the proportion of part-time 
or crofting holdings is negligible, and considerably lower than that in the Highlands or Western Isles 
of Scotland.
3Total variation (for any particular variable or attribute) in a population is composed of two 
elements: variation between strata and within strata. For example, among 536 holdings, those with 
SSSIs will have different views from those without; and there will also be variation of opinion within 
each special group. In stratified sampling, variation between strata does not enter into the Standard 
Error because one ensures that this component of variation in the population is exactly reflected in 
the sample. There is no 'chance' about it. Sampling, and therefore the occurrence of chance, only 
takes place within strata. Consequently, since only the variation within strata enters into the 
standard error, the greater the proportion of the total variation, the greater will be the gain due to 
stratification.
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The first stage divided the islands into SSSI and non-SSSI areas shown in Table 5.2. 
The second stage o f the stratification was by location within the SSSI and non-SSSI 
strata. This ensured an even geographical distribution of respondents across the 
islands which is illustrated Figure 5.1.




l4. West Mainland Moors 7 West Mainland 16
2. Harray and Stenness Lochs 3 East Mainland 10
3. Orphir and Stenness 10 South Ronaldsay 6
4. Stromness and Yesnaby 8
5. Rousay 7 Rousay 6
6. Sanday Machair 3
7. Sanday Moors 2 Sanday 2
Total 40 Total 40
This distribution was necessary because the SSSIs were designated over 
approximately a ten year period and there were changes in NCC/SNH staff 
administering the sites. These changes are considered to have had an influence on 
respondents attitudes. The distribution also accommodates the physical, spatial and 
temporal variation across SSSIs. A map of the SSSIs in Orkney is on the following 
page (Figure 5.1).
4 The number beside the name of the SSSI relates to the key in Figure 5.1.
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Figure 5.1 SSSIs in Orkney
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The farmer survey was conducted by the author and an assistant in a 43:37 split 
during January and February o f 1993. From the sample of 536 farmers, 91 were 
contacted to generate 80 successful responses.
Local organisation sample
The target population in the 'Local organisation' survey included representatives from 
the following organisations: Orkney Islands Council planning and economic 
departments; interest groups (agriculture and conservation); SNH (area office); 
SOAFD (local office); and SAC (local office). This included eight respondents and all 
were successfully interviewed.
Policy-maker sample
The target population in the 'Policy-maker1 survey included representatives from the 
following organisations: Scottish Office Agriculture and Fisheries Department; 
Scottish Office Environment Departments; SNH (head quarters); members of 
parliament; members o f the European parliament; peers of the House o f Lords; head 
offices o f agriculture, landowning conservation and environmental interest groups.
The policy-maker sample was based on a non-random sample in the UK generated 
from an informal round of interviews in 1991 which identified 25 key 'policy-makers'. 
Key 'policy-makers' were chosen according to their previous experience and/or their 
current involvement in nature conservation policy-making. The response rate to this 
questionnaire was more variable which was considered to be a result of two factors: 
the first was the high demands on respondents time as a result o f their work and the 
second was the closed nature of some government institutions with respect to policy­
making, and hence reduced accessibility to potential respondents.
All institutions within the target population were represented, although the specific 
individuals chosen in the government departments passed the interview on to other 
colleagues who were also involved in decision-making but with a reduced 
responsibility. With respect to the chosen Members of Parliament and Peers in the 
House of Lords, one MP from a possible two was interviewed and only one Peer 
from a possible four was interviewed. The 21 interviews conducted included a wide 
range of individual and organisation perspectives and that interviews were conducted
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in sufficient depth that the omission of 4 potential respondents was not considered to 
result in any bias.
5.2.2 Questionnaire design
A structured questionnaire was chosen to be the most useful way to generate the 
relevant information from the farmer population and local organisations necessary to 
address the research problem described above.
A combination o f open-ended, multiple choice and dichotomous response formats 
was used in order to provide variation in what proved to be a lengthy interview and 
also to meet differing objectives for different questions. A discussion o f the 
questionnaire design is included in Appendix If.
The farmer questionnaire, local organisation questionnaire and agenda for policy­
maker interviews are included in Appendix III.
A pilot study was carried out on 8 East Lothian farmers in January 1993 before the 
survey was commenced in Orkney. This constituted a sample of 10% of the Orkney 
farmers. While it was recognised that many differences exist between Orkney and 
East Lothian farmers in terms of farm type, size and issues relevant to their farm 
businesses the designation of SSSIs is a national policy and is relevant to all farmers. 
The purpose o f the pilot survey was to ensure the clarity of the questionnaire and its 
structure and flow and that the questions targeted the research problem. Following 
the pilot study, several minor changes were made to existing questions. One of the 
areas o f particular interest in the research was the perceptions of equity associated 
with the system of designating and administering SSSIs and the pilot showed this area 
had not been fully addressed. In order to meet this requirement a number of 
questions were subsequently added. Both the 'local organisation' and 'policy-maker' 
questionnaires were piloted 'in-house' at the Scottish Agriculture College and 
Edinburgh University's Institute of Ecology and Resource Management. Pilot- 
respondents were chosen with respect to their knowledge and experience in nature 
conservation and land use policy and each questionnaire was amended accordingly 
following their comments.
The farmer questionnaire included closed and structured questions and therefore 
generated more formal data than the local organisation and policy-maker
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questionnaires. These included more open questions and therefore generated more 
'soft' data. This has been accounted for in the data analysis in Chapter Six.
5.2.3 Questionnaire bias
In the analysis of the results there are three possible sources of bias which must be 
kept in mind:
(i) The Shetland Oil Spill
During the first week o f January 1993 the Braer oil tanker ran aground off Shetland. 
Extensive media coverage o f this continued during the survey in Orkney and served to 
polarise respondents scepticism towards environmentalists. Discussion with 
respondents revealed feelings of cynicism on two counts. The first was towards 
environmentalists who were perceived to be overreacting to a ’disaster1 which was 
seen by many respondents as not being of any consequence. The second element of 
revealed cynicism was towards local Shetland farmers and Shetland fish farmers 
'bandwagoning' for government money to save any potential loss in income associated 
with the oil spill.
It is thought, for example, that responses to question 27, "How important do you 
think television and newspapers are in influencing policy-makers?" may have been 
positively distorted. In addition to this, scepticism may also have served to distort 
how open respondents were about their own conservation-mindedness, perceiving it 
to be a negative aspect at that time.
(ii) Respondent bias
The ability of some respondents to provide an accurate answer may have been a 
significant area of concern in the farmer questionnaire for two reasons. The first was 
that some respondents admitted they had never considered several o f the questions 
before and secondly, they were unaccustomed to voicing their opinions. Any bias this 
may have created is thought to have been overcome by (a) the size of the sample and 
(b) the large numbers of questions in the survey which allows cross referencing of 




Interviewer bias is an important factor to take into account in questionnaires. The 
farmer questionnaire was carried out by two interviewers both o f whom had previous 
experience in farmer interviewing and who shared local geographical and 
conservation policy knowledge. The distribution of SSSI and non-SSSI respondents 
between interviewers is illustrated in the following figure.






Author 21 (52.5%) 22 (55%) 43
Assistant 19 (47.5) 18 (45%) 37
Total 40 40 80
Interviewer bias was controlled for by ensuring that there was a relatively equal 
distribution of interviews of SSSI and non-SSSI respondents between the two 
interviewers. As a result, the 80 interviews are considered to contain no interviewer 
bias. Furthermore, interviewers collaborated closely during the survey period and it is 
assumed no significant differences in interview technique occurred. Interviewer bias 
is irrelevant in the local organisation and policy-maker surveys as they were all 
conducted by the same interviewer.
In the Local organisation and Policy-maker questionnaires analyst bias is the only 
source of bias which may arise. This could arise as a result of the analysts subjective 
interpretation o f results. This is unavoidable in qualitative data processing but can be 
minimised by extensive interviewing and careful data analysis.
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5.2.4 Data processing and methods of analysis
Farmer survey
Due to the large database generated by the 'farmer' survey, statistical analysis of many 
o f the responses was possible. This was complemented with a non-statistical analysis 
o f the qualitative aspects of the data. Coding dictionaries were compiled for each 
'farmer' questionnaire and data were entered into an Excel spreadsheet database.
There are three main types of analysis on the farmer questionnaire data:
(i) Comparison of SSSI respondent with non-SSSI respondents (to identify whether 
or not the designation had an impact on the attitudes of the respondent);
(ii) Analysis o f the data set as a whole to investigate all respondents interests;
(iii) Cross-tabulation, of respondents answers to two questions. This was aimed at 
respondents as a whole, irrespective of their designation status and could allow for 
checking consistency of answers.
2
The Chi-Squared ) Test was used because o f its power in testing the association
between two data sets (namely farmers with SSSIs and farmers without SSSIs). A 
full description o f the Chi squared Test is included in Appendix IV.
Relative differences (as well as statistical differences) are commonly accepted 
methods o f data analysis as they can give an indication of relationships between 
variables (Burgess, 1991). This is used in all three sets o f data.
Local organisation and policy-maker surveys
The data from the local organisation and policy-maker surveys was collected and 
recorded systematically according to question number. A data base was compiled and 
from this analysis was undertaken.
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Statistical analysis was unsuitable for the 'local organisation1 and 'policy-makers' 
surveys due to the mainly qualitative nature of the data and relatively small sample 
sizes. Although there are 21 respondents of the Policy-maker survey not all of them 
answered all o f the questions. The is a result of the open nature o f many o f the 
questions and it was not always possible to cover all the questions if the interview 
discussion proceeded in a different direction. Therefore, analysis of the qualitative 
data included in all three questionnaires is based on a subjective appraisal o f the 
results and uses previous knowledge and researching skills (Mitchell, 1983).
Analysis o f the data from all three surveys has been made on two levels: statistical and 
qualitative. Throughout the discussion of the results in the following chapter both 
methods o f analysis are drawn together in a complementary role in order to explore 
the research objectives outlined above.
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Results
Chapter Six describes and discusses the major results of the surveys outlined in 
Chapter Five. Therefore, three main parts to Chapter Six include:
(i) the interests of individual fanners;
(ii) networks, influence and competition; and,
(iii) the nature of policy-making and the role of government.
For clarity, each set of results are accordingly referenced with respect to the target 
population: farmer, local organisation or policy-maker. Quotes used from the latter 
two questionnaires are anonymous as agreed during inteiwiews.
Part 1 The interests of individuals
The discussion o f part one of Chapter Six focuses on the results of the farmer 
questionnaire. The general issues which arose from the designation o f SSSIs in 1983 
and 1984 are presented below. These serve to highlight the fears and reservations of 
many Orkney farmers, landowners, representatives o f the NFUS and the local council 
and community councils about the NCC and the process of designations. They also 
provide a benchmark against which to explore more recent attitudes may be explored 
following the passage of time. Next farmer respondents' perceptions of the physical 
and economic impact of SSSIs are discussed, followed by discussion of their attitudes 
towards more general conservation and policy issues. Finally, the results of questions 
concerning farmer respondents' membership of interest groups and the translation of 
farmers' local interests to national decision-makers are presented.
6.1 General local issues arising from the designation of SSSIs
Section 6.1 covers the issues addressed by articles and letters, published in the 
'Orcadian', the local weekly newspaper in Orkney, which reported extensively on the 
conflict during 1983 and 1984.
I l l
These issues were indicative of the concerns of farmers at that time with respect to 
SSSI designations and have been used as a framework for the farmer questionnaire 
outlined in Chapter Five. The issues divide into the following three broad categories: 
economic, property rights and socio-political.
Economic concerns arising from SSSI designation
• A fall in land values resulting from 'designation blight'.
• The erosion of the local economy arising from a contraction in economic activity 
(for example, reduced demand for labour or agricultural inputs).
• The development of a two-tier system of compensation with large payments to 
prosperous farmers and smaller payments to farmers less well organised or placed 
to negotiate with government agencies.
Property rights concerns
• The infringement o f private property rights.
• Adherence to the system was not perceived to be as voluntary as the NCC was 
advocating.
Socio-political concerns
• The NCC was seen to be a non-elected and unaccountable body with no appeals 
procedure which led locals to anticipate absentee control by people who knew 
little or nothing about the locality.
• Perception o f the priority of birds over people.
• Locals felt ill-informed about the system of designations.
The above briefly summarises the principle concerns expressed by farmers and local 
communities at the beginning of the 1980s.
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The results presented in the rest of this Chapter are obtained from the responses to the 
survey questionnaires described in Chapter Five and carried out during January and 
February, 1993.
6.1.1 Farmer respondent attitudes to the system of SSSIs.
Farmer respondents' were asked a number of introductory questions about the general 
issues surrounding SSSI designation in order to introduce the subject area and put the 
respondent at ease. Following this, they were specifically asked, 'What would you 
say, i f  any, are the main shortcomings o f the SSSI policy?'
The main shortcomings of SSSIs by farmer respondents are presented in Table 6.1 
below.
Table 6.1 Main shortcomings o f SSSIs: farmer respondents (41=80)
R esponse SSSI no-SSSI T otal
1. NCC laid down the law; not flexible enough; loss of control; 18 7 25
2. Personality clashes; lack of understanding; lack of communication; 6 7 13
3. Not enough money; no money in the long run; 1 4 5
4. Not enough management of sites; left to nature too much; 2 - 2
5. Too preservationist 1 - 1
6. Unnecessary 1 - 1
7. Abuse of the system 1 - I
8. Cost of the system is too high - 1 1
9. Regulation should be stronger 1 - 1
10. Not enough SSSIs - 1 1
11. T otal com m ents 31 20 51
12. Don't know 9 20 29
T otal resp onses 40 40 80
Many more respondents with SSSIs commented than those without SSSIs. The first 
three responses were the most widely supported. These concerns correspond closely 
to those expressed through the local media during 1983/84 as outlined in section 6.1
above.
The following quotations serve to illustrate the main criticisms of the designation of 
SSSIs in Orkney:
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"What the farmer needed to he compensated for the most was the loss in control" 
(Non-SSSI respondent).
"Red tape, steamroller attitude and too much power" (SSSI respondent).
"The money won't he there in the long-run and money is needed to 'keep the peace'" 
(Non-SSSI respondent).
Responses 4 and 5 criticise the local management o f SSSIs; responses 6, 7 and 8 are 
critical o f the system as a whole; and the final two responses are positive about the 
system of SSSIs and promote their extension.
Of a total of 51 responses 43 were in the first three categories. The relative 
importance of these concerns to the respondents is in line with those expressed 
previously. That is, criticisms have remained in the same three themes as ten years 
before.
Following on from the main criticisms, respondents were asked what changes they 
would like to see to the system of SSSIs in Orkney. Table 6.2 below presents the 
results o f this question.
Table 6.2 Changes desired to SSSIs by farmer respondents (n=80)
Changes desired SSSI no-SSSI Total
1. More money 5 2 7
2. More flexibility 4 3 7
3. More co-operation/communication by SNH (NCC) 1 6 7
4. Practical management 4 2 6
5. Money available to all farms 1 2 3
6. Stop abuse o f the system I 1 2
7. Less staff turnover 1 - 1
8. Fairer compensation 1 - 1
9. Get rid of them 1 - 1
10. Take less time - 1 1
11. Policed more and penalties for violation - 1 1
Total changes 19 18 37
12. Don't know 21 22 33
Total 40 40 80
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The most common changes to the SSSI system desired by farming respondents were 
'more money' (i.e. increased compensation to farmers), 'more flexibility' and 'more 
local communication and co-operation1. 4 respondents said they particularly wanted 
to see positive practical management of heaths and moorlands where they considered 
the heather to be becoming overgrown and 3 respondents wanted to see positive 
management plans for farmers which would be available to all farms and not just those 
with SSSI designations (Table 6.2).
6.1.2 Summary of main results in Section 6.1
The above responses have indicated that the principle area o f dissatisfaction amongst 
farmer respondents lay in the loss of control associated with SSSI designations. This 
was followed by management issues o f consultation and co-operation, and finally, 
concerns over the level and future of compensation payments. The main difference 
between SSSI and non-SSSI respondents was that SSSI respondents gave more 
comments and these were more focused on property rights issues. Non-SSSI 
respondents responses were evenly split between property rights and socio-political 
(local management) issues.
6.2 Economic issues
Eight questions related to farmer respondents' perceptions of the economic impact of 
SSSI designations were asked in order to explore the extent to which the economic 
concerns expressed 10 years ago remained. These questions included the perceived 
impact of SSSI designation on income, stocking levels, off-site impacts and land 
values. The extent to which the system of payments was seen to be equitable was 
addressed with questions relating to the method of compensation and variation in 
compensation payments.
6.2.1 Farmer perception of impact of SSSI designation on farm income
Fanner respondents were asked if SSSI designation had or (in the case of non-SSSI 
respondents) would affect their farm income.
Table 6.3 Farmer perception of impact of SSSl designation on farm income
Respondent
Response SSSI No SSSI Total
Effect 15 18 33
(20.69) (12.31)
No effect 22 4 26
(16.31) (9.69)
Total 37 22 59
N=80; 21 'Don't blow' responses; %  = 9.52 with 1 d.f.; p<0.01.
-)
%  is statistically significant at the 1% level with 1 degree of freedom which
indicates that farmer respondents perception o f income is related to whether or not 
they had an SSSI designation on their land.
The majority of respondents with SSSI designations (22/40) perceived their income to 
have remained constant. 15/37 respondents felt their income had been affected, of 
which 12 perceived an overall increase.
There was a significant difference in perceptions between those respondents with 
SSSIs and those without. That is, following their 'hands-on' experience, those 
respondents with SSSIs were less likely to perceive an impact on their income
following a designation. Table 6.2 illustrates this relationship which has been tested
2
for independence between the two groups using the Chi-squared ) test, when
2
p<0.05. (This is illustrated as %._■)
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%  = 9.537 and is therefore significant. Respondents with SSSI designation were
statistically less likely to perceive an impact on their farm income than respondents 
without SSSIs. (For a full description of the Chi-squared test of independence please 
refer to Appendix IV).
6.2.2 Farmer perception of impact of SSSI designation on stocking levels
Table 6.4 Farmer perception of impact of SSSI designation on stocking levels
Respondent
Response SSSI No SSSI Total
Impact 14 20 34
(19.58) (14.32)
No impact 24 8 32
(18.42) (13.58)
Total 38 28 66
N = 80; 14 'Don't know' responses; ^  =7.721 1 d.f.; p<0.01
Farmer respondents were asked if they believed their stocking levels had been or 
would be affected by an SSSI designation. 24 of those with sites reported no change 
in stocking levels. This compares with one half (20/40) of those without sites who 
thought there would be an impact. The difference between SSSI and non-SSSI 
respondents was significant at the 1% level which indicates a strong association 
between SSSI designation and perceptions o f the impacts of a designation on stocking 
levels. That is, a non-SSSI respondent was significantly more likely to anticipate a 
reduction in stocking levels than a respondent with an SSSI.
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6.2.3 Farmer perception of impact of SSSI designation off-site
Table 6.5 Farmer perception of impact o f SSSI designation off-site
Respondent











Total 37 30 67
N = 80; 11 'Don't know' responses; 2 'No response'; %  = 4.751, 1 d.f.; p<0.05.
Farmer respondents were asked if they thought the designation of an SSSI would 
affect or had affected farming practices on the rest of the farm. Over one half of all 
(SSSI and non-SSSI) respondents thought there had been no change and 24/80 o f all 
farmer respondents thought owners of sites would have intensified activities on the 
farm off-site. The majority of respondents (43/80) reported that they did not perceive 
SSSIs to lead to an intensification of farmer activities on the rest of the farm.
Substantially more farmer respondents without SSSIs answered 'Don't know' (8/10 
'Don't know' responses) which reflects their higher degree of uncertainty not having 
had first hand contact with SSSI designations.
The above results suggest that SSSI designations are not generally perceived to lead 
to farm intensification. This is supported from the results of the other two 
questionnaires.
1 1 8
6.2.4 Farmer perception of impact of SSSI designation on land values
Following concerns in the early 1980s of'designation blight', farmer respondents were 
asked if they perceived a change in land values following an SSSI designation.
26 out o f 80 farmer respondents believed land values to have changed through SSSI 
designation and of these over one half (17/26) expected a decrease in value. 35/80
respondents considered there was no change and the remainder (19/80) responded
2
'Don't biow'. ^  =0.008 with 2 d.f. which indicated that there was no significant 
difference in responses between SSSI and non-SSSI respondents.
6.2.5 Farmer perception of the equity of the SSSI system
In order to examine the concerns expressed in the early 1980s of a two tier system 
developing, farmer respondents were asked for their perceptions about the general 
fairness of the system of SSSI designation. They were then asked more specifically 
about the perceived variation in compensation payments over the last ten year period.
Table 6.6 Farmer perception of the equity o f the SSSI system
Respondent
Response SSSI No SSSI Total
Fair 19 10 29
(15.52) (13.48)
Not fair 11 6 17
(9.10) (7.90)
Don't know 8 17 25
(13.38) (11.62)
Total 38 -> o JJ 71
N = 80; 9 no response; %  = 7.187; 2 d.f.; p<0.025.
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Farmer respondents were asked how fair they perceived the system of SSSIs to be. 
The system was perceived to be 'Fair' by 29/80, 'Not fair' by 17/80 and 25/80 
responded 'Don't know'.
The ChiSquared test indicates a relationship between respondents' perception of 
fairness and whether or not they had a designation. Table 6.5 shows that respondents 
without an SSSI were significantly less likely or able to comment on their perception 
o f fairness in the SSSI system. However of those respondents' who did express a 
view (43) a small majority suggested the system was fair (29/43).
6.2.6 farm er perception of the variation in compensation payments
All farmer respondents were asked if they perceived any variation in compensation 
payments. Payments were perceived to vary by 35/80 of farming respondents, with 
4/80 perceiving there to be no variation in payments and a further 36 responding 
'Don't Know'. Perceptions of variation in compensation payments differed significantly 
depending upon whether or not the respondent had an SSSI; SSSI respondents were
significantly more likely to perceive a variation in compensation payments and non-
2
site respondents were more likely to respond 'Don't Know' (21/40) =5.189; 1
d.f.; p<0.025)
Some respondents pointed out that certain areas of SSSI on the mainland of Orkney 
(Evie, Stenness and Harray) were better compensated in comparison to the other 
areas o f SSSI such as the Isles of Sanday and Rousay. The former areas had been the 
object of agreements reached in the early 1980s during the period of the most intense 
conflict between farmers and landowners, and the NCC. Many respondents tended to 
believe the system had matured in the last 10 years and payments to different areas 
had become more comparable. This perception was substantiated by SNH in 
Edinburgh whose spokesperson said that as more management agreements were 
completed and SNH land agents accumulated a portfolio of payments it became easier 
to calculate comparable levels o f compensation.
A small number of farmer respondents with SSSIs designated in the latter half of the 
1980s commented that the combination of the NCC gaining experience, increased 
public support for nature conservation and an increasingly limited budget, meant 
NCC/SNH were less likely to make large payments to secure management
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agreements. However, there is insufficient data to say how widespread this trend was 
across Scotland.
All farmer respondents were asked if they thought farmers and landowners should 
receive compensation for any loss in income associated with an SSSI. There was 
considerable support for continued compensation of farmers and landowners. 74 
respondents of the farmer survey supported compensation for farmers and 57 
respondents supported compensation for landowners.1
SSSIs were generally perceived to be fair despite the awareness of variation of 
compensation in management agreements throughout the 1980s. The principle issue 
o f unfairness as perceived by farmer respondents was the limited application o f SSSI 
designation to areas of particularly high nature conservation value, rather than across 
the farming community and the wider countryside as a whole.
6.2.7 Farmer perception of the method of calculating compensation.
Following the issue of whether or not there should be compensation for a loss in 
income, all respondents were asked their views on the current method o f calculating 
SSSI compensation payments.
55/80 wished to keep the existing method of calculating compensation with 13/80 
wanting to change to a more standardised payments method than the present method 
of negotiating individual compensation payments. The views of farmer respondents 
with and without SSSI designations were compared using the ChiSquared Test. It
was found that there was no significant relationship between designation and
2
preference for method o f payment. (%  = 1.712; 1 d.f; p<0.05). Furthermore, 57/80
of all farmer respondents wanted to have the right to choose between one-off or 
annual compensation payments. Of those respondents against the concept o f choice 
(10/80), 3 suggested one-off payments were unfair if the land was sold following 
compensation. (13/80 respondents responded 'Don't know'.)
6.2.8 Summary of main results in Section 6.2
1 Marginally lower support for landowners is considered by the author to be due to the negative press 
coverage of certain NCC payments, for example the NCCs compensatory payment of approximately 
£1 mn to J. Cameron (Chapter 2). In addition to this, the view was expressed by a number of farmer 
respondents that some local landowners had enjoyed higher compensation payments. The perception 
amongst farmer respondents was that because landowners are wealthier they can more effectively 
represent their interests.
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There remained a degree of negative perceptions about the economic impact o f SSSIs 
from those respondents without SSSIs. Results from those with SSSIs indicated that 
the designation of SSSIs had a minimal economic impact; in particular, changes in 
income, stock levels and land values were not as great as had been anticipated. 
Therefore there was a notable difference between those with experience o f SSSIs and 
those respondents without experience. Therefore the concerns of the early 1980s 
were not realised although the negative perceptions of those without experience 
remain.
With respect to the perceived fairness o f the system at grassroots, results are 
inconclusive, although the system was perceived to have become fairer over time.
6.3 Property rights issues
This section of the survey explored the political nature of the implementation of a 
policy which has scientific objectives. This included aspects o f control over land use 
decisions and voluntary versus regulation methods o f meeting policy objectives. 
Respondents were asked a number of questions in order to reveal their attitudes 
towards land use policy and to determine the local issues which arose from policy 
implementation.
6.3.1 Non-SSSI respondents' attitudes towards a designation on their land.
Non-SSSI respondents in the farmer survey were asked how they would feel about a 
designation on their land. Respondents were almost equally divided between being 
unhappy (14/40) about a designation or not bothered (16/40). 8/40 said they would 
be happy about a designation; 2/40 responded 'Don't know'.
These results implied a substantial minority of respondents resistent to an SSSI 
designation on their land. However, 24/40 respondents reported that they would be 
'Happy1 or 'Not bothered' about a designation.
6.3.2 Farmer respondents perception of benefits and difficulties associated with 
SSSI designation
SSSI and non-SSSI respondents were asked about the real and perceived difficulties 
and benefits o f SSSIs, in order to determine how they felt it did or would affect their 
farming interests.
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Farmer respondents with SSSIs were asked:
"What, i f  any aspects o f SSSI designation are beneficial (difficult) to you in your 
farming operations?".
Non-SSSI respondents were asked:
"Which, i f  any, o f the following would you consider to be benefical (difficult) aspects 
o f SSSI designation to you in your farming operations?".
Respondents were offered four possible benefits or difficulties with an option to 
identify an 'Other' benefit/difficulty.2 These are the categories used in Table 6.7.
Table 6.7 Perceived difficult and beneficial aspects o f SSSI designation to farmer
respondents
B eneficial 




N on -S S S Is
respondents
Difficult




N on -S S S Is
respondents
A new  




L oss o f  
control 27 29
A n increased  





d isputes 0 5
Increased  







incom e 8 12
L oss in 
incom e 0 1
N one 17 10 N one 11 o5
O ther 0 0 O ther* 2 0
D on't K now 2 2 D on't know 0 0
T otal 40 40 T otal 40 40
* Same income but not enough work.
2 See Appendix III for farmer questionnaire.
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'Loss o f  control' over decision-making on the farm was the only difficulty mentioned 
by site respondents (27/40) (Table 6.7). A slightly higher proportion of non-SSSI 
respondents perceived 'Loss o f control' as being a difficulty (29/40). Overall 37/40 
non-SSSI respondents anticipated some form of difficulty compared to 27/40 o f SSSI 
respondents.
In order to carry out a ChiSquared test for independence between having an SSSI 
designation and the perception o f difficulties associated with designation. 'Loss o f  
control' and 'Legal disputes' were combined to make one stream and compared with 
'No difficult aspects'!Table 6.8).
Table 6.8 Perceived difficulties of an SSSI designation: SSSI and non-SSSI
respondents
Respondent
Response SSSI No SSSI Total
Loss of control 27 34 61
& Legal disputes (31.75) (29.25)
No difficult 11 3 14
aspects (6.25) (5.75)
Total 38 37 75
N = 80; 2 'Other'', 2 'Time involved'', 1 'Loss in income'', %  = 9.029, 1 d.f.; p<0.01.
2
%  was significant at the 1% level and this indicates an association between
respondents perceptions of difficulties associated with SSSIs and whether or not they 
had a designation. That is, though all respondents thought loss of control and legal 
disputes to be the main difficulties, significantly more non-site respondents perceived 
these to be difficult aspects than did site respondents. Significantly less non-site 
respondents (3/40) than site respondents (11/40) thought there could be no 
difficulties.
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This result showed that a significant number of non-SSSI farming respondents still 
had a negative perception of SSSI designation.
6.3.3 Farmer respondents perception of benefits associated with SSSI 
designation
Respondents with and without SSSIs were asked which aspects of a designation they 
saw as being beneficial (Table 6.7). 'No beneficial aspects' was the most common 
answer by all farming respondents to this question and there was no significant 
difference between SSSI and non-SSSI respondents ( ^  =1.418, 2 d.f.; p<0.05).
The potential increase in income was the second most common response followed by 
a new interest in nature conservation.
The single greatest difficulty associated with SSSI designation was the loss in control. 
Overall the most common response regarding beneficial aspects of designation was, 
'None' followed by the potential increase in income.
6.3.4 Voluntary versus legal/regulation approaches to conservation policy
To further explore the reasons for difficulties in the implementation o f SSSI 
regulation respondents from the farmer questionnnaire were asked if they thought the 
legal approach to SSSIs was detrimental to the aims o f the policy (Table 6.9).
"Do you think the legal nature o f SSSIs is detrimental to the aims o f the policy?”
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Table 6.9 Farmer perception of legal approach to conservation policy:
comparison between SSSI and non-SSSI
Respondent
Response SSSI No SSSI Total
Yes, detrimental 16 16 32
(16.86) (15.14)
Not detrimental 19 4 23
(12.12) (10.88)
Don't know 4 15 19
(10.01) (8.99)
Total 39 35 74
i 'no response1; %  = 15.982, 2 d.f.;p<0.001.
The legal nature o f SSSIs was considered to be detrimental to the aims of the system 
by 32/80 farmer respondents with an equal division between SSSI and non-SSSI 
respondents. 23/80 responded 'Not detrimental' and 19/80 'Don't know'. Significantly 
more SSSI respondents gave the response 'Not detrimental' than did non-SSSI 
respondents, and non-SSSI respondents were significantly more likely to respond 
'Don't know'.
Farmer respondents were then asked:
"Do you think a voluntary approach is capable o f achieving:
1. The same
2. More than a legal approach
3. Less than a legal approach
4. Don't know".
The majority (45/80) also perceived a voluntary approach only to achieve as much as 
or even less than, a legal approach. Many comments suggested that although 
respondents personally preferred a voluntary approach, they realised it was not
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possible to achieve enough for conservation objectives. 21/80 farmer respondents 
replied that a voluntary approach could achieve 'More than' a legal approach and 
10/80 responded 'Don't know'. There were 4 no responses. There was no 
relationship between the respondents view and whether or not the respondent had an 
S S S I ( ^ 2 = 1 .185;2d .f.;p<0.05).
6.3.5 Summary of the main results in Section 6.3
The main difficult issue in SSSI designation for farmer respondents was the loss in 
control o f decision-making. While many respondents (with and without SSSIs) 
perceived there to be no benefical aspects of SSSI designations, almost as many 
identified the potential increase in income as a benefit. Significantly more SSSI 
respondents perceived a legal approach to not be detrimental to the aims of 
conservation policy than did non-SSSI respondents which suggests there still remains 
a negative perception o f SSSIs by many of those respondents without SSSIs.
6.4 Socio-political issues
Criticisms of a clash o f personalities, a lack of consultation and communication were 
reported in the Orcadian during the most intense period of SSSI designations in 1983 
and 1984. The results o f Section 6.1 above which asked respondents for their main 
critisisms of SSSIs is also relevant in this section. The second principle critisism was 
'personality clashes, lack o f understanding and communication' (13/80). Two 
changes desired by farmer respondents to the system of SSSIs were 'less staff 
turnover' (1,80) and 'more co-operation/communication' (7/80) (by the NCC with 
local farmers). This final section on SSSIs explores the current understanding of 
SSSIs across the farming community in Orkney in order to understand the basis upon 
which critisisms were made.
6.4.1 Farmer respondents understanding and knowledge with respect to SSSI 
designation
In order to examine whether or not farmer respondents understand the main aim of 
SSSIs they were asked: "For policy-makers what is the MAIN AIM  o f SSSI 
legislation?"
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They were offered six possible responses from a prompt sheet (Table 6.10). This 
question was followed with, "Do you think this has been achieved'?" and these 
responses are summarised in Table 6.11.
Table 6.10 Farmer respondents perceptions of the main aim of SSSI designations
(n=80)
Main Aim Response
Conserving natural resources for 
scientific research 12
Conserving natural resources for 
wildlife and plants 61
Conserving landscapes for people and 
their leisure 2
Maintenance of rural incomes 2




'Other' includes 'To pacify conservationists1
As expected, the majority (61/80) correctly identified the main aim of SSSI 
designation is to conserve natural resources for wildlife and plants. Again the 
majority o f all farming respondents (54/80) considered the policy to have been 
successful in meeting its aims.








There was no significant difference between SSSI and non-SSSI owners in the
2
understanding of what the main aim of designation was %  -  0.798, (p<0.05) or in
2
the perceived levels o f success = 2.455, p<0.05).3 There was also no significant
difference in their attitude towards the idea of designating SSSIs. That is, 68/80 
thought they were, in principle, a good thing. The remaining responses included 
10/80 'not a good thing' and 2 'Don't know'.
6.4.2 Summary of main results in Section 6.4
ft is possible to conclude that an understanding o f SSSIs was held by the majority of 
respondents and that even those with no direct contact with an SSSI had knowledge 
of their purpose. Those with SSSIs had not developed a significantly more advanced 
level o f knowledge or understanding about SSSIs than non-site respondents although 
they were significantly more likely to offer an opinion on SSSIs. The data in Section
6.1 suggests there is both the scope and desire for increased local co-operation and 
consultation by SNH (NCC).
6.5 General policy choices
The discussion of the results so far has concentrated on farmers attitudes compared to 
those o f ten years ago. This is an indirect method of examining farmers interests. The 
survey continued the indirect approach by asking questions relating to farmers future 
nature conservation policy preferences.
6.5.1 Policy choices: preferences of farmer respondents
All respondents from the farmer questionnaire were given a prompt sheet with eight 
possible policy options from which they could choose as many or few as they wanted. 
The options were as shown in Figure 6.1.
3 The local SNH office pointed out that they do not have much time for monitoring sites and work 
lends to be reactive than proactive. However, damage to SSSIs tends only to be a result of slight 
changes in agricultural activity.
129
Figure 6.1 Policy choices: preferences of farmer respondents (n=80)
Regulation Voluntary Don't know Government Voluntary Regulation Conservation
and an scheme plus land scheme with and a one-off group land
annual supervision purchase no payment purchase
payment supervision
S e le c t e d  p o l i c y  c h o ic e s
When asked what kind of policy mechanism farmer respondents would like to see in 
place 'Regulation with an annual payment' was the most popular choice (51/80), 
followed by 'Voluntary system with supervision' (26/80). Although n=80, the total 
number of responses is greater than 80 as several respondents chose more than one 
option.
6.5.2 Farmer respondents perceptions of Environmentally Sensitive Areas 
(ESAs)
The difficulties o f a more regulatory type of policy (SSSIs) are discussed above. The 
following question sought to determine the support for an additional or alternative 
policy for Orkney (ESAs). ESA designation had been proposed during the late 1980s 
by the voluntary organisations (NFUS, RSPB) and would cover the whole land area 
of all the Orkney islands.
Farmer respondents were asked if they had heard of Environmentally Sensitive Areas 
and if so, what they considered their most attractive features to be.
Although a high proportion of respondents (68/80) had heard of ESAs many did not 
have much understanding of them. The following results are biased by this fact. Many 
respondents had not considered policy mechanisms before so were unable to answer 
(28/80).
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Table 6.12 Evaluation of Environmentally Sensitive Areas fn=68)
Most attractive feature of ESA policy. Response
Financial incentives 23
Voluntary approach 8
5-10 year plan 2
The whole package 4
Not a good policy 3
Don't know 28
Total 68
Financial incentives were cited by the greatest number of 'ESA-aware' respondents as 
being the most attractive feature of ESA designation. This was followed by the 
'Voluntary approach'. This result was consistent with earlier results pertaining to 
respondents attitudes to SSSIs. That is: more flexibility; management plans for all 
farmers and not just those with SSSIs; and seeking positive management of 
conservation features.
6.5.3 Planning Controls: farmer respondents perceptions
A second policy option for Orkney farmers is the extension of planning controls to all 
or specific aspects of agricultural activity. Farmer respondents were asked how they 
would feel if presented with planning controls on their farms. The majority (55/80) 
considered that these would be very unsatisfactory. 26/55 replied that they would 
actually leave farming if planning controls were imposed. Many felt they had more 
than enough restrictions already and any more would be too much to live with. There
was no relation between whether or not the respondent had an SSSI and his/her
2
attitude to planning controls {)r = 0.947, 1 d.f., p<0.05).
6.5.4 Summary of main results in section 6.5
Regular payments were the highest priority to farmer respondents and there was 
resistance to too much control. While farmer respondents were widely supportive of 
the purpose of conservation policy they supported voluntary policy options.
6.6 Farming objectives of respondents
The discussion o f the results so far has concentrated on an indirect method of 
examining farmers interests. The discussion continues by asking questions relating to 
respondents' farming objectives, interests in conservation and membership of interest 
groups. This is a direct approach to establishing farmer interests. Section 6.6 also 
examines how interests of individual farmers are represented through interest groups.
6.6.1 Farming objectives of farmer respondents
Respondents were asked to choose among five alternative farming objectives:- 
'maximising income'\ 'living and working in the countryside'beingyour own boss'; 
'working the land fo r  future generations' and, finally, respondents were also given the 
opportunity to identify their own objective. The following Figure 6.2 illustrates the 
distribution of responses. (A flaw of this question was that initially it urged 
respondents to choose one objective as their main objective which some did 
reluctantly and after the first 10% of responses the interviewers altered the question to 
allow respondents to choose as many or few answers as they pleased. This means 
that the 31/80 single objective responses are possibly inflated).
Figure 6.2 Farming objectives of farmer respondents (n=80)
1 4
1 , 2 , 3  3  2  &  3  O t h e r  2  1 1 , 2  &  4  1 &  3  1 & 2
& 4  3
F a r m i n g  o b je c t iv e s
Key to Figure 6.2 Farming objectives
1 Maximising income
2 Living and working in the countryside
3 Being your own boss
4 Working the land for the future
Other To get out of farming (4)
Its just a way of life (5)
To run a successful organic farm (1)
Very few respondents (6/80) considered maximising income to be their sole farming 
objective and only 31/80 (12+8+6+5=31) defined one single objective with 'Being 
your own boss' as the most popular. This is consistent with the anti-regulation 
sentiment conveyed in results to earlier questions about policy choices. The remaining 
49/80 had multiple objectives. 33/49 o f those with multiple objectives included 
'Maximising income' as one o f several farming objectives and 37/80 included non­
tradable objectives only such as 'Living and working in the countryside', 'Beingyour 
own boss' or 'Other'. These results support the theory of the alternative paradigm that 
individuals are not totally rent-seekers.
Respondents' farming objectives were independent o f location on the island
( j^ o5 = 3.304), education ( j ^  = 0.459), type o f farm ( ^ 05 = 2.299), size of farm
2 2
= 0.522) or age o f respondent (% 05 = 0.032). Farming objectives were also
2
independent o f whether the respondent had an SSSI or not ( £  = 0 .036) and their
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status as an 'incomer' or a 'local' respondent =0.566). (Ail Chi-Squared Tests 
were carried out with 1 degree of freedom and p<0.05).
6.6.2 Farming respondents' interest in conservation.
In order to discover farmer respondents interest in conservation issues they were 
asked a number o f questions. These included whether or not they considered 
themselves to be a conservationist, and whether they did any conservation work on 
their own farms. To determine whether or not there was a link between farmer 
conservation activities and the level of farm income they were asked if they thought 
prosperous farming would lead to environmentally friendly farming.
All farmer respondents were asked: "Do you consider yourself to be a
conservationist?" 66/80 of farmer respondents did consider themselves as 
conservationists but many were eager to point out that they did not mean 
conservationists in a popular sense (as portrayed on television and the press) but in a 
traditional sense o f managing the land in a conservation-minded way. There was no
relationship between whether or not the respondent had an SSSI and their self-
2
perception as a conservationist (%  =0.215, p<0.05).
The majority o f respondents did no grant-aided or self-funded conservation work 
(grant-aided (50/80), self-funded (43/80)). What grant-aided conservation work did 
occur tended to be ADP environmental payments.4 Self-funded conservation (37/80) 
was mainly dry-stone dyking undertaken for functional reasons rather than through 
any specific interest in conservation. There was no relation between whether or not 
the respondent had an SSSI and their propensity to undertake grant-aided or self-
i
funded conservation work =0.215, 1 d.f., p<05.).
54/80 respondents thought prosperous farming would lead to environmentally friendly 
farming. A comment made by several respondents was that if prosperous the farmer 
would then have resources to allocate to tree-planting, hedge maintenance, creation of 
ponds or maintenance o f dry stone dykes. 20/80 thought there was no reason to 
believe prosperous farming would be environmentally friendly and it was more
4 ADP = Agricultural Development Programme, an EC initiative to provide funds for chosen areas. 
A 5 year plan is developed for any farm opting into the scheme and environmental payments are 
made for. e.g. dry-stone dyking and fencing off wetland areas.
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dependent on the individual farmer. The remaining 6/80 respondents responded 
'Don't blow’.
6.6.3 Membership of groups
Membership of interest groups is an explicit expression of an individuals interests. 
Therefore, farmer respondents were asked about their membership of groups and their 
perceptions of effectiveness of these groups in representing their interests.
Figure 6.3 Membership oflocal interest groups: farmer survey respondents 
(n=80)
0 10 20 30 40  50  60
No. o f  respondents
As expected the NTUS had the largest membership of farming respondents, followed 
by FWAG(S) (founded in the early 1980s) and 'Other'.5,6
5 'Other' includcd:Scottish Crofters Union (2); Highlands and Islands Sheep Health Association (2); 
Sheep Farmers Association (1); Soil Association (3); Game Conservancy (1): Orkney Agricultural 
Discussion Group (1); Orkney Organic Group (1); Orkney Natural History Society (1); Scottish 
Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals (1); National Sheep Association (1); Friends of the 
Earth (1); Field Studies Council (1); Jersey Wildlife Preservation Trust (1); British Organic Growers 
(I); National Trust for Scotland (1); Greenpeace (1); Rare Breeds Survival Trust (1).
6 Figures for Orkney Field Club and 'Other' are not divided into more than or less than 5 years as the 
figures are very low.
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The majority o f NFUS members had been with the NFUS for most if not all o f their 
farming lives, while the majority o f FWAG(S) membership was relatively new, 
occurring within the last 5 years. There was a small SLF membership o f which the 
majority had been members for more than 5 years. RSPB and WWF had a relatively 
small farmer respondent membership. A substantial proportion of respondents (21/80, 
see 'Other' above) were members of other smaller farming, conservation or 
environmental organisations as described above.
The NFUS membership in Orkney has declined by 16% in the last 7 years from 1064 
in 1986 to 890 in 1992. A number of respondents indicated dissatisfaction with their 
NFUS membership, deciding to remain members for the purpose o f cheap insurance. 
Some had already discontinued their membership.7
FWAG(S) membership had increased from 60 in 1991 to approximately 200 in 1993 
which suggest increasing support over time. However, the local FWAG(S) advisor 
thought membership to have levelled out at the moment while FWAG(S) seeks more 
funding.
Membership numbers o f WWF and RSPB were insufficient to determine any trends 
over time.
6.6.4 Summary of main results in Section 6.6
There are two main conclusions to be drawn with respect to farmers objectives: that 
respondents objectives are multidimensional; and secondly, they are independent of 
socio-economic variables such as age and education. Respondents objectives are 
therefore more complex and personal than those associated with single objective rent 
seekers. There is no evidence to suggest that the status of farmer respondents with 
respect to SSSI designation had an impact on respondents interests in conservation. 
The majority of farmers considered themselves to be conservationists, although there 
was little conservation work being undertaken by respondents and this is perhaps 
because the majority perceived that prosperous farming leads to a more 
environmentally friendly approach. NFUS was the principal interest group to 
represent farming interests. However, there is also a notable membership o f other
7 However, two important factors affecting levels of local NFUS membership were amalgamation of 
farms and some farmers were retiring and/or renting out land. The local NFUS secretary pointed out 
that they lose and gain membership over time and there is no real difference in membership overall.
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fanning groups which represent less mainstream farming interests. Membership of 
environmental and conservation groups was low.
6.7 Representativeness of interest groups and translation of interests
Having examined farmers' interests, this section examines the translation of individual 
interests from a local level to the policy-making level, thereby broadening the analysis 
o f data from individual interests to include interest groups and policy-making arenas. 
This section aims to determine the relative importance and role of groups according to 
farmers (their members), local organisations and policy-makers.
All respondents (farmer, local organisation and policy-maker) were asked what they 
considered the main role of an interest group to be. Following this, farmer 
respondents were asked: which organisation they felt to be the most representative of 
their interests; the extent to which the NFUS and conservation groups represented 
their interests at the UK and European level; and the extent to which conservation 
issues were perceived to vary between Orkney and the rest o f the UK.
6.7.1 Farmers' perceptions of interest group roles and effectiveness
Farmer respondents:
The majority (57/80) of farmer respondents perceived the main role of any of the 
groups such as the NFUS should be to represent members' interests through lobbying 
(Table 6.13).
Table 6.13 NFUS's most important role (n=80)
NFUS's most important role Response
Representing members interests 57
through lobbying
Providing information to members 7
Both of the above 13
Don't know J
Total 80
Table 6.14 Perceived effectiveness of NFUS in the above role (0=80)
Effectiveness Response
Not effective 7






Farmer respondents generally considered NFUS to be reasonably effective in its role 
of representing their interests.
Local organisations (n=8)
Local organisations were equally divided in their views of a groups role between 
'Representing members interests through lobbying' (4/8) and 'Both o f the above' 
(4/8). RSPB and WWF were identified by many respondents as having wider aims 
which do not relate directly to the needs of their members. That is, the promotion or 
protection o f the 'environment' or 'birds' was seen to be the main objective rather than 
the advancement o f members interests.
Policy-makers (n=9)
6/9 o f policy-maker respondents indicated that a groups most important role is to 
lobby for members' interests. 1/9 considered that it was to provide information, while 
the remaining 2/9 (which included conservation group respondents) suggested groups 
had wider, public interests. WWF was perceived to be philosophy driven and 
describes their remit as: "to represent the interests o f the environment." The WWF 
respondent explained:
"they use the weight o f  their arguments rather than the 1weight o f their membership to 
push an issue" (Policy-maker respondent, 1993).
Therefore, this question revealed a fundamental difference between farming groups, 
and environmental and conservation groups. That is, the general perception across all 
respondents was that the most important role o f the NFUS is to represent the interests
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of their members by lobbying. The most important role of conservation groups was 
less clear and included providing information and representing the interests of the 
environment.
6.7.2 Representativeness of interests
This research sought to discover the level o f input into policy-making which comes 
from the local level and the significance of the local influence as a determinant of 
policy-making. These results are intended to offer an understanding of how close local 
organisations and farming respondents felt to policy-making.
Farmer respondents were asked, "Which organisation is the most representative o f 
your interests?".
46/80 farming respondents considered the NFUS the most representative organisation 
for them. The NFUS has 121 branches which each elects its own representatives to 
Area Executives, of which there are 28. Each area then elected representatives to the 
Unions 125-strong national Council. The Council annually elected two vice- 
presidents and a president to lead the Union. The local NFUS respondent argued that 
agricultural interests are thoroughly and fairly represented through this devolved and 
accountable system.
The remaining 34/80 respondents were divided between a range of other groups (24) 
and responding that there was no single organisation representative of their interests 
(10). The range of other groups included: SCU; SLF; FWAG; SAC; and, Other8.
Farmer respondents were then asked how representative different interest groups are 
of their interests (Table 6.15).
8 Although there are a number of small organisations representing organic growers, sheep farmers 
etc the>- are considered marginal in terms of political influence. Their resources are limited which 
constrains them from engaging in polictical lobbying to any significant extent.
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All of the time 2 4 2 6
Most of the 
time
19 29 12 17
Sometimes 36 37 23 30
Never 12 5 8 8
Don't know 11 5 35 19
The results in Table 6.15 illustrate that 33 farmer respondents considered UK farm 
groups to be representative of local interests 'all' or 'most o f the time'. The majority 
considered the NFU(S)) to be representative 'sometimes'. Those who considered UK 
farm groups i.e. the NFU(S) 'never' to be representative o f their interests were 
members o f FWAG(S), the Soil Association and other smaller, lower-profile farming 
groups. For EU farm groups and EU and UK conservation groups there was a higher 
number o f 'never' or 'don't know' responses. These results may reflect a lack of 
knowledge about European politics and conservation issues.
In order to determine other channels of representation of their interests, farmer 
respondents were asked two questions: to what extent they thought the local council 
(Orkney Islands Council, OIC) was involved in farming and conservation issues; and if 
it was involved, whether or not it had a bias towards either interest.
OIC was perceived by 41/80 farmer respondents to be involved to some extent in 
farming. 38/80 farmer respondents considered OIC to be involved in conservation 
issues through its Agriculture Working Group, funding of FWAG, green tourism and 
marketing o f farming.
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Table 6.16 Perceived bias o f QIC to farming or conservation interests: farmer
respondents (n=80)








An even proportion of farming respondents perceived the council to be biased 
towards farming, 'neutral' or they didn't know. Only a small proportion perceived the 
council to be biased towards conservation. Council membership by farmers was 
considered to be one reason for OIC bias towards farming interests by four farmer 
respondents (Table 6.16).
6.7.3 Translation of local farmer interests to policy arenas
To further determine the connection between farmers and organisations, local 
organisation respondents were asked about the channels of communication existing 
between themselves and farmers, and the wider community (Table 6.17).










RSPB = occasional = local radio and 
newspaper
NFUS = — local radio and 
newspaper
SNH = farm visits
SAC = farm visits
SOAFD = occasional general farm 
meetings
OIC -planning paper published
OIC - economic paper published
FWAG(S) = = farm visit
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Local organisations generally had no formal system o f contact with the Orkney 
community and tended to rely on the local media (newspaper and radio), their own 
publications, occasional community council representations, local organisation 
meetings covering particular issues and farm visits. Organisations including SOAFD, 
SAC, FWAG(S) and SNH undertook regular farm visits. Individuals represented their 
interests to local organisations by writing occasional letters and telephone calls. 
Therefore, while the results showed that there was not a great deal of formal contact 
between local organisations and individuals, there appeared to be a degree o f contact 
on an individual (organisation) to individual (farmer) basis. No local organisation 
respondent indicated a need for a more formal or regular system of community 
representation.
In representing the interests o f Orkney at Scottish Office, Westminster and EU levels, 
neither the RSPB, NFUS, SNH, SAC, SOAFD, OIC nor FWAG(S) perceived any 
real problems. The OIC Economic Department did point out the constraint o f access 
to departments in Edinburgh because of the time and expense involved in going to 
meetings on the mainland. One local organisation respondent commented that 
sometimes the Scottish or UK interest overrode the local Orkney interest.
On policy issues, local organisations tended to rely on their head offices in Edinburgh. 
The NFUS, RSPB, SOAFD and OIC had direct contact with the Scottish Office. The 
OIC were the only organisation with direct EU contact, although their EU 
representative covered all OIC departments and therefore had little time for specific 
farming or conservation issues.
6.7.4 Summary of main results in Section 6.7
A distinction was made between the role o f farming groups and conservation groups: 
the farm groups role was to promote members interests and conservation groups 
tended to have a less clearly defined role including advancing conservation interests 
and providing information. RSPB was the only interest group actively representing 
conservation interests in Orkney. In terms of the representation of private economic 
interests (farming) and their translation to policy arenas the NFUS was reasonably 
effective. Local organisation contact with the local community was informal and ad 
hoc. Local organisations represented local Orkney interests at their head offices and 
relied on their head offices to supply them with information of policy development.
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Part 2 Networks, influence and competition
6.8 Networks
From the results presented in Part 1 a profile of individual farmer respondents 
interests has been derived, indirectly from their attitudes to SSSIs and other policy 
options, and directly from their expressed farming objectives and their membership of 
interest groups. The discussion in Part 2 widens the focus o f interest to include an 
analysis of organisational networks. The aims o f this part are to identify the key 
groups, public and private, in policy-making, and how they interact. Part 2 identifies 
the organisations farmers depended upon for the information necessary to conduct 
their farm business, and the individuals and/or institutions which local organisations 
and policy-makers relied upon to implement or design land use policy. Information 
exchange was assumed to be the basis of networks and therefore the key institutions 
were identified as being those most commonly used by respondents o f all three 
surveys. This information was supported with independent data on interest group 
membership and income because these were assumed to be necessary for any 
organisation to generate useful information.
In order to establish existing networks, and develop an understanding of the overlap 
of networks the analysis sought to determine the overall key groups and the source o f 
their support. It also investigated the groups most influential at the local, regional, 
national and European policy arenas. Integral to the concept of overlapping networks 
was the concept of ongoing competition of interests (private farming and landowning 
interests, and public conservation and environmental interests) at all levels o f decision­
making. An understanding of the interaction of key groups was also sought in order 
to determine the competition of interests and its effect on policy-making.
The results in this section were mainly generated from the policy-maker survey but are 
also supported by farmer and local organisations where relevant.
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All respondents were asked to identify their important sources o f information (Figure 
6.4).
Farmer respondents:
Figure 6.4 Sources of information for farmer respondents (n=80)
6.8.1 Important Sources of Information for farmer, local organisation and
policy-maker respondents
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70
N o .  o f  r e s p o n d e n t s
Overall, SOAFD and SAC were seen to be the key sources of information to farmer 
respondents (Figure 6.4). Also important were Journals, NFUS, ATB and TV and 
Radio. There were a number of organisations which were important to a few farmer 
respondents and these included FWAG(S), SNH, CC and OIC. 'Others' in the above 
Figure 6.5 included the Tenant Farmers Association, the Soil Association, the British 
Organic Farmers and North Eastern Farmers.
Sources of information for local respondents (n=8)
At the local organisation level SOAFD emerged as the most important overall source 
of information, followed by SNH, then Orkney Islands Council (OIC), FWAG(S), 
SAC, NFUS, Journals and magazines, and the RSPB. Local offices attached a great 
deal o f importance to to their own (and other) head offices in Edinburgh.
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Sources of information for policy-maker respondents (n=8)
Policy-makers relied heavily on a small core o f organisations. The 1st and 2nd most 
commonly chosen were SNH and the RSPB respectively. SNH, SOEnD and RSPB 
all considered SNH to be the most important which may have reflected the role of 
SNH as statutory advisors who have to conduct extensive research. Other important 
sources o f information were the NFUS, SOEnD, SOAED, SAC and Journals.
Radio and television were the next most commonly mentioned source of information, 
followed by 'Others' which included the organisation's own research, the DoE, 
members (SNH board members and SLF members) and private individuals (such as 
environmental correspondents and HRH Prince Charles). SLF were seen not to 
generate much information and FWAG(S) were seen largely as actors rather than 
sources o f information.
One conservation interest group respondent said: "It is hard to distinguish [in terms of 
importance] between SNH, SOAFD and SOEnD" (1993). This was because they were 
considered to generate different sets of information and were given equal importance 
in their own information domains. The distinction between policy-oriented 
information and technical information was established with the recognition that some 
organisations are more oriented towards providing one or the other. For example, 
SAC and SOAFD were seen to provide technical information while the RSPB and 
SNH provided policy information.
Having established what were generally important sources o f information to 
respondents, Table 6.18 compares the responses of all three survey respondents to the 
question, " What do you consider to be the single most important source o f 
information for you in your work1".
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Two main points are illustrated in Table 6.18: the key organisations for information 
provision at each level of decision-making, and the extent of information provision 
across decision-making levels by any single organisation.
The single most important source of information was not the same at all three levels. 
However, SAC, OIC, SNH were all the most important at more than one level. 
Although by fewer respondents, the NFUS was seen as the singularly most important 
information source across all 3 levels. For technical and practical information at the 
local level the following were considered to be the most important: SAC, SOAFD and 
SNH. More policy oriented information was generally taken from SNH and Journals.
As a general source of information the Crofters Commission and FWAG(S) did not 
rate highly although they were considered to be the single most important by 4 and 2 
farming respondents respectively. This suggests they were of more interest to those 
respondents with special interests (information needs).
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6.8.2 The most important ways to keep up to date with new ideas and 
developments in land use and nature conservation: farmer, local organisation 
and policy-maker respondents
In order to discover which organisations are integral to decision-making thus 
providing new and useful information, all respondents were asked, "What is the s i n g l e  
most important way you keep up to date with n e w  ideas and developments in farming  
and land use?"
Farmer respondents (n=80)
The farming respondents' most popular sources of new ideas were 'Other farmers, 
family and friends', (25/80); 'SAC  (20/80); and 'journals', (18/80).
Local organisations (n=8)
The single most important way to keep up to date with new ideas for local 
organisations tended to be through their head offices. The RSPB used its agricultural 
advisors in Edinburgh, as did NFUS, SAC (Edinburgh and Aberdeen) and SNH. 
Farmers were considered to be the most important source o f new ideas by the 
remainder of respondents. Also considered to be important were other local 
organisations which included SAC, FWAG(S), NFUS, RSPB, ATB and SNH and 
TV, radio, newspapers and study visits to Edinburgh. The reliance on other local 
organisations was further explored by the following question:
7a Do you think the following groups are in r e g u l a r  c o n t a c t  with one another? 7b 
Please indicate the s t r o n g e s t  w o r k i n g  r e l a t i o n s .  7c. Please indicate any d i f f i c u l t  
r e l a t i o n s ,  i f  any, between the above local organisations. Why do you think this is the 
case? Respondents were given a matrix with all the local organisations listed (This is 
in Appendix III, in the local organisation questionnaire').
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Local organisations had a good working network with each other with the strongest 
relations existing between (i) NFUS, SOAFD and SAC; (ii) SAC and FWAG(S); and
(iii) Orkney Islands Council, FWAG(S), RSPB and SNH. Therefore, there was two 
distinct groups of agricultural and conservation interests with a degree of bridging by 
SAC and FWAG(S).
Policy-makers (n=9)
Information to policy-makers about new ideas and developments in land use and 
nature conservation came from three main sources.
The most common source (3/9) was through research surveys conducted by several 
organisations. The second was journals and newspapers (2/9), and the third source 
was members at the local level (2/9). That is, ideas came to SLF from its membership 
and to SNH from its area offices. One SNH respondent commented that to keep up 
with new ideas and developments in land use and nature conservation he relied upon:
"joint efforts from board members, staff and the regional management team. Few o f  
these, i f  any, come from the policy directorate. Ideas tend to come from the grass 
roots. When they come to main board we then get in touch with the policy unit to 
develop these ideas" (SNH policy-maker respondent, 1993).
Contacts with civil servants were also important to one respondent (1/9).
SOEnD was less receptive to keeping in touch with new ideas:
" We try more to keep things the way they are - we don't try to kick o ff ideas. SNH do 
- they are in the frontline and we give approval fo r  the different ways o f using the 
cash. SNH have implemented new ideas in Islay and the Flow Country" 1 (SOEnD 
policy-maker respondent, 1993).
1 Islay Geese Control Scheme and the Flow Country' Peatland Management Scheme.
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6.8.3 The source and application of information on UK and EU farming and 
conservation policies: local organisation and policy-maker respondents
In order to determine group and organisation contacts on wider policy issues, both 
local organisation and policy-maker respondents were asked how they best kept up to 
date with the development and application of EU policies.
Both sets of respondents were asked, "Where does [for example] 'RSPB' obtain 
information on the application and development o f National UK (or EU) policies?" 
Respondents were given a list o f sources of information including an 'Other' option in 
which they could express a source not listed.
Local organisations (n=8)
Local organisation respondents had two main methods to keep up to date with the 
development o f UK policies: information was passed on to them through head
quarters and through direct involvement with a government minister or civil servant. 
The RSPB and NFUS used all possible sources of information (as listed in Appendix 
III, 'Local organisation questionnaire') which reflected a keen desire to maintain an 
up-to-date knowledge o f what is going on (2/8). The UK civil servant, UK 
government minister and Scottish Office departments (SOAFD and SOEnD) were the 
most commonly used (5/8). FWAG, more known for its apolitical stance (Cox et al, 
1986) mentioned the local NFUS and SOAFD offices as their sources of information 
( 1/ 8 ).
The above sources of information on UK policy developments were also relevant for 
EU policy developments. The RSPB "utilisedevery means available" (RSPB), as did 
the NFUS (2/8). Other local organisations relied on their head offices in Edinburgh 
who dealt directly with European issues (5/8). The Orkney Islands Council economic 
department had an EU liason officer who liases directly with the EU (1/8).
Policy-maker (n= 10)
For policy-makers information on the development and application of UK policies for 
nature conservation came primarily from the following government departments; 
SOEnD (5/10), SOAFD (2/10), DoE (2/10) and MAFF (1/10). The House of Lords 
was considered by one private sector respondent rather to be a sink o f information
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than a source and government ministers were described as 'bottom o f the list'. (The 
same categories were applied for this question to policy-makers as for the local 
organisation question).
With respect to the development and application o f EU policy information, sources 
for policy-makers appeared to be more numerous. They included the European 
Union, the RSPB, respondents' MEPs, the UK civil service and the Baissels office of 
organisations. Much EU information was perceived to filter through government 
departments. SOEnD agreed that most information came through Westminster 
(MAEF and DoE) although there was a desire now to establish more direct contact 
and representation o f Scottish interests at the EU. The increased number o f sources 
reflected the greater requirement o f policy-maker respondents to keep in touch with 
new information.
6.8.4 Summary of main results in Section 6.8
Core information requirements o f farmers, local organisations and policy-maker 
respondents divided into two types: policy and technical. No one single organisation 
stood out as providing all the new ideas and developments in land use and nature 
conservation policy. A core of key organisations existed at each level (farmer, local 
organisation and policy-maker) specialising in their 'type' of information (policy or 
technical). Only a very few organisations were important across all levels of decision­
making: local Orkney, Scottish Office, UK Westminster and EU.
Sections 6.9 and 6.10 further develop the concepts of influence, networks and 
competition. Section 6.10 explores networks and the competition and associations 
between different organisations and interest groups.
6.9 Influence
Dependence upon specific organisations for information awards them a degree of 
influence. To be in a position to generate information which is in demand, groups 
have to have a membership in order to maintain their income. Data on the 
membership and income of key interest groups in England and Scotland was collated 
from groups Annual Reports and is included in Appendix VI. A summary o f this 
information is given below (Table 6.19).
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Membership and income award a group the basis for political influence.2
6.10 Policy-making arenas
The following discussion is based on results from the local organisation and policy­
maker surveys and is a summary of their perceptions of the key groups, their type of 
influence and their forms o f interaction in terms of networks and competition.
6.10.1 Key groups
It is the purpose of this section to establish which groups are perceived to be the key 
groups in terms of policy-making.
Local organisations and policy-maker respondents were asked an open ended question 
about which interest groups they perceived as being o f importance at different levels 
of policy-making. Table 6.20 presents the results o f this question.
2 1990/91 was the only year in which income figures for all groups was available. There is not 
expected to be a significant divergence beteen income levels in 1990/91 and 1992/93 and the 
1990/91 figures are therefore used to support 1993 membership figures.
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Table 6.20 Arenas of influence3










NFUS = = = - -
SAC = = =
SCU = = - -
L a n d o w n i n g
CLA = =
SLF = = - -











RSPB = = = = = =
SCP - = =
SWCL = -
SWT - = = -
WCL = = -
E n v i r o n m e n t a l
FoE(UK) = = =
FoE(S) = =
Greenpeace - - = = =
WWF - = = = =
= the group has an office
- the group has a membership or regular influence
For the purposes o f analysis groups were divided into the four main categories: 
farming, landowning, conservation and environmental. Within these categories they 
were then presented in alphabetical order rather than order of importance, because 
local organisation and policy-maker respondents were not asked to rank groups in 
order of perceived importance. Athough SAC is not an interest group it was
3_For more information on the organisations mentioned in the survey and their characteristics see 
Appendix V.
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considered to have significant influence on policy and policy implementation at a 
grassroots level by many respondents.
Overall the groups with the most influence on nature conservation policy in Scotland 
were perceived most often to be the RSPB, NFUS, WWF, followed by SAC, NTS, 
SWT and SLF. From Table 6.20 it is evident that there is a concentration o f groups 
at the UK policy-making level which illustrates its significance in terms o f policy 
decisions.
From Table 6.20 there are several main points to note. During the interviewing 
conducted for this research it became clear that each interest group had a distinctive 
character which emanated from its modus operand!, its chosen remit and the political 
market (grass roots, Scottish, Westminster and/or European Union) in which it 
functioned.
There were several remits or modi operandi which affect the type o f influence an 
interest group may have exerted. Some interest groups limited themselves mainly to 
one method of influence in one influence arena, for example FWAG(S) operated at 
the grassroots level, giving practical advice to farmers and landowners within 
Scotland, while others such as the RSPB operated across wider policy arenas. The 
RSPB used a range o f tactics including talking to local communities at the grass roots 
level and lobbying the international policy arena through letters and presentations to 
key individuals or groups. WWF had a very wide remit encompassing broad, global 
environmental objectives and it operated across all policy arenas except the local 
Orkney grassroots level. Despite a considerable degree of overlap in groups working 
in different policy communities, two distinct policy communities emerged: groups in 
Scotland and groups outwith Scotland. The policy community in Scotland was 
perceived to be influenced at times by groups which normally focused on 
Westminster.
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6.10.2 Interest group networks
It was shown above (Table 6.20) that many groups in Scotland were UK groups with 
devolved Scottish offices, or independent Scottish groups with sister interest groups 
in England. There existed strong formal and informal links between environmental 
and conservation organisations within Scotland. There also existed strong links 
between the two principal environmental and conservation interest groups in Scotland 
and England (RSPB and WWF). Both groups maintained a devolved Scottish office 
in addition to their UK headquarters in England. SWT had regular formal links with 
RSNC, the umbrella organisation for the County Trusts in England.
A formal network for conservation and environmental interest groups in Scotland had 
been established through Scottish Wildlife and Countryside Link (SWCL) which co­
ordinated 'working parties' to deal with specific issues associated with agriculture, 
forestry, marine and freshwater. All organisations which were members o f SWCL 
had representatives on its working groups.
England also had an established network for environmental and conservation 
organisations, known as Wildlife and Countryside Link (WCL). WCL was older and 
larger than its Scottish counterpart (See Figures VI.3 and VI.4, Appendix VI) and 
hence tended to be more of a significant lobbying force. WCL and SWCL co­
ordinated with each other and this represented a formal network between England and 
Scotland.
A more informal network also existed although this was less easy to characterise. It 
was reflected by the fact that respondents knew so much about other organisations. 
The shared interests and relatively small geographical and political area of Scotland 
in which they work made this inevitable. Conferences, in particular, were recognised 
to be regular meeting places. There was flexibility over coalitions between groups, 
such as WWF, SWT and RSPB, during lobbying.
An interesting point to note was that the farming and landowning organisations (the 
NFU, SLF, SCU) did not participate formally with SWCL although NTS and SNH 
did have farming and landowning members on their executive committees. 
Furthermore, there was no similar umbrella organisation linking farming groups 
although policy-maker respondents from agriculture and landowning interests 
indicated that they did meet over certain issues when required. The fact that the NFU,
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NFUS, CLA and SLF were seen to have a monopoly over the respresentation of 
farming and landowning interests in England and Scotland, and that they are few in 
number, means that formal co-ordination is not required.
6.10.3 Type and level of competition within Scotland between interest groups
The type and level o f interaction between conservation groups in Scotland was 
determined by asking local organisation and policy-maker repondents open-ended 
questions about their perceptions of the conservation movement in Scotland, and the 
movements interaction with agricultural interests.
Competition between conservation and environmental interest groups:
Although environmental and conservation groups did tend to have their own 
individual remits which mobilised different constituencies there existed a degree of 
overlap. When this is combined with the limited membership recruitment 
opportunities available given the small population of Scotland, a degree of 
competition between conservation groups may be inevitable. While there was no 
explicit competition in membership recruitment, competition for public resources 
(grants) was seen by respondents to occur and was mainly between WWF, RSPB, 
SWT and NTS. SWT and SCP in particular were reported to have an overlap in their 
remits leading to competition for similar funding. The following quote from a Policy­
maker respondent (1993) illustrated this point:
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" The NGOs are smitten with human weakness - competitiveness. People in the same 
fields mobilising different constituencies. SWCLs organisations overlap. For 
example, SWT and SCP have a massive overlap - why have separate organisations 
other than because o f competition? SCP and SWT are offshoots o f BTCV and 
RSNC. It is insinuated in Scotland that Scotland is a thing apart and ought to have 
its own show but there is too small an amount o f money to be able to do this. SWCL 
is made up o f organisations who won't give up their rights. I f  you amalgamate them 
the competitive element is taken away" (Policy-maker respondent, 1993).
The benefit of competition between conservation groups was highlighted by another 
policy-maker respondent:
"The unity o f the movement is not necessarily a good thing and the more groups 
there are the better to attract a wider clientele" (Policy-maker respondent, 1993).
Competition between farming and landowning interest groups:
There was only one farming (NFU/NFUS) and one landowning organisation 
(CLA/SLF) in England and Scotland which were representative o f these interests. 
The existence of only one farming organisation is explained by the government's 
decision following World War II to allocate the NFU special powers of consultation 
over the Annual Price Review. As a result the NFU/NFUS developed a monopoly 
over the representation o f farming interests at a national and EU level o f policy­
making.
Although there were a number of small organisations representing organic growers, 
sheep farmers etc. mentioned by respondents (and also by farmer respondents in 
Section 6.6) they were considered marginal by respondents in terms o f political 
influence. Their resources (membership and income) were limited which prevented 
them from engaging in political lobbying to any significant extent.
In addition to this there was no real competition between the farming and landowning 
organisations because o f the general difference between farm business and landowning 
interests. There was an element of competition between the NFUS and SCU over 
crofting membership. The argument was made by the Scottish Crofters Union 
respondent that the NFUS ought to give up its crofting membership o f approximately 
600 and concentrate on farming interests.
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Competition or convergence between farming and conservation interests
Respondents were asked what they considered the main role of an interest group to 
be. Two distinct poles of interest and activity emerged between conservation/ 
environmental groups and farming/landowning groups. The main difference was in the 
nature o f the interest: private or public. That is, between the private interests o f land- 
based groups (NFUS, NFU, SLF, CLA and SCU) and the public interests of 
conservation and environmental groups (RSPB, WWF etc.) The main role o f the 
former was to protect their member's private interests and the latter was to promote 
the public interest.
The general perception of policy-making respondents appeared to be that while the 
more radical environmental groups - Greenpeace and FoE - had become more publicly 
responsible and less openly critical o f the establishment, publicly the land groups such 
as NFUS, CC and SLF had had a 'green rinse' and were adopting a more 
environmentally friendly image. As environmental groups had become more politically 
credible, land groups had altered their image, and the diametric opposition which 
traditionally characterised these interests was perceived to have become less apparent.
One policy-maker respondent (1993) commented on a recent joint press release by 
SWT, NFUS and the SLF. He commented that although it illustrated a move closer, 
it was "a bit o f superficial public relations" and their basic interests had not changed.
Competition between government departments.
One policy-maker respondent identified a traditional hierarchy in the Scottish Office 
concerning matters of land use, with agriculture at the top and nature conservation at 
the bottom. Agricultural interests were perceived to have been gradually imposed 
upon by forestry and nature conservation. SOAFD staff were seen to be facing a new 
situation with more equal footing with the leaders o f SOEnD and the UK Forestry 
Authorities. In support of this, policy-maker respondents from environmental and 
conservation groups and SNH perceived the leaders o f SOAFD to be more in a 
discussive mode, although there was still perceived to be some difficulty in getting 
SOAFD to consult with a sense of equality rather than superiority.
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"There is a blurring at the edges about land use policy in government departments. 
There are different considerations about how land should be maintained" (Policy­
making respondent, 1993).
Although there was a recognition o f moderate change to this status quo it does reflect 
the geography o f the government departments which treats agriculture and 
environmental interests as separate issues. In having the Secretary o f State for 
Scotland as an umbrella minister over all departments in the Scottish Office, Scotland 
was noted as having an advantage over England. MAFF and SOAFD were seen to 
have a strong relationship with SOAFD as a minority. MAFF represented Scottish 
farming interests at the EU.
6.10.4 Balance of power between competing interests
Policy-maker respondents were asked, "What, do you perceive the trend to be for the 
balance o f power between conservation and agriculture interest groups?".
Just over half o f the policy-making respondents thought the balance still went in 
favour of agriculture and landowning interests (9/14). The remaining respondents 
either thought the situation was balanced (1/14), that it was simplistic to view the 
situation as entirely adversarial (2/14), or finally, that the situation was too complex to 
see a balance (2/14).
The NFUS and SLF respondents identified scope for the development of the common 
ground and a partnership between agriculture, landowning and conservation.
"There is a clear development o f conservation conciousness which is not necessarily 
at the expense o f farming and we could use common ground. It is possibly an 
erroneous approach to view this is an entirely adversarial situation. Land use policy 
has to be one o f co-operation. We regard farmers as central to the rural economy 
but respect other land user's needs and aspirations so long as these do not seriously 
compromise agriculture's pivotal role" (Policy-maker respondent, 1993).
Flow far the common ground was developed was seen to be determined by factors 
which generate uncertainty about the future of support to the agriculture industry in 
the UK.
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These factors include: the recent changes in CAP ("the fa ll in CAP subsidies makes 
people nervous" Policy-maker respondent, 1993); the final outcome of GATT 
negotiations; world agricultural market prices; public opinion on support to 
agriculture and conservation issues; the extent o f opening up o f Eastern European 
markets and resultant supply o f relatively cheap food; and, the extent o f the UK 
governments response to the Rio Summit.
6.10.5 Accessibility and receptiveness of government departments to interest 
groups.
Policy-maker respondents were asked which government departments they perceived 
to be receptive and accessible to interest groups.
According to the department and the interest being represented, the receptiveness and 
accessibility of government departments to interest groups was perceived to vary. All 
departments were perceived to be fairly accessible but the traditional relationships of 
consultation between the agriculture department (SOAED) and the NFUS and a 
parallel practice of consultation between the relatively new environment department 
(SOEnD) and a select few environmental and conservation interest groups (WWF and 
RSPB) were thought to continue. Some bridging did operate between the two but the 
NFUS was said not to go direct to SOEnD; SOAFD was not considered to be as 
receptive to environmental groups as SOEnD.
"Different departments are receptive in different ways. SOEnD is good at listening 
to conservation groups and takes groups views to ministers. SOAFD however, 
though getting belter, still tends to listen to the NFUS" (Policy-maker respondent, 
1993).
SOEnD and SNH both commented that although there were consultative relations 
between their organisations and the environmental and conservation NGOs, "they 
come to us more than us to them. We have a standard consultation list which 
includes all groups and i f  a consultation paper is issued we let them know. But i f  an 
issue is o f importance they will come to us" (SOEnD policy-maker respondent, 1993).
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With respect to SNH (the independent government agency for nature conservation) 
an element o f change was identified following the reorganisation of NCC (SNH). 
" We do consult one another and discuss common areas. NCC in Scotland used to 
shun all voluntary bodies except SWT. SNH is fa r  more open" (SNH policy-maker 
respondent, 1993). 4
SNH generally only worked with SWT, the RSPB and FWAG(S). Their relationship 
with the RSPB was described as being complementary with a close dialogue whereas, 
though the SWT have regular dialogue with SNH, SWT tended to be more dependent 
on SNH for funding. SNH was also a major funder of FWAG(S). SNH had a close 
relationship with SLF because o f SLF landowning members and SNH also had a less 
close association with FoE(S) and the NFUS.
The House of Lords was deemed to be more accessible to interest groups than the 
Commons mainly due to the fact that most Scottish Tory MPs were ministers and 
were too busy for consultation. For the SLF, because of the presence of Scottish 
landowners in the House, their interests were represented by default. Members of 
Parliament tended to be targeted as the local representative over particular issues 
rather than a focus for more general lobbying.
At a European level the Parliament (MEP's) and the Commission were perceived to 
be very receptive to conservation and agriculture. The closest links lay between 
DG11 and the RSPB, WWF, FoE(UK) and many other environmental and 
conservation interest groups. The NFU was perceived to be becoming more involved 
but that they did not regularly participate in [EU] public meetings (of the Environment 
Select Committee) attended by the RSPB, WWF, Greenpeace, FoE(UK), chemical 
and pharmacutical industries.
Therefore to sum up, the main target arenas for interest groups were, civil servants, 
House o f Lords and the European Union.
4A degree of NGO funding was a legal requirement of SNH as set out in Section 5 of the Natural 
Heritage Scotland Act (Resource Funding) 1991.
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6.10.6 Summary of main results in Section 6.10
Competition between conservation/environmental groups tended to be at policy- 
making centres from the Scottish level in Edinburgh upwards, in order for the interest 
groups to secure resources. Competition between conservation groups was not 
perceived to occur as much at local grassroots level for membership recruitment. 
There were more environmental and conservation groups than agriculture or 
landowning groups at each policy community (Table 6.20). As a result a more 
developed network and more competition for resources existed between conservation 
and environmental groups. There were two main policy communities: the Scottish 
Office and Westminster, with the former being considerably smaller.
Agricultural and landowning groups had a monopoly over the representation o f their 
respective interests and thus prevented entrance of smaller groups into the political 
market. This meant there was little, if any, competition among farming or landowning 
interests. Furthermore, groups representative of land and farming interests in 
Scotland have not been as exposed to the elements o f competition from conservation 
and environmental interests to the same degree as in England.
The general trend o f perceived convergence between the two main interests reflected 
a professionalisation on the part o f the environmental/conservation groups and a 
recognition o f the importance o f the public on the part of the land groups rather than 
any real convergence in their poles o f interests.
Competition between conservation and agriculture interests in government 
departments also existed and a new balance was being sought by conservation 
interests groups.
The overall perception was that the private economic interests o f farmers were still 
very much the determining ground with public interest conservation and 
environmental groups making some inroads to decision-making but not impacting the 
core. One important point to note was that no conservation groups' respondents 
suggested the non-adversarial or partnership approach. This was an approach 
advocated by farming interests and politicians only.
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6.11 External influences: the media, public opinion and the EU.
In order to determine whether or not there were other external influences on policy­
making, policy-maker respondents were asked how influential they perceived public 
opinion, the media and the European Union to be.
6.11.1 Public opinion and the media
The indirect impact of public opinion has already been demonstrated through the 
influence of key interest groups who rely on public membership for their continuing 
influence. The degree to which public opinion and the media were important to 
policy-makers was further explored by the following two questions,
"How important do you think TV and newspapers are in influencing policy-makers 
decision-making? "
"How important do you think public opinion is in influencing policy-makers 
decision-making? "
Local organisations (n=8)
Public opinion was perceived to be 'Very', 'Quite important' or 'Important' to policy­
makers by 7/8 local organisation respondents. The remaining 1/8 perceived it to be 
'Unimportant' and was qualified by the following quotation,
"Public opinion isn't very important. Politicians only listen to pressure groups, not 
people" (Local organisation respondent, 1993).
However, only 1/8 of local organisations perceived TV and newspapers to be 
unimportant in influencing policy-makers, with the majority of 7/8 respondents 
perceiving them to be 'Very' or 'Quite important'. This was reflected in the following 
statement,
"Agriculture is becoming more and more dependent upon government and taxpayers. 
TV is a powerful media and we're aware o f that in farming. Most governments are 
oblivious to public opinion" (Local organisation respondent, 1993).
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Policy-maker respondents:
Importance of public opinion (n=\2)
Public opinion was perceived by policy-maker respondents to be 'Very important' 
(8/12) or 'Quite important' 3/12) to policy-makers. The re-organisation o f the NCC 
(seen to partially be a result o f public pressure) was offered as an example o f the 
recognition by policy-makers of the strength of public opinion.
The influence of public opinion was qualified by two respondents:
"Only influential when public opinion is sufficiently vocal and massive to make its 
influence felt. Government will act i f  it feels it has to. "
1/12 respondents perceived public opinion to have no influence over policy-makers. 
This opinion was further explained by the respondent in the following quotation,
"Public opinion tends to be more diffuse than lobby groups" (Policy-maker 
respondent, 1993).
Importance of TV and newspapers (n=12)
The majority o f policy-maker respondents perceived TV and newspapers to be 'Very 
important' (6/12) or 'Quite important' (5/12). This opinion is reflected in the 
following quotations,
"[TV and Newspapers are] very important at the political level as politicians can be 
very sensitive to what the papers say although a lot o f policy is developed without 
press attention so press is reactive rather than creative" (Policy-maker respondent, 
1993).
"On an issue like this the media is an instrument o f persuasion from the interest 
group" (Policy-maker respondent, 1993).
"The efforts with the press are aimed at the quality end because those are the ones 
civil servants read" (Policy-maker respondent, 1993).
1/12 respondents perceived TV and newspapers to have no influence over policy­
makers. This final response was qualified by the following quotation,
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"Civil servants are sceptics and are not easily influenced by rhetoric in the media 
which is o f questionable value. I f  a fu ll time environmental correspondent says 
something and creates an undercurrent it won't influence ministers directly.
Wildlife programmes have no effect and probably only divert attention from real 
issues. Politicians are good at focusing on non-contentious issues away from  
transport and energy etc. It depends on how well informed journalists are and how 
capable they are o f arousing the public. Reporters skip from one issue to another so 
there is no depth. But there are some good environmental correspondents emerging" 
(Policy-maker respondent, 1993).
If an issue looked like becoming contentious and a threat with momentum, for 
example oil pollution and transport issues, the media latched onto the issue and 
stimulated growing public concern. The type of coverage SSSIs tended to receive 
concerned the costs of the management agreements or a specific site under conflict 
(for example, when a landowner such as John Cameron received a large compensatory 
payment or a site such as Loch Leven was under threat). On a local level the Orcadian 
had almost weekly coverage of NCC versus farmers disputes over the issues described 
above. In 1983 there were 7 articles. This peaked at 35 in 1984 and 15 in 1985.
The view of the Scottish Office Environment Department to public opinion was 
summed up in the following quote.
"Public opinion does not change policy. There are bursts o f correspondence from  
the public which don't take long to give them a satisfactory response" (SOEnD 
policy-maker respondent, 1993).
To conclude therefore, public opinion is considered to be crisis driven and influenced 
by the local and national press. The greening o f politics is perceived to be a result of 
awareness o f public opinion which indicates how vote-driven politicians are. There is 
a role for public opinion expressed in the media in influencing decision-makers but it 
cannot be said to be consistently effective.
6.1E2 The European dimension
Policy-maker respondents were asked how important they perceived the European 
Union to be in terms o f UK policy-making and what the anticipated impact o f the 
1995 Species and Habitats Directive would be.
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Importance o f the EU (n=T 1)
8/11 policy-maker respondents considered the importance o f the EU to be 'Very 
significant'.
" The framework fo r  policy is determined at the international level with building 
blocks down to the member states" (Policy-maker respondent, 1993).
The remaining respondents were evenly divided between the importance of the EU 
being 'Quite significant' (1/11), 'Increasingly significant' (1/11) and 'Can be, it varies 
issue by issue '(1/11).
Impact o f the Species and Habitat Directive (n=l 1)
The majority o f policy-maker respondents (7/11) considered the impact of the 
Directive to be 'Very significant'.
"It will have an enormous impact and it is receiving a lot o f government attention. 
There exists a moral and legal commitment by government to do everything to 
implement Directives. Government works hard to do everything to minimise its 
impact but once the directive is passed there will be a determination by government 
to do everything to implement it" (SNH policy-maker respondent, 1993).
However, within this 2/11 though recognising the significant impact o f the Directive 
were less encouraging:
"Potentiallyproblematical" (Policy-maker respondent, 1993).
"We already have the SSSI system and this is yet another thing. Is it necessary in 
this country? It will stir up antagonism just as SNH are trying to sort things out" 
(Policy-maker respondent, 1993).
The remaining 4/11 respondents perceived the impact to be 'Quite significant'.
The EU was seen to be influential in that it layed down directives, but the 
interpretation and actual structures within the directives framework were seen to be 
determined within the member countries. Therefore, there was considerable freedom 
in member country interpretation of directives.
Presently, nature conservation regulation tends to be driven by the international scene 
under the influence of conservation and environmental interest groups. For example, 
the EU Birds directive resulted in the Wildlife and Countryside Act (1981) and the
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EU Species and Habitats directive will require Special Areas o f Conservation to be 
selected.
While the European Union was recognised as being very influential, the above critique 
is brief as there was not the scope or resources within the boundary o f this 
investigation to explore European influence in more detail.
6.11.3 Summary of main results in Section 6.11
Public opinion and the EU are considered to be influential at all levels of the policy 
arena: grassroots; Scottish Office; Westminster; EU; International. Public opinion was 
identified as being expressed in two forms: either the mass public opinion expressed 
through the media or a more focussed expression through interest groups such as the 
NFU or the RSPB.
Public opinion and the media are important determinants of public policy to a variable 
extent and this variation is dependent on the issue. Though many farming respondents 
did not know a great deal about policy issues they generally all relied on the media to 
remain 'in touch'.
The EU is perceived to be a growing influence by policy-making respondents and 
more of an influence than many policy-makers recognise.
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The following discussion focusses on the reform of the Wildlife and Countryside Act 
(1981) included in the 1990 Environment Protection Act based on responses from the 
Policy-maker survey. As described in Chapter Two, the NCC was reorganised into 
three country agencies for England, Wales and Scotland. The reform transferred 
decisions over nature conservation in Scotland from the NCC head quarters in 
Peterborough, England to SNH in Edinburgh. This section explores the competition 
of interests, the range of motivations, role of the government, external influences and 
the overall nature of decision-making through a subjective appraisal o f policy-maker 
respondents perceptions o f reform of the regulation. Analysis was divided into two 
main areas: the actual reform o f the legislation, and the policy status quo following 
reform. Respondents were asked a range of open-ended questions. The results are an 
amalgamation and interpretation o f information from all the respondents o f the policy­
maker survey. Individual quotes are in italics and references are made to public 
organisations but individuals names are not printed as agreed in interviews.
6.12 1990 Reform of the Wildlife and Countryside Act (1981)
6.12.1 Re-organisation of the NCC
The two opening quotes below were characteristic of views pertaining to the 
reorganisation o f the NCC.
"Attempting to pin the reorganisation on the antics o f  Peterborough and the Flow
Country is too simplistic You never entirely know what goes through ministers
minds. It is probably best to see [the reorganisation] as a range o f circumstances 
which occurred at one time. It is an unclear story because it is hard to unpick the 
various conspiracies involved" (SNH policy-maker respondent, 1993).
"There existed a long-running unease although even some o f the most politically 
aware in Edinburgh did not anticipate the change" (JNCC policy-maker respondent, 
1993).
There were several key findings relevant to this investigation:
• Government ministers were central to the reform;
• the reasons for change were not explicit; and,
Part 3 : the nature of policy-making and the role o f government
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• there were various long-running arguments across several arenas which built up 
pressure for change and contributed to the final decision to reform existing 
legislation.
From these key findings three issues related to the alternative paradigm were 
addressed, 'What prompted the change bearing in mind the dispute had already gone 
on for a long time9' 'What was the focus for debate (which issues)? and 'across which 
arenas did the debate occur?1.
6.12.2 The push for change.
The push for change came from two main fraternities: (i) the DoE minister Nicholas 
Ridley; and (ii) the landowning fraternity, by way of a few particular individuals 
(Lord Pearson, Lord Rannoch, Lady Saltoun) and later in the proceedings, the SLF 
and NFUS.
A very important issue at the time was the resource costs to the DoE of NCC 
management agreements with Scottish landowners. There were a few substantial 
payouts which highlighted the issue o f Scotland paying for its own nature 
conservation.
Furthermore, there was a long-running debate about the role of nature conservation in 
Scotland and the relationship between the NCC and the Scottish Office (SO). The 
NCC was an English-based organisation and the SO wanted decision-making in 
Scotland5 for a number of reasons as described below.
Nature conservation was the only area of rural activity excluded from the SO. This 
made integration and delivery o f rural policy difficult. In addition, Peterborough was 
considered to have too much influence,
"Bearded weirdo's in Peterborough were dictating nature conservation to Scotland. 
Everything came from Peterborough and that caused contempt" (Policy-maker 
respondent, 1993).
5 There were also some identifiable moves for change from the SO who were perceived to already 
have a contingency plan for reorganisation which had been prepared two years previously (although 
it was not the model finally used).
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The SO was perceived by one respondent to be strongly territorial and the head office 
o f the NCC in Scotland was, at times, not sure from whom it should take leadership - 
the SO or the NCC in Peterborough.
There was widespread discontent with NCC particularly from the landowning and 
farming lobbies, but also environmental and conservation lobbies. This discontent is 
explained in the following quotation from a policy-maker respondent.
" There had always been considerable dissatisfaction with the NCC in Scotland 
because it didn't meet needs" "[The NCC had] loo few wider trained sta ff and they 
also had to implement the Wildlife and Countryside Act (1981) in a hurry. Things 
were not f o r  them and being a scientific remit they didn't have a balanced view" 
(Policy-maker respondent, 1993).
Furthermore, the fact that the NCC was a distant English bureaucracy meant it was 
difficult to sell conservation ideas to the Scottish people. There had been damaging 
confrontations in the Highlands and Islands (Caithness, Islay, Cairngorms and Orkney, 
NCC, 1984b).
6.12.3 Side issues of the time.
Additional issues were perceived to have contributed to the push for policy reform:
• There was dissatisfaction with the Countryside Commission for Scotland which 
was considered by many to be too vocal and ineffective.
• The forestry issue needed specific attention within Scotland and was a separate 
issue from nature conservation in England (NCC, 1984b).
• DoE wanted to breakup the closeness of the NCC in Peterborough with the RSPB 
headquarters nearby in Bedfordshire. There were also perceptions in the NCC in 
Scotland that the government organisation of the NCC was becoming an arm of 
the RSPB rather than being its own organisation.
• In Peterborough they were developing a federal model to enhance local decision­
making so the need for more local input had already been recognised.
• There was a strong devolution for Scotland debate running at the time.
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The above discussion illustrates the political and economic complexity o f the policy 
debate. In addition to the long build up of pressure, the catalyst for change is 
identified as (i) the costs of the regulation followed by (ii) pressure by key individuals 
and interest groups. The political aspects of policy range from the implementation of 
policy at the local level to national, inter-departmental competition over decision 
making. The number of arenas of debate and influence lead the discussion into the 
next section on the main decision-makers involved.
6.12.4 The main decision-makers involved.
Policy-maker respondents were asked,
"Please rank the following main arenas o f policy-making in terms o f influence with 
respect to the 1990 reorganisation o f the NCC":
1. Government departments
2. Political parties
3. House of Commons
4. House o f Lords
5. Interest groups
6. Public arena (media, public opinion)
7. International arena
8. European Union
While the issue was very complex and it is recognised that the various arenas involved 
in the push for re-organisation do not easily lend themselves to simplistic ranking, the 
responses of policy-makers allow a general pattern o f ranking which orders agents in 
the following way.
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1. Government ministers (DoE - Nicholas Ridley and Scottish Office - Malcolm 
Rifkind) and a civil servant (Scottish Office, Natural Heritage Division- Roger Crofts)
2. Peers in the House of Lords (Pearson, Rannoch and Lady Saltoun)
3. Interest groups (SLF, NFUS)
4. Public opinion
The remaining decision-making arenas were perceived as influential to varying 
degrees although they had little impact on this particular case of public policy reform) 
and can be approximately ranked as the EU, the international political arena, non- 
ministerial politicians in the House o f Commons and political parties.
6.12.5 Support for the reorganisation
The higher echelons o f the NCC in Scotland supported the reorganisation. However, 
Scottish environmental and conservation interest groups views were divided at the 
time. Many feared the reorganisation would result in a reduction in nature 
conservation as it would be more open to the influence o f local landowning and 
farming interests. In contrast to this were groups who supported the move towards 
greater autonomy over decisions with respect to nature conservation policy in 
Scotland.
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The English and UK based environmental and conservation bodies were perceived by 
several respondents to have been against the reorganisation. As nature conservation 
would come under the power o f the Scottish establishment they felt they would lose 
what indirect control they had over Scottish nature conservation through the DoE.
6.12.6 Summary of main results in Section 6.12
There were a number o f arenas perceived by respondents to be integral to reform and 
these included the government at Westminster; government at the Scottish Office; 
farming interests in Scotland; landowning interests in Scotland; environmental and 
conservation interests - UK outwith Scotland, English and Scottish interest groups.
The key arenas of influence in this instance were: (i) government ministers; (ii) the 
Lords; (iii) farming and landowning interest groups (environmental and conseiwation 
group's influence was retrospective once the reform was under way as opposed to 
their being invited to comment and consult on reform proposals as were the 
farming/landowning groups). There was no conservation or environmental group 
discussion and these groups entered the debate later. The overall costs o f policy were 
the catalyst to policy reform although the long-running arguments had also 
highlighted political difficulties. Public opinion expressed through farming groups is 
influential. Reform was not coherent or part o f an obvious overall strategy, but rather 
used to solve one instance o f high transaction costs and political controversy.
6.13 Policy status quo following reform
The final discussion broadens the focus o f analysis o f public policy from the 1990 
NCC reform to examine the status quo thereafter and the perceptions of respondents 
as to determinants of budget allocation in nature conservation. The 
comprehensiveness o f nature conservation regulation, the need for reform and the 
constraints to reform were also examined.
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6.13.1 Devolution of SNH decision-making
Policy-maker respondents perceptions o f the extent of devolution o f SNH
decision-making (n=13)
8/13 policy-maker respondents considered the establishment o f SNH to have resulted 
in devolution of decision-making from NCC head office to the SNH regions and area 
offices.
"SNH is preaching the message o f partnership right the way through the 
organisation. This has reinforced the devolution resulting in a significant presence 
throughout Scotland. There is no 'Edinburgh effect' and we're prepared to talk to 
people and go out o f our way" (SNH policy-maker respondent, 1993).
"[There was perceived to be a] limited Edinburgh effect by the creation o f regional 
boards. It was a shrewd move to get interaction in the regions. It works well but it 
does create another bureaucratic layer within SNH and slows things down" (Policy­
maker respondent, 1993).
"This devolution is very important. What happens it] the Lammermuirs will not 
necessarily work in Sutherland. We need to match local decisions. Locals need to 
fee l the matter comes from closer to home which is better than Edinburgh or 
Westminster or Europe" (Policy-maker respondent, 1993).
"Re-organisation has given us the opportunity to start positive management 
agreements and implement the voluntary ethos. It was almost a natural consequence 
following the big rush o f management agreements. Government was also beginning 
to get unhappy about the level o f some agreements especially where the forestry 
issue was included. Glen Lochay was a watershed case" /SNH policy-maker 
respondent, 1993).
3/13 perceived there to be no devolution "not in terms o f real power" and the 
remaining 2/13 responded 'Don't know'.
6.13.2 Budget allocation
Budget allocation or what is known as 'Grant-in-aid' to SNH is formally determined 
within a framework as described in Chapter Two. Respondents were asked what they 
perceive to be the main determinants of budget allocation to nature conservation by 




Results showed that policy-maker respondents perceived there to be non-economic 
determinants o f budget allocation in addition to formal economic determinants. This 
supports the view held by Spash and Simpson (1994. See Chapter Two) that decisions 
are not simply and rationally based on the costs of nature conservation which are in 
turn dependent on predetermined scientific objectives for nature conservation policy. 
Determinants were as follows:
• 4/11 policy-maker respondents thought public opinion, which is in turn
determined by the level of controversy and public profile of an issue;
"The main factor is how will a government minister have a quiet life. I f  an issue 
gets a high profile and piihlic commitment then it will receive more money" 
(Policy-maker respondent, 1993).
"The Treasury allocates the whole budget on political expediency and the loudest
voice at the time. The time frame is as short as possible to cdlow maximum room
fo r  manoeuvre" (Policy-maker respondent, 1993).
• 3/11 respondents thought the main determinant was to minimise public
spending; "During the 1980s, the budget was fairly demand-led and increases 
year on year. Yes, o f  course there are limitations (there always are)" (Policy­
maker respondent, 1993).
"Because SNH is a creation o f the government they have to make it work. So fo r  
the first few years they gave a good budget and it may tail off. The implications 
o f the Species and Habitats directive are only just coming home to government 
and we may need extra funds to meet extra costs. I f  we don't get a larger budget 
we may have to cut back on innovative work. The directive may just end up 
refocussing us on sites. The Species and Habitats Directive and the Wildlife and 
Countryside Act (1981) are geared towards site protection and over the long-run 
there are more fundamental changes needed, fo r  example, sustainability" (SNH 
policy-maker respondent, 1993).
• 1/11 respondents considered the general economic climate to be the main
determinant of budget allocation.
The remaining 3/11 did not know what the determinants were of Treasury budget 
allocation for nature conservation.
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There was also perceived by several respondents to be a tradition o f competition 
among departments for Treasury resources which constrains budget allocation to any 
department (this perception is supported by Heclo and Wildavsky, 1977).
The above elements are proposed determinants of budget allocation to the DoE, and 
hence, grant-in-aid to SNH. This also stands now for budget allocation to the 
Secretary o f State for Scotland and the Secretary's allocation to SNH.
The following quotation summarises the main determinants of budget allocation as 
perceived by respondents,
"There are two key forces: the drive to spend as little as possible and public rhetoric 
on spending" (Policy-maker respondent, 1993).
Therefore the main determinants o f grant-in-aid to SNH are the costs o f nature 
conservation 'policy' and the priority of nature conservation and protection of the 
wider environment in the Treasury and the Secretary o f State for Scotland's decision­
making.
6.13.3 Comprehensive Nature Conservation Regulation
The following discussion seeks to establish how comprehensive policy-making 
respondents considered existing nature conservation regulation to be and what needs 
and constraints existed for any necessary reform. This relates to (i) the outcome of 
competition o f interests, (ii) the dynamic nature o f policy-making and (iii) the 
irrelevance of the neo-classical concept o f an equilibrium outcome.
Policy-maker respondents were asked whether they agreed or disagreed with the 
following statement,
"The UK government does not have a comprehensive nature conservation policy".
Policy-maker (n=15)
Two thirds (10/15) o f policy-making respondents perceived the framework for 
existing nature conservation regulation to be 'comprehensive'. SSSIs, the EU Species 
and Habitat Directive, the UK government signing at Rio (which required nature 
conservation to be incorporated into sectoral plans - transport, energy etc.), and the
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fact that there are 'green ministers'6 in every government department were cited as 
examples. One third of the respondents perceived the only constraint to 
comprehensiveness, in terms of actual implementation, to be the limited budgetary 
commitment by the government.
The remaining 5/15 perceived the legislation itself not to be comprehensive enough. 
A variety o f reasons were cited including the lack o f scientific knowledge o f civil 
servants and ministers, the reluctance to confront industry on pollution matters and 
the focus on site protection rather than adopting a more comprehensive ideology of 
sustainability.
"It is not comprehensive because there is no regime for below the low water mark 
and no safeguarding o f the wider countryside. We are still driving down the site 
protection route. Not much time has been freed from the notification o f SSSIs" 
(SNH, 1993).
That policy is not perceived to be comprehensive overall (in terms o f framework and 
budget allocation) illustrates that the outcome o f the competition of interests and the 
policy-making process should not be seen as an equilibrium in which all interests 
reduce their pressure for change. The need for reform has been clearly identified by 
several policy-maker respondents. This ongoing assessment by respondents o f the 
legislative and financial framework o f policy illustrates the dynamic nature o f policy­
making.
6 In recognising the all-pervasive nature of environmental problems in 1990 the government decided 
to decided to 'name1 a 'green' minister in each government department who is responsible for 
ensuring environmental standards are met within his or her department.
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6.13.4 Need for Reform
Following the above section on the comprehensiveness o f legislation, respondents 
were asked what reform, if any, they would like to see.
Policy-maker (n=l 5)
13/15 o f all respondents perceived a need for reform of legislation.
O f these, 2 respondents identified marine issues to be an area requiring further 
legislative attention and 7/15 sought legislative provisions for the wider countryside.
The remaining 2/15 respondents did not perceive the need for reform of existing 
legislation and this was qualified by one respondent,
"It is early days [following the 1990 reform]. The concern has been that the 
scientific designation is given with no economic thoughts. The Bill now has a 
balancing act [which is] the best outcome possible" (Policy-maker respondent, 1993).
These results provide an illustrative example o f the difference between conservation 
and farming interests. The farming lobby seeks better justification of designation and 
the conservation groups seek to improve mechanisms to more adequately meet 
conservation objectives. Many respondents at all levels identified scope for further 
reform and with this in mind the outcome of policy reform can not be described as an 
equilibrium. Generally government policy is in a state of perpetual change. Optimal 
solutions are a theoretical abstract and the reality o f the outcome of competition 
among interests to influence government policy is one o f satisficing.
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6.13.5 Constraints to Reform
The final question in this section sought to establish respondents' perceptions o f the
constraints to successful policy reform.
Policy-maker (n=12)
The following were identified by respondents as constraints to the reform o f existing
policy:
.  Cost (3/12);
• Political will, which is dependent on public pressure, in turn dependent on public 
understanding. The 'Not In My Back Yard' (NIMBY) syndrome is a significant 
factor in public pressure. People will conserve nature as long as their own jobs 
are not under threat. "The real problem is getting people to realise the value o f 
non-markelable benefits and costs. Reform means changing consumption 
patterns and agriculture policies and transport policies. The biggest problem is 
the complexity and long term ism" (SNH policy-maker respondent, 1993).
There is not enough political pressure in Scotland or even in the South East of 
England because o f the reasons mentioned previously with respect to low 
environmental group membership and mainly that there are other economic issues 
with priority; and, the fact that the government is reactive to public opinion (as 
discussed in 6.13.6) means it is difficult to see where reform would come from 
(3/12);
• House of Lords and their vested interests in land (2/12);
• Ideology. It is against the present governments ethos to be regulatory (1/12);
• The recent passing of the Heritage Bill. That is, there has just been some 
reform and any new reform will not be for sometime yet; (1/12)
The remaining responses included 'No reform' (1/12) and 'No response' (1 /12).
To sum up, constraints are a combination of cost and political will (of decision­
makers and the public at large) and dominant interests.
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6.13.6 Role of the government
All policy-making respondents were asked if they perceived the UK government to be 
reactive or proactive to policy changes.
Policy-maker (n=12)
9/12 o f policy-maker respondents perceived the government to be reactive to policy 
changes. This was reflected in the following quotation,
"The UK government is reactive and the EU  is more proactive. Nature conservation 
tends to be driven by the international scene under the influence o f pressure groups. 
The framework is determined by the international level with building blocks down to 
member states (if they want to call it policy-making that's nice but its not really)" 
(Policy-maker respondent, 1993).
"Reactive, particularly so in this government. Policy is often determined by the 
economic climate - this government is very much against regulation. The EU is 
proactive because they are not elected. Some say too proactive and act before the 
public is ready to accept change. The EU relies very much on regulation and this 
government is anti it" (Policy-maker respondent, 1993).
1/12 respondents perceived the government to have its own agenda (proactive) and 
this was illustrated in the following quote:
"As the Thatcher years continued there was more and more dogma and less listening 
to other arenas. In 1981 there was lots o f consultation although the initial drafting 
was very bad technically. The 1990 Environmental Act was very much a pollution 
Act and they only slipped in reorganisation. The government put it in not expecting 
it to be controversial. The big difference between 1981 and 1990 was the attention 
paid to pressure groups" (Policy-maker respondent, 1993).
2/12 policy-maker respondents replied 'Don't know'.
6.13.7 Summary of main results in Section 6.13
Overall the government was seen to be reactive to needs o f policy change or to 
changes in public opinion. However, many respondents did report that in the instance 
of NCC reform government was seen as having its own agenda and therefore to be
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proactive. The outcome of policy reform was not seen to be an equilibrium as the 
majority o f respondents perceived the need for change. Costs and political will were 
seen to be the principal determinants of policy, and therefore, also the main 
constraints to reform. Other constraints included vested interests, government 
ideology and the governments generally reactive stance to policy reform.
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Validation of the alternative paradigm
7.1 Introduction
The principle aim o f this study was to identify the determinants o f the UK 
government's economic policy in relation to the conservation o f natural habitats.
From this aim the following two propositions have been established:
1. policy is determined by government decision-makers on the basis o f competition 
between agriculture/landowning and environmental/conservation interests;
2. property rights and the claims to benefit streams provide the focus fo r  
competition between agriculture and landowning, and environmental and 
conservation interests.
These hypotheses were investigated earlier (Chapter 3) through an evaluation o f the 
role o f Public Choice theory as a theoretical framework for the development o f 
economic policies for conservation of habitat and through the construction o f an 
alternative paradigm (Chapter 4) developed from a critique of Becker's 'A Theory o f  
Competition Among Interest Groups for Political Influence' (1983). This alternative 
paradigm was empirically tested through a survey of farmers, local organisations and 
policy-makers (Chapters 5 and 6).
This chapter consists o f a summary and validation of the alternative paradigm. On the 
basis o f this analysis the implications for future development of conservation policies 
are identified. These are presented in the final chapter (Chapter 8) with suggestions 
for avenues for future research.
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7.2 Summary of the alternative paradigm.
The alternative paradigm, presented in Chapter Four was constructed on the basis o f a 
critique o f 'A Theory o f Competition Among Interest Groups fo r  Political Influence' 
(Becker, 1983). This paradigm comprises four principle elements: the methodological 
approach; the interests o f individuals; the nature o f competition; and the nature o f 
policy-making and the role o f government.
Methodology
The methodological approach adopted in the development of the alternative paradigm 
was essentially multidisciplinary and non-mathematical. This had the effect of 
broadening the scope o f analysis by avoiding the restrictive assumptions associated 
with neo-classical economic theory, and thereby enabling the complexity o f political 
decision-making to be addressed. The approach employed both quantitative and 
qualitative data to allow a more complete empirical analysis o f the alternative 
paradigm.
Individual interests and the nature of competition
In addition to government policy-makers, private (landowning and agriculture) and 
public (conservation and environmental) interest groups were assumed to be the 
central players in the decision-making process. The conflict between these interest 
groups is principally one o f property rights distribution, and it is this that provides the 
groups with the motivation to prescribe policy reforms. By using their influence over 
the decision-making process, the interest groups essentially compete with each other 
for the adoption o f their particular desired policy direction. Each group seeks to 
maintain or promote the benefit streams o f its members, with property rights assumed 
to be redefined and allocated through the political market.
Influence is assumed to be determined by expenditure of time and money on exerting 
political pressure; for example through campaigns, political advertising and 
maintaining a large membership and income. Formal and informal networks are 
perceived to be o f particular importance in the generation and exchange of 
information. Absolute influence is assumed to be constrained by the prevailing social 
ideology.
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Nature of policy-making and the role of government
In addition to interest groups, important sources of influence include civil servants, 
government ministers and external influences, such as the EU and public opinion. 
Therefore, influences on the policy-making process were deemed to be 
multidimensional, and because o f the networks of information exchange, 
interconnected. Because government is an interested player (i.e. not neutral) the 
influence o f civil servants and/or ministers may reflect a government agenda. The 
outcome o f competition is not assumed to be an 'optimum equilibrium outcome' 
(Becker 1983) but rather a disequilibrium outcome characterised by the satisficing of 
various agents interests which, with time, reform policy in an iterative and fragmented 
manner.
7.3 Validation of the alternative paradigm
The four principal themes of the alternative paradigm provided the framework for the 
survey described in Chapter Five. The results o f this survey were presented in 
Chapter Six; the following discussion analyses these results in relation to the 
alternative paradigm.
7.3.1 Interests of individuals
The alternative paradigm relies upon the assumption that human behaviour is not 
necessarily driven by rent-seeking behaviour, but is rather the consequence o f a 
diverse range o f interests. In support of this there were shown to be three dimensions 
to farmer attitudes to SSSI designations: economic, property rights, and socio­
political. Further illustrating the complexity of individual interests, it was evident 
from the survey that all three categories were considered by the respondents as 
important factors in policy implementation (Chapter 6, Sections 6.1-6.4).
The focus o f local conflict was shown to be: (i) the loss of control over individual 
farmer's decision-making (i.e. the loss in control over benefits streams from land); 
and, (ii) the way in which policies were implemented (i.e. the management of 
farmers). While the perceived negative economic impact of designation was shown to 
be a significant concern, the actual economic impact was minimal. There were no 
beneficial aspects of SSSI designations according to the majority o f farmers although 
one possible benefit identified by many respondents was the potential increase in
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income. There was no identifiable impact o f SSSIs on respondents farming interests, 
and farmers were no more likely to be a member of a conservation group or to do 
conservation work on their farms had they had an SSSI designated on their land.
A divergence in compensation levels between the early 1980s and 1993 was identified. 
The perception o f relatively lower levels of compensation (in 1993 than in the early 
1980s) in Orkney indicated farmers had developed greater understanding o f the aims, 
objectives, and impacts o f SSSI designations. This, combined with an increase in SNH 
(NCC) influence, resulted in more standardised compensation payments. The 
contemporary threat to private property rights (and hence landowners and occupiers 
benefits streams) by SSSI designations has been significantly reduced following this 
increase in understanding. According to the survey, farmer respondents generally had 
a good understanding of the purpose of SSSIs, and their attitude to the idea o f 
designating areas for nature conservation was positive, illustrating their recognition o f 
the importance o f nature conservation.
It was clear from the survey that non-SSSI respondents, having had little contact with 
SSSI regulation had a negative perception of the legal or regulation approach to 
nature conservation policy. The voluntary approach was seen to work by the majority 
o f all respondents, provided it received adequate financial support. Overall, the 
majority o f farmer respondents recognised the value and necessity o f a mixed system 
o f regulation and voluntary policies.
When asked about future policy options the voluntary approach supported by regular 
payments was seen as having considerable merit. In reference to planning controls 
over farming, the majority of respondents gave a negative response indicating that 
they felt they had already lost a considerable amount of freedom with regard to 
decision-making on their farms (Chapter 6, Section 6.5).
This later point was further emphasised when respondents identified a range o f factors 
attracting them to farming including non-monetary benefits such as 'Being your own 
boss'. This reinforced the high value placed by farmers on their individual freedom 
over decision-making. It was widely acknowledged by the respondents that while 
they were in farming for the freedom of being self-employed and the benefits of 
working and living in the countryside, they could not meet these objectives without a 
reasonable income. It was evident that the respondents were receptive to 
conservation, and recognised its value, but felt they did not have either the time or
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financial resources to pursue those interests. Therefore, while maximising income was 
not an objective in itself for the majority, maintaining a reasonable income in order to 
pursue other non-monetary objectives was an important factor in running a farm 
(Chapter 6, Section 6.6).
From the diversity o f responses to the survey it is evident that the interests o f farmers 
are more complex than those attributed to 'rational economic man'. Although all 
respondents were shown to be pursuing their self-interest, these were shown to be 
multi-dimensional with rent-seeking behaviour a less dominant characteristic.
7.3.2 Representation of interests
This section explores how the interests o f farmers and landowners combined with 
conservation and environmental concerns are represented in policy arenas. The 
discussion offers an empirical illustration o f how local farming interests are translated 
from the local grassroots arena to the various tiers o f policy-making. For the purpose 
o f this analysis individuals are assumed to express their economic, social or 
conservation and environmental interests in the form o f membership o f a related 
group, which then competes with other groups to promote the interests they 
represent.
At the time o f the survey there were only a small number o f interest groups with 
offices in Orkney, including the NFUS, RSPB, FWAG(S) and Orkney Field Club. 
Only the NFUS and RSPB were actively representing Orkney farming and 
conservation interests in policy arenas outside o f Orkney. Membership o f respondents 
was concentrated in the NFUS. The next most popular interest group was FWAG(S), 
with the remaining memberships distributed across an array o f groups including SLF 
and several more politically marginal farming interests such as organic and sheep 
farming. Within the farmer sample, membership of conservation and environmental 
interest groups was low (Chapter 6, Section 6.6).
Generally local organisations keep in touch with the local community through an 
informal and ad hoc procedure (Chapter 6, Section 6.7). They then presented local 
Orkney interests to their head offices, who they depend upon to supply them with 
information o f policy development. The RSPB and NFUS are more proactive in 
attaining policy information and used other contacts, including direct contact with a 
civil servant or MP. There were not generally seen to be any problems in voicing
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Orkney's interests to Edinburgh head offices, but the expense o f travel was recognised 
as a constraint.
Local organisations rely upon their head offices in Edinburgh to provide them with 
information and to represent their interests at higher tiers o f policy-making. There is 
an extensive translation o f local interests from Orkney grassroots to the main policy 
arenas. This is chiefly accomplished by public bodies (SOAFD, SNH, OIC), however 
the two main interest groups operating across all policy arenas were also the two main 
groups representing farming and conservation interests in Orkney (NEUS and RSPB).
It was important to make the distinction between groups having an office in Orkney 
and those just having a membership there. While there are very few interest groups 
with offices operating in Orkney there are significantly more groups with a degree of 
support in the Isles (i.e. a small membership in the Isles) that are based elsewhere in 
Scotland or outwith Scotland altogether.
Figure 7.1 diagrammatically illustrates the office location, membership or regular 
influence at each level of policy making and implementation of the various interest 
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The main points to note from Figure 7.1 are:
• There is a hierarchy of policy communities, from the Orkney and Scottish 
grassroots to the Scottish Office, Westminster/Whitehall and the EU.
• There is a core policy community at Westminster/Whitehall illustrated by the 
existence o f a large number of groups there. This policy community is also 
influenced by international and grassroots arenas;
• There were very few interest groups representing interests at the Orkney 
grassroots level;
• From Figure 7.1 it is evident that groups representing farming and landowning 
interests were few (6) while the number representing conservation and 
environmental interests was much larger (16); and,
• There were many non-governmental organisations and relatively few government 
organisations. These are represented on the right and left o f the diagram 
respectively; and those groups on the dividing line represent quasi-government 
organisations or 'insider' groups (SAC, ADAS, NFU, NFUS, NT, NTS, SLF and 
CLA).
7.3.3 Networks and policy communities
The information networks which exist involve government and non-governmental 
organisations. Policy arenas are linked through networks, thereby increasing the 
complexity o f interactions etc.; consequently the boundaries between public and 
private organisations disappear in a haze o f insider groups and quasi-government 
agencies.
The influence o f a group is a function of how extensive its representations are across 
policy arenas combined with the role of the group. The NFUS's most important role 
was perceived to be the representation of its members interests through lobbying; a 
role it was believed to perform with reasonable success. The NFUS was seen to be 
representative o f their membership in Orkney 'most o f the time' and the conservation 
groups to be representative of conservation issues in Orkney less so with 'sometimes' 
being the majority response. One recognised essential difference between farming and
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conservation interest groups is that the NFUS directly represent their local members 
interests while environmental and conservation groups represent a broader community 
o f individuals seeking to promote the wider public interest.
Conflict arises when an attempt is made to redefine property rights through the 
political market. The NFUS seeks to maximise the benefits to its members, which 
although multi-dimensional, principally focus on maintaining freedom over decision­
making with respect to benefit streams from their land, and to being able to maintain 
these benefit streams (incomes). This was in contrast to conservation groups who 
attempt to redistribute property rights and establish public access to benefit streams.
From the numerous tiers of policy-making and the high number and range of 
governmental and non-governmental organisations illustrated in Figure 7.1 it is 
evident that networks, based on information exchange exist. There are a small 
number o f key interest groups which are important sources o f information for all 
respondents, these being supplemented by a wider network of smaller interest groups. 
All organisations, government and non-government, generate information which fall 
into two broad categories: policy and technical. SAC and SOAFD are the key 
organisations for technical information, and SNH for policy information. The most 
extensive organisations, in terms of information generation across all survey 
respondents, were NFUS, SAC, SOAFD and SNH. For new ideas the most popular 
sources were: for farmer respondents, other farmers; for local organisations, head 
offices and other local organisations; and, for policy-makers, own research, journals 
and staff or members on the ground. Government departments were shown to be very 
important for the other players in policy-making. To remain informed about EU 
policy developments, numerous sources were identified but generally information 
tends to filter through government departments to the Scottish Office.
Conservation and environmental interest groups have a formal network at the Scottish 
Office policy-making level, known as Scottish Wildlife and Countryside Link 
(SWCL). There was also a formal network at the UK policy-making level known as 
the Wildlife and Countryside Link (WCL). Through regular meetings o f SWCL and 
WCL there has been established a network between Scotland and the rest o f the UK. 
The WCL also co-ordinates other national Link organisations so as to present a united 
UK conservation lobby in the EU policy arena.
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Agriculture and landowning interests rely upon an informal network o f 
communication. The fact that there are only two farming and landowning interest 
groups make it relatively easy for them to present a united front. The farming and 
landowning lobby do not participate formally with the LINK organisations in 
Scotland.
The existence o f networks and key organisations in providing relevant and important 
information establishes the importance of government departments as well as interest 
groups. This provides strong evidence to support the view that policy elites do exist.
7.3.4 Influence
In the paradigm the determinants of influence were assumed to be pressure generated 
by a group; pressure generated by other groups; the economic climate; and, the 
political climate.
Resources in terms o f income and membership were important to the influence o f an 
interest group, for without these it would be unable to generate information (Chapter 
6, Section 6.9). The generation of useful technical and policy information awards an 
organisation influence (Chapter 6, Section 6.8). The results identified a small number 
o f key groups which included the RSPB, NFUS, WWF (in Scotland) and the RSPB, 
County Wildlife Trusts, FoE(UK), WWF and the NFU in the UK. The key groups in 
Scotland, in terms o f membership and income, were the same as those which were the 
key groups at the UK level, although the magnitude o f support at the UK level was 
substantially greater. There was marginally lower distribution of support/capita for 
conservation groups in Scotland than in England. This combined with the 
concentration o f population in the SE of England (which resulted in an absolute 
concentration of support in the SE o f England) to create a locus o f influence 
geographically and politically well placed to influence the central policy arena in 
Westminster and Whitehall.
The NFUS, NFU, CLA and SLF were shown not to have the highest relative 
memberships or incomes, but were known to be particularly influential. It was evident 
therefore, that they had an added dimension to their influence; this attributed to two 
factors: (i) the main role of the group was maximising economic benefits to their 
members; and, (ii) their relatively easy access to, and consultative relationship with, 
government agriculture departments.
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In summary, it is proposed that the degree o f influence a group can generate is 
dependent upon the following factors:
• Membership and income. Both are essential resources. Those groups shown to 
be the wealthiest and most supported are also perceived to be influential in policy­
making. This is also affected by the economic climate, for example the 1989 - 
1992 recession caused membership o f environmental and conservation groups to 
fall or stagnate.
• The nature of their interest. Economic interests are easier to mobilise than 
public interests; the relative power of representation is partly conditioned by the 
representor's control over land based resources and low incidence o f free rider 
behaviour in agriculture interest groups.
• Receptiveness and accessibility of government departments. To gain 'insider' 
status in the relevant government department awards an interest group an added 
dimension to their influence. NFU(S) has a tradition o f access to MAEF(SOAPD) 
which have been more receptive to NFU(S) than to conservation and 
environmental groups.
• The above three determinants o f influence also combine to affect how a group is 
perceived. Negative or positive perceptions of a group accumulate. The RSPB 
was seen to have increasing influence which contributes to increasing pressure in 
policy arenas.
The current level o f political rents will also be significant since groups involved must 
try to defend them. Finally, the economic and political climate are important 
determinants o f group influence. The rising membership of environmental groups was 
shown to have tailed off as a result o f the recession and the influence of the NFU was 
constrained by international demands on the European Common Agricultural Policy. 
Both o f these were political and economic influences, which although intangible, were 
nevertheless important factors of influence.
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7.3.5 Competition
From the survey it was concluded that the determinants o f influence were attributable 
to the relative pressures o f groups, with these groups competing for influence. This 
concept o f competition for influence over the policy-making process was assumed to 
be represented by a continual struggle and renegotiation between key decision-makers 
and interest groups.
Consequently, the competition o f interests at the different policy arenas is a 
substantial factor in determining the distribution o f public environmental goods. The 
willingness o f government to legitimise and protect different property regimes was 
shown to be partly explained by their perception of the importance o f the individuals 
holding different types of property rights. Whilst the governments perception o f the 
importance o f agriculture has slowly changed, the NFU(S) have successfully 
continued to redefine their position.
The NFU(S) has a monopoly over the representation o f agriculture interests, however 
this is clearly not the case with conservation and environmental interests, where there 
are several key groups active in the policy elite, such as WWF and RSPB.
The conservation lobby is widely perceived to be diffuse, although as a consequence 
o f evolving formal and informal networks (WCL, and SWCL) it is increasingly 
offering a coherent and united front. The locus o f support in the South East of 
England provides the key resources for the interest groups across the UK.
In the alternative paradigm the balance o f power between conservation and 
agriculture groups was assumed to determine the transfer rules. The conflict over 
benefit streams was shown to be the focus of competition between interests (Chapter 
Six, Section 6.1) with the existing balance of power slightly in favour o f agriculture 
interests. Conservation groups sought to extend or redefine transfer rules based on a 
more legal, and less voluntary, structure. There appeared to be no real convergence of 
interests, although publicly the NFU(S) tended to advocate the development o f the 
common ground between them (Chapter 6, Section 6.10).
The overall perception o f respondents was that the private economic interests of 
farmers remained dominant in policy-making with conservation and environmental 
groups successfully making some inroads to the decision-making process but, as yet,
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not impacting the core. The receptiveness and accessibility o f government 
departments to interest groups was perceived to vary according to the department and 
the interest being represented. Whilst all departments were seen to be reasonably 
accessible, the traditional relationships, established on the hierarchical structure of 
government departments, was thought to continue (i.e. NFUS and SOAFD; and 
SOEnD and WWF, RSPB). Within Scotland there was shown to be a strong policy 
community. Scotland relies upon key interest groups and the Scottish Office to 
represent Scottish interests at the national and international policy level. The NFUS 
appears to be representative of Scottish farming interests although the NFU was 
perceived to take the lead at the UK and EU level unless it was a particularly Scottish 
issue such as sheep or hill farming. With the concerns o f the NFUS essentially 
subsumed into the NFU remit at these higher policy levels, the potential for 
competition o f interests' is reduced.
7.3.6 External influences
Public opinion was generally considered to have substantial influence, but being 
inherently diffuse, tended to be viewed as a backdrop to more focused pressure by 
interest groups. The media was also seen to have an important influence on public 
opinion and policy-makers. Coverage o f conservation and environmental issues was 
identified as being crisis driven, although, more recently the increased number of 
environmental correspondents has improved this situation.
It was universally accepted that through the issuing o f directives the EU is responsible 
for establishing the environmental and conservation policy framework. However, 
because member states have the freedom to implement directives, a reasonable degree 
o f independence is maintained by the individual nations o f the EU.
It was evident from the survey that the 'competition o f interests' within and outwith 
government departments is an ongoing process influenced both by the EU and public 
opinion. The EU essentially provides an umbrella framework and public opinion a 
base, within which competition occurs (Chapter 6, Section 6.11).
7.3.7 The nature of policy-making
The main questions addressed in this section are the catalyst for change; the focus for 
debate; and, across which arenas did the debate take place. In short, the cost o f the
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policy was the catalyst for change, with long-running organisational and political 
difficulties also important factors; the focus o f the debate was principally 
organisational, (i.e. where decision-making for nature conservation in Scotland should 
lie). The political elements creating the long running debates ranged from the 
implementation o f policy at the local level through to the national level, and the 
interdepartmental competition over decision-making and resources. The economic 
aspects and the short-run debate were based on the cost of policy which provided the 
catalyst for policy reform. There were several policy arenas and external influences, 
with Whitehall remaining the key arena for decision-making.
Following reform and the subsequent cost and political constraints the policy status 
quo appeared to be relatively stable. The majority of policy-maker respondents 
perceived there to be a comprehensive policy framework for nature conservation, but 
that this was not supported by an adequate budget commitment, and that further 
legislative reform was necessary. Whilst those with a farming interest saw the need to 
improve the justification of SSSI designations and to maintain the status quo, 
conservationists perceived existing policy to be without a coherent philosophy, 
essentially oriented towards site protection, and that legislative economic mechanisms 
required modification to better meet conservation objectives.
The continued dissatisfaction with the policy framework is reflected in the ongoing 
work o f interest groups to influence policy-makers (with information being the main 
factor) and therefore the policy outcome can not be described as having achieved an 
equilibrium, in the 'neo-classical' sense. Advisory and feedback loops, and formal and 
informal networks characterised the interconnected and ongoing nature o f policy 
reform. The overriding determinants of grant-in-aid to SNH were the costs o f nature 
conservation policy and the importance of nature conservation and protection o f the 
wider environment to Treasury and Scottish Office ministers and civil servants. From 
this analysis it appears reasonable to conclude that the lack o f an underlying 
government strategy, the reactive nature of government decision-making and the 
competition o f interests, have resulted in a fragmented and iterative evolution of 
policy.
Satisficing, rather than optimising, characterised the outcome o f the decision-making 
process as was illustrated by the majority of all the policy-maker respondent sample 
identifying the need for policy reform.
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With respect to policy-making the survey results clearly support the alternative 
paradigm. The overall cost of the policy is the principal catalyst for policy reform, 
and not the competition between interest groups to minimise members taxes or 
maximise members subsidies in a bid to increase allocative efficiency. The main 
elements o f policy-making identified in the paradigm reflected those emphasised in the 
survey, however, one case study is not sufficient to establish clear rules for policy­
making. A distinction between decision-making and policy-making can be identified: 
decision-making is bounded in time and location, and policy-making is an ongoing 
process o f negotiation and information exchange.
7.3.8 Role of government
In his theory o f 'Competition Among Pressure Groups for Political Influence' Becker 
(1983) assumed government intervention to occur as a result o f pressure by interest 
groups to correct market failure. The relative pressure o f competing interest groups 
was considered to be very important as government favours the politically powerful. 
Becker also proposed that the competition o f interests has a determining effect on the 
extent and type o f government intervention. In this study, the dominance o f 
agriculture was identified as leading to 'voluntary regulation and incentives based' 
policies to encourage the provision o f conservation benefits. The devolution of 
decision-making to meet local interests was not a policy reform that conservation 
groups had lobbied for, as they believed it would open up the opportunity for vested 
interests in Scotland to have excessive influence on the decision-making process. This 
research has provided evidence that policy is still being strongly influenced by the 
farming and landowning lobby but that government maintains its own agenda of 
reducing or constraining public spending. Therefore, government is not simply the 
servant o f political rent-seekers and the politically powerful, or does not solely 
concentrate on maximising social welfare, but rather has its own independent agenda.
This view is commensurate with Dunleavys (1987) concept o f the Broker State 
referred to in the alternative paradigm (Chapter 4) whereby the state does not 
neutrally follow public interest or mirror society. Whatever steering capacity it 
possesses is a product o f the strength of the dominant coalitions inside and outside the 
state. Coalitions were shown to include MAFF and NFU; SOAFD and NFUS; DOE, 
SOEnD, and a number o f conservation and environmental groups, the most influential 
o f which are RSPB and WWF.
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From the above discussion it is possible to conclude that the role o f the UK 
government can essentially be described as reactive, with an internal agenda to 
minimise public spending. Implications may then be drawn as to the contemporary 
issues o f existing policy and the likely direction of future policy for nature 
conservation with respect to agricultural land use.
7.4 Conclusions: validation of the alternative paradigm
The two main propositions o f this thesis were:
1. policy is determined by government decision-makers on the basis o f  competition 
between agriculture/landowning and environmental/conservation interests;
2. property rights and claims to benefit streams provide the focus fo r  competition 
betM’een agriculture and landowning, and environmental and conservation 
interests.
The analysis in the preceeding section of this chapter (Section 7.3) validates the 
alternative paradigm upon which these propositions are based
Individual farmer interests have been shown to be multi-dimensional, with the 
difference between the diverse interest groups (maximising economic benefits to 
members or promoting the wider public interest) reflecting the range o f interests 
seeking to influence policy arenas. The degree o f influence exerted was shown to be a 
function o f a groups resources, the nature o f their interest (private or public), 
receptiveness and accessibility o f government departments and the accumulation and 
interaction of these three determinants. The overall political and economic climates 
were also identified as important determinants o f a groups influence.
The EU sets the framework for UK conservation and environmental policy, within 
which the driving force of policy is the competition between conservation and 
agriculture interest groups to maintain, or redistribute, existing property rights. The 
influence o f the EU and the dominance of agriculture interests in the UK policy­
making arena indicate that there is not a free market for influencing UK conservation 
policy. Competition of farming and conservation interests are concentrated in a policy 
elite, where only a few key interest groups are involved. Government is reactive to 
policy change, having no overall long-term policy strategy other than to reduce public
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spending. Consequently, policy development is incremental and driven by the 
dominant interests.
The political market in which interests are represented divides into two main interests: 
private economic and public. Within these there is a further division: 'private 
economic' includes landowning and farming; and, 'public' includes conservation and 
environmental interests. The origins o f the division between the conservation and 
environmental movements was identified in the early evolution o f recreation, 
landscape, nature conservation and wider environmental concerns as separate issues 
(Chapter Two). During the 1980s common ground was developed between farming, 
landowning and conservation interests.
To be able to make reliable generalisations about the policy-making process would 
require a significantly larger body of data: information exchange continues as the basis 
for ongoing development of policy analysis. The difference between policy-making 
and decision-making has been established; where following policy-development there 
is a period o f decision-making during which policy reform occurs.
The aim o f the thesis has been 'to identify the determinants o f the UK government 
economic policy fo r  nature conservation'. The principal determinants identified are 
the European Union, public opinion, the relative influence of interest groups and the 
government's agenda.
The implications of the above findings for future policy development and research are 
discussed in the final chapter, Chapter 8.
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Implications for future development of 
economic policies for conservation.
8.1 Introduction
The alternative paradigm has provided an understanding o f the competition o f 
interests at both the policy-making and policy implementation levels. This integrated 
approach allows the constraints and limitations for development o f policy at both 
levels to be identified.
Chapter 8 first outlines the existing state o f policy development and the likely future 
direction given the political and economic parameters identified in Chapter Six. In 
recognition o f these parameters, suggestions for future policy development are 
presented.
8.2 The political and economic parameters of policy development
The main determinants o f policy are the EU, key interest groups, government 
departments and public opinion. The driving force o f policy is the competition 
between key interest groups (e.g. NFU, RSPB, WWF) and the main constraints to 
policy reform are the costs o f policy, political will, vested interests and government 
ideology. These political and economic parameters have shaped the existing trend 
towards "commoditisation o f rural space and non-use values" (Marsden, Murdoch, 
Lowe, Munton and Flynn, 1993) which is perceived to be a part o f the attempt by 
landowners to continue drawing on their pre-emptive claim to maintain existing 
property rights.
So far there has been a tradition of voluntary co-operation and self-regulation. The 
designation o f SSSIs has challenged this tradition, however the NFU has responded 
by continually redefining its position and therefore maintaining an element o f the 
"tyranny o f the status quo" (Becker, 1983). The special relationship between 
agriculture interests and the government agriculture departments continues today.
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How much more agriculture and conservation lobbies can develop common ground is 
dependent upon the relative strengths of the two lobbies.
Figure 8.1 A range of interests
Private econom ic 
interests
Private property rights 
- well-defined
Public interests
Public property rights 
- undefined
agriculture landowning conservation environmental
agriculture, landowning and conservation 








- air and water 
pollution from 
the use of pesticides, 
nitrates and energy
Policy a jproach
incentive-based to encourage 
the supply o f conservation 
benefits; voluntary
regulation to prevent 
society incurring 
environmental costs; 
voluntary code of 
practice.
presumptive policy entitlements retained; 
slow redefinition of property rights 
through incentives and compensation.
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In Figure 8.1 the two principal interests are identified (private and public) and sub­
divided into four main types: agriculture; landowning; conservation; and,
environmental. The essential difference between private interests and public interests 
is grounded in the definition o f property rights, or benefit streams, associated with 
land use. The division between conservation and environmental interests exists 
primarily because conservation interests focus on localised externalities (loss o f 
habitat and landscape) and environmental interests on more subtle, complex and often 
pervasive externalities (air and water pollution). Offenders and the victims o f localised 
externalities are relatively easy to identify, and thus establishing public entitlements to 
countryside benefits has been further developed than public entitlements to clean air 
and water. Furthermore, because of the opportunity for the agriculture lobby to 
increase their subsidies, incentives to induce the provision of countryside benefits 
from agriculture has been easier to establish than the prevention o f pervasive external 
costs.
Becker assumes that the competition for political influence among interest groups 
determines the socially optimal level of market regulation. Valuation techniques, 
though still receiving considerable attention in environmental economics, cannot at 
present identify the social optimal level of nature conservation. There is no market 
for nature conservation and individuals can only express their preferences through 
membership o f environmental and conservation interest groups.
It is difficult to assess accurately the degree to which nature conservation is 
determined through the political market. Although interest groups are the driving 
force in policy development and given that the political market is dominated by 
agriculture interests, it cannot be assumed that the supply of nature conservation is at 
a socially optimal level.
Because agriculture and landowning interests dominate the political market the policy 
approach is primarily incentive-based and voluntary. The policy approach for 
mitigating pervasive externalities is less well-developed and voluntary (SOAFD, 
1993). Therefore, there is less common ground between agriculture and 
environmental groups, with the latter being relatively less influential. Given the 
relative lack o f influence of wider environmental interests, it is necessary that the 
government intervene to coerce agriculture interests to embrace environmental 
regulation if pervasive externalities are to be mitigated.
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8.3 Future policy
From Figure 8.1 there are two possible directions for nature conservation policy­
makers:
(i) the status quo or "free market environmentalism" (Jacobs, 1993) approach; that 
is to say, continue with the present iterative and fragmented policy in which the 
government is principally reactive to policy reform; or
(ii) the development o f a clear definition of public entitlement and the establishing o f 
public property rights. This would require government intervention to address 
wider environmental issues (pervasive externalities). The lack o f political will 
(NIMBY) to embrace wider environmental issues was identified in Chapter Six 
as a constraint to further reform.
The UK government could achieve its conservation and economic goals through the 
second direction by legislating to require farmers to pay to depart from the goals 
rather than paying them to conform to the goals. Farmers could buy marketable 
permits in order to engage in certain agricultural activities. This system would 
provide the government with revenue rather than being a burden on the public 
spending budget. However, it takes a long time to change the system o f property 
rights and to implement a law which is fundamentally different. Government faces 
political constraints to changing the reference points because o f the dominance of 
agriculture and landowning interests. A continuation o f the current direction o f 
government decision-making (leaving policy to the market) is more likely.
Future policy development would therefore have to come from a change in the 
influence o f one o f the four main determinants of policy: government departments, 
key interest groups, public opinion and/or the EU.
8.3.1 Government departments
Policy reform is unlikely to come from within government for the reasons explained 
above. Increased competition of interests within the government administration may 
occur over time and if public pressure on government departments also increases, the 
supply o f public environmental/conservation goods may increase. In the meantime,
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there exist political and monetary constraints to embracing international sustainability 
agreements and protection o f the wider countryside.
8.3.2 Influence of interest groups and public opinion
The private economic interests o f agriculture are an important determining factor in 
policy development. The bargaining process has been shown to be weighted in favour 
o f more organised economic interests. A policy elite has emerged which includes 
groups which represent public and private interests. These have formed loose 
coalitions with economic interests by developing their common ground. Furthermore, 
because the roles o f private and public interests remain essentially unchanged (Figure 
8.1), the conflict between them is unlikely to alter.
Factors which could change the relative influence of the two lobbies
• There may occur a decrease in the influence o f the NFU(S) as it becomes less 
representative o f the whole body o f its members. As a consequence a number of 
smaller farming interest groups may become more influential. The trends o f these 
politically marginal farming interest groups require examination. In the future the 
representation o f farming interests may experience more heterogeneity and 
competition between farming groups may increase. This increase in competition 
would free up the political market as long as government departments increase 
their accessibility to non-elite interest groups and allow other interests, including 
wider environmental interests, into the land use debate.
However, NFU may continue its behaviour o f adapting its remit in order to 
maintain its influence. Since the policy elite broadly determines policy direction, 
future reform is particularly dependent upon on how much the NFU broadens its 
remit. It is evident that the senior levels of the NFU recognise the need to address 
wider environmental issues (Swales, V., pers comm RSPB, Bedfordshire, 1994).
• The continuing competition between conservation and environmental groups will 
affect the relative influence of conservation/environmental and 
farming/landowning lobbies. The continuing increase in influence o f the formal 
conservation/environmental networks will serve to promote conservation interests 
on the policy agenda. Conservation groups and environmental groups will have to 
strive to establish their common ground in order to pool resources and present a
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stronger, united lobby. The alternative is that existing large conservation and 
environmental groups (e.g. RSPB, WWF) who have formed loose 'coalitions' with 
the farming/landowning lobby may develop those further. These large 
conservation groups thus become 'political market leaders' and perpetuate the 
policy elite.
• The majority o f the general public pay taxation, of which a small proportion is 
allotted to agricultural support. This severely reduces the potential for mobilising 
public concern (i.e. it is simpler to mobilise a small number of people paying a 
large tax or receiving a subsidy, than a large number of people paying a small tax 
or receiving a subsidy (Becker, 1983)). Consequently the conservation and 
environmental movements experience problems of freerider behaviour, 
(particularly associated with the environmental movement because o f the 
pervasive nature o f environmental externalities).
8.3.3 Influence of the European Union
The significant influence of the EU will probably continue as will the 
internationalisation o f conservation and environmental policy. As the EU supports 
broader environmental protection it will, in the long run, be necessary for the UK 
government to address environmental issues more fully. However, as it is unlikely 
that enforcement will keep pace with environmental legislation, effectiveness of 
reform may be undermined (Collins and Earnshaw, 1993).
8.4 Policy prescriptions
Recognising the political and economic constraints under which the UK government 
operates, and that it is likely to continue with free market environmentalism 
(dominated by the policy elite) the following policy prescriptions are presented. These 
policy recommendations are relevant to Orkney and other equally geographically and 
politically remote farming communities with high nature conservation value and in 
which farmers are characterised as having multi-dimensional farming interests.
SSSIs are considered as "the critical stock o f natural capital in the UK" (SNH, pers 
comm, 1994) and therefore their continuing protection is essential. However, they 
are widely viewed as being, to some extent, inappropriate and an emergency, stop-gap 
measure. The results of this thesis have shown that the designation o f SSSIs have
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gradually been accepted into the farming community in Orkney. SSSIs, although 
essential are considered to be an expensive method o f maintaining the stock o f natural 
capital. It is probable that over the next 10 to 25 years existing management 
agreements will not be renewed, and that the farmer and landowners pre-emptive 
policy entitlement will continue to be eroded. Coupled with this, the transfer rules 
associated with SSSIs will have to be strengthened in order to ensure continuing 
protection post agreement.
The farmer profile presented in Chapter 6 is made up o f three main dimensions: 
economic, property rights and socio-political. These provide the framework upon 
which policy prescriptions can be made.
Table 8.1 Policy framework and requirements
Framework Policy requirements
1. Economic - need to maintain benefit 
streams and require payment to trade 
benefit streams.
2. Property rights - loss o f control, 
require flexibility.
3. Socio-political - negative perceptions 
o f SSSIs by those without SSSIs 
indicate farmers require increased 
provision o f information, and increased 
local co-operation and consultation by 
SNH.
1. Encourage the provision o f public 
conservation goods from the wider 
countryside.
2. Address wider, more pervasive 
environmental externalities;
discourage external environmental costs 
of agricultural activity
3. Meet national conservation and 
environmental requirements.
Additional information: (i) farmer interests are multi-dimensional, complex and 
personal; (ii) other farmers are important to farmer decision-making; (iii) farmers 
generally support conservation objectives; (iv) farmers recognise the need for a 
combination of regulation and voluntary mechanisms
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To meet the policy requirements within the above framework and employ (i) - (iv) 
(additional information) the following proposals are made.
Integrated policy which seeks to enhance the supply o f conservation benefits and 
minimise external environmental costs. Develop a policy framework based on the 
experience o f cross-compliance mechanisms in the USA and ESA management 
agreements in the UK. which also includes the Code o f Good Working Practice. 
To receive payments farmers would have to meet certain environmental guidelines 
(hence the cross-compliance element) and incentives would be offered within a 
framework to enhance the supply of conservation benefits. In essence, the policy 
should be voluntary in order to protect farmer autonomy while also addressing 
pervasive externalities arising from farm pollution. To generate sufficient interest 
(to meet national conservation and environmental objectives) the financial 
commitment would need to be substantial given the low uptake rates in some 
ESAs. This may be associated with cost reductions in other areas especially those 
resulting from CAP reform which in the long run may mean no overall increase in 
public spending. This approach would encourage farmers to develop their farm 
plans according to extensive farming objectives commensurate with, for example, 
the Integrated Farming Systems concept (Jordan and Hutcheon, 1993)1.
• Promote local networks to develop the common ground between farming and 
conservation organisations at the local level. These include SAC, SOAFD, 
NFUS, SNH and FWAG(S). Exploit SAC, SOAFD and NFUS farmer contacts to 
integrate public conservation interests into private economic agricultural activity. 
This would recognise the integral role of local organisations in meeting non­
national needs in a coherent way.
. The importance of other farmers is recognised and the need to minimise 
bureaucracy and maximise flexibility. Therefore, the introduction o f participatory 
approaches into the farming community would meet all three dimensions o f the 
framework in Table 8.1. ESA-type management plans would be established 
through the local organisations network and then farmers would adopt a self-
1 Integrated Farming Systems involves the use of a selection of pesticides, nutrients, soil and water 
management technologies and practices and most represent low-external input options. They are 
usually integrated on farms to give a finely tuned strategy specific to the biophysical and socio­
economic conditions of individual farmers. Natural processes increasingly substitute for external 
inputs, and so the impact on the environment is reduced. (Jordan, V.W.L., and Hutcheon, J.A., 
(1993) Less-intensive Integrated Farming Systems for Arable Production and Environmental 
Protection The Fertiliser Society Proceedings No. 346
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regulatory approach within the guidelines of the local organisations. This would 
allow farmers to pursue multi-dimensional farming objectives.
Establish a long-term commitment to formal and informal agricultural education 
in order to integrate good conservation and environmental working practices into 
farming and land use.
8.5 Overall conclusions for future policy development
The following conclusions are made on the basis o f the alternative paradigm about the 
process by which economic policies for nature conservation are determined, and how 
economic theory can be used to describe a theoretical framework. SSSIs have 
provided an entry point for identifying the key policy issues for the design and 
implementation o f economic policies for conservation of natural habitats.
There can be no hard and fast laws of policy-making and implementation but the 
alternative paradigm presented in this thesis provides a framework that encompasses 
the continuity and change in public expenditure and illustrates the integral nature of 
expenditure and policy. Whilst a complete empirical data set does not exist for 
determining policy, this study provides support for an interim assessment by 
narrowing the gap between theory and practice, and global trends and local changes.
The property rights argument illuminates policy design and helps to define the issues 
and focus debate. Property rights are defined through the political bargaining process. 
The multi-dimensional interests of farmers illustrate that a range o f farmer 'types' 
exist, and that this provides an opportunity for the development of 'the public interest' 
through government policy.
Property rights are central to the emerging environmental economics discipline, which 
is already beginning to contribute to environmental and conservation policy design 
and implementation. As valuation techniques mature it may be possible for policy­
makers to get closer to the 'socially optimal level' o f nature conservation.
One o f the principle conclusions of this study is that the competition o f interests will 
continue, but that the balance will gradually change as the economy develops and the 
membership o f conservation and environmental groups increase. In the UK, there are 
few signs o f imminent change, with the policy elite (NFU, WWF and RSPB)
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continuing to dominate the direction of future policy. Therefore, if government 
intends to meet its national, European and international conservation and 
environmental commitments (for example, Agenda 21) it will be necessary to adopt a 
more proactive role in the development of economic policies for conservation o f 
natural resources.
Given the escalating public concern over land use and degradation, it is essential that 
the evolutionary process of policy development be understood if more desirable 
(socially optimal) environmental objectives are to be achieved. This thesis initially 
identified the inherent limitations and inaccuracy of adopting a neo-classical 
perspective o f policy development as extolled by Becker (1983). It then proceeded to 
construct an alternative paradigm whereby policy development was proposed to be a 
function o f (i) government decision-makers on the basis of competition between 
agriculture/landowning and environmental/conservation interests and (ii) property 
rights and the claims to benefits streams provide the focus for competition between 
agriculture/landowning and environmental/conservation interests.
These propositions were empirically tested and validated by conducting a survey in an 
area o f SSSI designations.
From the constructed model of the policy development process, several fundamental 
themes for moving towards a more socially desirable environmental and conservation 
policy are evident:
traditional relationships of consultation should be weakened to open up the 
political market to more and other interest groups (i.e. increased competition of 
interest groups at the policy-making level) in order to increase the subjects on the 
policy agenda;
• less o f a 'free market' approach to environmental and conservation policy by 
government. This may occur as a result o f the EU influence;
change in environmental and conservation policy is essentially incremental and 
driven by crisis. Future reform depends on an increase in public support to 
environmental/conservation groups and public pressure on the government. At 
present, given the problems of freerider behavior associated with conservation and
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environmental group membership, and widespread NIMBY attitude there are no 
imminent signs o f such an increase.
By determining a framework for nature conservation policy-making this study has 
illustrated the main determinants and parameters o f economic policies for 
conservation and therefore the likely way forward in policy design. This research has 
also set the context for policy reform and identified the key issues for successful 
implementation o f policy to meet objectives. Furthermore, it provides the context for 




• Research into the appropriateness and effectiveness o f an integrated framework 
for meeting the policy prescriptions addressed in Section 8.4 above is required. 
The framework would integrate cross-compliance and incentive mechanisms with 
farm management plans and the Code o f Good Working Practice in order to meet 
economic and conservation/environmental objectives. It would be necessary to 
determine the appropriateness and effectiveness o f such a mixed system o f 
voluntary and regulatory mechanisms to meet a multi-objective policy while still 
maintaining farmers benefit streams. Given the importance of maintaining farmer 
benefit streams, research into the economics o f a mixed system o f support and the 
likely economic impact on an area such as Orkney would be necessary. It is 
widely recognised that regions vary according to physical factors (climate, soil 
type, topography) and that farmer types vary according to economic, property 
rights and social factors (Chapter Six). Therefore, a study determining a typology 
o f farmer interests in a number o f regions within the framework established in 
Chapter 6 and a typology o f agricultural regions in parallel is proposed. From this 
it would be possible to establish not only the parameters o f farmer interests 
according to economic, social, geographical and ecological determinants, but also 
the economic, social, geographical and ecological parameters o f regions. A 
comparison across different areas could be made and the determinants o f attitudes 
which affect agricultural practices could be established, and matched with physical 
data from the regions. Such a coherent and integrated research programme 
would require a multi-disciplinary approach and would promote successful policy
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design and implementation, not only in terms o f farmer interests but also for 
conservation and wider environmental objectives.
In support o f the above research, further research into the appropriateness o f 
participatory approaches to conservation and environmental policy in areas such 
as Orkney should be undertaken in order to maximise policy flexibility for farmers 
and local organisations. The purpose o f such research would be to determine 
methods o f farmer participation in the above type o f policy, which sought to 
minimise the overall costs of policy and maximise the flexibility open to farmers.
. A more long run objective o f agric-environment policy should be to modify farmer 
behaviour and therefore research into the most efficient and appropriate farmer 
education and advisory infrastructure ought to be undertaken. This would not 
only secure farmers autonomy over decision-making but also enhance the supply 
o f environmental benefits and minimising environmental costs.
Integral to all o f the above research suggestions should be farmer surveys in order to 
maximise the relevance o f policy proposals to farmer requirements and abilities; 
thereby securing the success o f policy design and implementation with respect to 
economic, social and environmental objectives.
8.6.2 Policy design
Continue research into valuation techniques in order that it becomes possible to 
edge towards a more socially optimal level of nature conservation; environmental 
economists would then be in a position to offer policy-makers guidelines as to 
what the preferences of society are rather than leaving the supply o f nature 
conservation to be determined by the existing policy elite. As public awareness of 
environmental and conservation issues increases, so their ability to express their 
non-market values may also increase. This would be an interesting and useful 
hypothesis to investigate.
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• Research into the trends in membership and income resources o f farming, 
conservation and environmental groups in Scotland and the UK in order to 
identify any likely increase in competition among interest groups. This would 
indicate any changes in public support for the above interests, (and therefore, 
public opinion) which would also impact the future direction o f policy. In parallel 
with this, a survey o f public attitudes to environmental protection could be 
undertaken in order to identify the extent of 'freerider' behaviour and the reasons 
why the increasing support for environmental and conservation issues witnessed in 
the 1980s has slowed.
Research into who or what is the driving force of the EU given the considerable 
influence of the EU upon UK environmental policy. That the EU is also driven by 
influential interest groups is likely. If this is the case, then it would be possible to 
establish the likely future direction o f EU environmental policy once the coalitions 
and conflicts at the European level were established.
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1 13 January 1983 P-l "Eday designation cause fo r  concern "
2 31 March 1983 P-l "NCC Eday plan goes ahead"
oj 22 September 1983 P-l "Council vote against Hoy sale "
4 6 October 1983 P i "Fruitful talks on conservation fears"
5 6 October 1983 p.4 "Hoy sale" In: 'Letters to the Editor'
6 6 October 1983 p.5 "Countryside Committee discusses Hoy trust"
7 1 December 1983 p.7 "Conservation area renotified"
8 5 January 1984 p.3 "Spread the accurate word on SSSIs"
9 12 January 1984 P-l "Farming versus Conservation"
10 19 January 1984 p.4 "Nature can't keep up" In: 'Letters to the Editor'
11 19 January 1984 p.5 "Conservancy Plan explained to Farmers"
12 26 January 1984 P-l "Council to protest over Harray SSSI"
13 26 January 1984 p.3 "Strictly fo r  the birds"
14 26 January 1984 p.4 "No conflict" In: 'Letters to the Editor'
15 2 February 1984 P-l "Wallace speaks on conservation and CAP"
16 16 February 1984 p.5 "The case fo r  habitat conservation in Orkney"
17 23 February 1984 p.4 "Traditional approach to conservation in Orkney"
18 23 February 1984 p.5 "Error in acreage calculation o f SSSI"
19 8 March 1984 P-l "NCC deny 'threats' to SSSI landowners”






21 22 March 1984 p.5 "Farmers appeal to NCC"
22 29 March 1984 p.l "Councillor reserves right to criticise "
23 5 April 1984 p.l "SSSI objections: Talking about conservation"
24 26 April 1984 P i "SSSI discussions" In: 'News in B rie f
25 24 May 1984 p.l "Advisory Committee put SSSI decision on ice"
26 14 June 1984 p.3 "Convenor reports on 'cordial' NCC meeting"
27 28 June 1984 p.l "Grimond calls for Orkney SSSI curb"
28 28 June 1984 p.4 "NCC reply to convenors remarks" In: 'Letters to the 
Editor'
29 5 July 1984 p.4 "Peat bank controversy" In: 'Letters to the Editor'
30 12 July 1984 P i "NCC drops five scientific sites"
31 12 July 1984 p.6 "NCC compensation" In: 'Letters to the Editor'
32 30 August 1984 p.l "RSPB - Government shoidd take conservation flak"
33 30 August 1984 P i "Farmers and conservation - moving closer"
34 4 October 1984 p.l "NCC under fire over Westray conservation order"
35 4 October 1984 p l "Economic interests must be considered"
36 11 October 1984 p.l "Feelings run high over conservation order"
37 18 October 1984 p.l "Orkney could become 'conservation desert' "
38 25 October 1984 p.4 "Councillors 'drivel' on conservation" In: 'Letters to 
the Editor'
39 6 December 1984 p.4 "Conservation" In: 'Letters to the Editor'





41 13 December 1984 P i "NFU have fruitful talks on Westray SSSI"
42 13 December 1984 p.10 "HIDB issue guide on conservation areas"
43 31 January 1985 p.4 "Desecration or Conservation" In: 'Letters to the 
Editor'
44 14 February 1985 p.3 "Countryside Committee propose coastline walks fo r  
tourists"
45 21 February 1985 P-l "Objections to Westray SSSI are withdrawn"
46 21 February 1985 p.6 "Failure o f voluntary approach may mean statutory 
controls"
47 7 March 1985 P-l "We were misled by NCC, claims councillor"
48 21 March 1985 P-l "NCC to dive under water"
49 18 April 1985 P-l "Orphir andStenness SSSI - Council drop rejection"
50 18 April 1985 p.4 "Udal land tenure "
51 2 May 1985 P-l "More 'positive atmosphere' now over conservation'
52 2 May 1985 P-7 "Countryside Committee call fo r  new anti-litter drive "
53 9 May 1985 P-l "New step to seal conservation rift"
54 4 July 1985 P-l "Land buying grants to RSPB comes underfire "
55 4 July 1985 p.6 "Conservation done by Orcadians fo r  Orcadians"
56 11 July 1985 P-l "RSPB in row over Evie land purchase "
57 18 July 1985 P-l "RSPB reject accusation over Evie land purchase "
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Appendix II: The Questionnaire Design
Design of the questionnaires
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II. 1 Response format.
There are three basic response formats that questions can adopt. The first is open-ended 
question in which the respondent is free to give any answer within the limits imposed by the 
question. The second is multiple choice format in which the respondent must select from 
among those specified responses. The third method is a dichotomous question. Like multiple 
choice, dichotomous questions may be referred to as 'closed' questions (Tull and Hawkins, 
1987).
In the questionnaire used to interview farmers in Orkney a combination of all three methods 
was used in order to provide variation in what proved to be a lengthy interview and to meet 
differing objectives for different questions. Each method has its particular advantages and 
disadvantages and during the actual survey some questions worked better than others because 
the aim of the question was more suited to the question format chosen. A full discussion of 
the questionnaire follows.
Open-ended questions
The degree of openness will vary between questions. For example, question 10 asked,
"Can you name the organisations which represent conservation interests?
This gave the respondent almost complete freedom to identify the organisations they 
considered representative of conservation or farming interests.
The question was also pre-coded so that the respondent was effectively faced with an open- 
ended question although for the interviewer it was a multiple choice question. The interviewer 
selected the answer depending on the respondents reply.
Open-ended questions had a number of desirable features. The respondent was not influenced 
by a pre-stated set of answers. It was more likely that a wide range of responses would be 
achieved free o f any bias that the researcher unknowingly included in pre-coded responses. 
Tull and Hawkins (1987) promote this method suggesting it can offer a 'feel' for the 
information which is difficult to capture with more structured techniques. They suggest 
respondents enjoy a few opportunities to express themselves openly during the interview and 
representative quotes may be used in report writing to add to the quality o f the information. 
While there are several sources of error or difficulty associated with this method only one 
important source of error associated with open-ended questions is considered relevant here. 
The question may have measured the degree of respondent 'articulateness' rather than the real 
issue. Some respondents answer in-depth on almost any issue just as others, with equal 
knowledge, may be more reluctant to answer or need more time to consider their answer than 
that for which the interviewer was prepared to allow (Tull and Hawkins, 1987).
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Multiple-choice questions
Multiple choice questions have advantages over open-ended questions. That is, they are easier 
for the interviewer and respondent and they tend to reduce interviewer bias and bias caused by 
varying degrees o f respondent articulateness. Also, multiple choice questions enable easier 
tabulation and analysis especially when compared to dichotomous questions in that they offer 
measures of gradation or degree. An example of a multiple choice question is Question 3c:








6. don't know □
However, there could be disadvantages associated with this technique. For example, the 
provision o f answers can result in the omission of alternatives. Even when an 'other' category 
is included there is a strong tendency to choose from among the alternatives offered. This may 
occur because the respondent is tired or because one of the listed answers sounds familiar or 
logical rather than it being the proper answer to the question. Alternatives that the 
respondent had not thought about may be selected over alternatives that would have been 
thought about independently.
The basic rule to knowing how many alternatives to include is that no alternative should occur 
more than once and all possible alternatives should be included when practical.
It is also important to consider how many alternatives a researcher offers on either side of an 
issue. As above, in question 8c, it is important to offer a balanced number of alternatives.
Position bias is another form o f bias to take into account. This results from a tendency of 
respondents to select those values near the middle of the range presented. This type of error is 
considered particularly critical when there is no 'correct' answer. If the range of answers 
covers the hypothesis in the middle of the range there is a possibility that the hypothesis will be 
confirmed although this could be incorrect (Tull and Hawkins, 1987). This could be overcome 
by asking another question in a different format but which has the same hypothesis.
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The final point to note is in the wording of alternatives listed and the inclusion, labelling and 
positioning of "don't know" or "neutral” categories. Within this questionnaire in trying to 
overcome position bias the aim has been to vary the order of types of alternatives. That is, 
changing the position of the aforementioned categories within the range and inserting the 
positive answers at the beginning, middle or end of ranges. Prompt sheets were used in the all 
three questionnaires where appropriate. These offered a range of answers and the order of 
choice was altered in order to avoid position bias. The prompt sheets are included at the end 
of the farmer questionnaire in Appendix III.
Dichotomous questions
Dichotomous questions are an extreme form o f multiple choice questions and allow only two 
or three answers, for example, 'yes', 'no' and often also include a supplementary neutral 
category such as 'don't know'.
The advantages associated with the dichotomous question are similar to those with the 
multiple choice question. It is especially well-suited for determining certain points o f fact, 
such as in question 32;
"Do you have an SSSI designated on your farm?" Yes/No
II.2 Decisions about the question sequence.
Questions need to be organised in a logical manner to avoid introducing errors. The specific 
order in which the respondents receive the questions is a potential source o f error. It was 
decided in this questionnaire to begin with some simple, objective and interesting questions. 
This reassures and relaxes the respondent and attains their co-operation. Therefore, the next 
determinant o f the structure of the questionnaire is topic order. For example, asking them 
whether or not they carried out practical conservation work before they answered questions 
relating to their attitudes towards conservation ensured respondents were not led into feeling 
they ought to respond positively to one or other question. Also, initial questions of each topic 
were constructed to avoid providing a biased frame o f reference or suggesting the answers to 
following questions.




The first six questions of the questionnaire aimed to discover respondents information sources 
for their farm business. These were simple multiple choice questions aimed at putting the 
respondent at ease. These were followed by question seven about respondents membership of 
farming and conservation organisations, again a direct and simple multiple choice question.
Wider nature conservation issues
The next topic covered was wider nature conservation issues about policy at local and national 
government levels and the role of pressure groups.
The first two dichotomous questions (8a, 8b) aimed to discover respondents attitudes to local 
council involvement in farming and conservation issues followed by a third multiple choice 
question (8c) on whether they perceived any bias in the local councils decision-making. This 
was followed by a large multiple choice question on perceptions about different organisations 
involvement in the policy-making process.
Questions 10 to 13 were open-ended and aimed to discover the most well-known and most 
representative organisations which represent farming, landowning and conservation interests. 
It was thought rather than create any bias by prompting respondents into choosing the most 
familiar response in a range of multiple-choice answers it would be better to allow them to 
name organisations spontaneously.
The role of pressure groups
The questions were multiple choice and aimed to discover respondents perceptions about the 
role, importance and effectiveness of pressure groups associated with nature conservation, 
landowning and farming interests. They also aimed to discover how representative 
respondents felt groups were of local Orkney interests and also how conservation-minded they 
saw themselves as being with respect to the rest of the UK.
The final questions in this topic asked respondents how they perceived the balance of interests 
between conservation and agriculture, the role of the media and if they saw the government as 
actually having a nature conservation policy. This was kept to the end to allow respondents to 
warm up to the subject under discussion and give them time to have thought about the topic.
Sites of Special Scientific Interest
The next topic was specifically on Sites of Special Scientific Interest (SSSIs). The first seven 
questions were aimed at discovering the perceptions o f the respondent about the wider issues 
surrounding the policy of SSSIs - the aims of the policy, the shortcomings and any changes 
they would see made to the system.
II.3 Description of farmer questionnaire.
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Two sections: those with SSSIs and those without SSSIs
The questionnaire was then divided up into two sections following a dichotomous question on 
whether the respondent had an SSSI designation on their land. If the response was 'yes' there 
followed a series o f open-ended and multiple choice questions about the nature and the impact 
of the designation. It was also intended that the real issues behind the designation and any 
associated problems be discovered.
If the respondent did not have an SSSI designation this section was omitted and there was a 
separate section o f hypothetical questions aiming to discover how the respondent would feel 
to having a designation This was aimed at discovering any preconceptions respondents have 
surrounding the implementation of the Wildlife and Countryside Act o f 1981. As in the 
previous section, multiple choice questions were asked to discover farmer perceptions with 
respect to beneficial and difficult aspects o f SSSI designation and the likely financial and 
ecological impact of such a designation.
All respondents were then asked about their own conservation activities in order to give a 
short break from questions about SSSIs.
SSSIs - the wider issues
The questionnaire then returned to wider questions surrounding the equity o f the system, the 
existing system of compensation and how it is calculated, the effectiveness of a voluntary 
approach and the possible alternatives they would like to see in place. Finally, in this section 
respondents were asked if they consider environmentally-friendly farming and prosperous 
farming to be compatible.
Socio-economic profile of respondents
The final section included eleven questions in order to attain a socio-economic profile o f the 
respondent. These were direct and simple open-ended and multiple choice questions.
These questions covered whether the respondent was an incomer or a local, age, education 
levels, tenure status and size of farm and voting behaviour. Some of these questions were 
asking for sensitive information and so by being placed at the end of the questionnaire thus 
gave the interviewer time to establish a rapport with the respondent.
Also, simple questions were needed at the end because the questionnaire was so long it would 
have been difficult to maintain respondents attention to attain accurate answers from in-depth, 
more complex questions.
II.4 Decisions on the layout of the questionnaire.
The questionnaire was organised in a manner to avoid confusion and recording errors. 
Therefore, only 3, 4 or 5 questions were presented on each page with either a formal answer- 
recording procedure in the form o f boxes or sufficient space for writing open answers.
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The Farmer Questionnaire
The Local Organisation Questionnaire
Agenda for Policy-maker Interviews
Appendix III: The Survey
The Farmer Questionnaire
Confidential
SECTION ONE : M EM BERSH IP AND INFORM ATION
The following questions are specifically about memberships and information sources.
1 Which o f  the following are important sources o f  information fo r  your farm  business? (PROMPT)
1. Scottish Agricultural College (SAC) □
2. Scottish Office Department of Agriculture (SOAFD) n
3. National Farmers Union for Scotland (NFUS) u
4. Farming and Wildlife Advisory Group (FWAG) □
5. Agriculture Training Board (ATB) □
6. Scottish Natural Heritage (SNH) □
7. Orkney Islands Council (OIC) □
8. Orkney Field Club □
9. T.V.. Radio or Journals □
10. Other, please specify
2 Which o f  the above is the M O ST important source o f  information fo r  your farm  business? Please rank the 
top three sources with 'I ' being the most important.








8. Orkney Field Club □
9. T.V.. Radio or Journals □
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3 Which, i f  any, o f  the following newspapers do you read regularly, that is, more than once a month? 
(PROMPT)
1. Orcadian □
2. Press and Journal □
3. Scotsman □
4. Farmers Weekly □
5. Scottish Farmer □
6. Daily Record □
7. Glasgow Herald □
8. Dundee Courier □
9. The Times □
10. Daily Telegraph □
11. Daily Express □
12. Other, please specify
4 Do you watch any fanning television programmes?
please list:. yes
z. no □




6 What is the single most important way that you keep up to date with new ideas and developments in fanning  
and land use? (PROMPT)
1 Scottish Agricultural College (SAC)
2. Scottish Office Agriculture Department (SOAFD)
3. National Farmers Union for Scotland (NFUS)
4. Farming and Wildlife Advisory Group (FWAG)
5. Agricultural Training Board (ATB)
6. Scottish Natural Heritage (SNH ex-NCC)
7. Local Agricultural College
8. Media (T V., radio and newspapers)
9. Other farmers, neighbours, family or friends.
10. Other
7 Are you a member o f  any o f  the following organisations?
has membership been < 5 years or > 5 years
1. NFUS
2. FWAG
3. Scottish Landowners Federation (SLF)
4. World Wide Fund for Nature (WWF)
5. Royal Society for the Protection of Birds (RSPB)
6. Scottish Wildlife Trust (SWT)
7. Orkney Field Club








1. yes | | please comment




8b Do you think the local council is involved in conservation issues?



















9 What do you understand by Nature Conservation Policy?
10 Can you name the organisations which represent farming interests?
11 Can you name the organisations which represent landowning interests?
12 Can you name the organisations which represent conservation interests?
13 Which organisation, from  those mentioned is the most representative o f  your interests? (PROMPT)
14a How important do you think farming pressure groups are to policy-makers?
1. very important Z l go to 14b
2. quite important □ go to 14b
3. important □ go to 15
4. not very important □ go to 14c
5. not important c go to 14c
6. don't know □ go to 16
14b I f  very important/quite important why do think this is the case?







16a How important do you think conservation pressure groups are to policy-makers? (PROMPT)
15 Do you think this level o f  importance has changed over the last five years? (PROMPT)
1. very important go to 16b
2. quite important U go to 16b
3. important □ go to 17
4. not very important □ go to 16c
5. not important □ go to 16c






16b I f  very important/ quite important why do think this is the case?
16c I f  not very important/not important, why do you think this is the case?
17 Do you think this has changed over the last five  years? (PROMPT)
1. increased greatly □
2. increased □
3. no change □
4. decreased □
5. decreased greatly □
6. don't know □
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18 Do you think EU fanning /landowning groups represent local Orkney farming/landowning interests?
(PROMPT)
I. all of the time U
2. most of the time □
3. sometimes □
4. never □
5. don't know □
19 Do you think National farming/li
1. all of the time u
2. most of the time □
3. sometimes □
4. never □
5. don't know n
20 Do you think the consen’ation i 
interests? (PROMPT)
1. all of the time □
2. most of the time □
3. sometimes □
4. never □
5. don't know □
21 Do you think the 
interests? (PROMPT)
consen’ation
1. all of the time U
2. most of the time □
3. sometimes □
4. never □
5. don't know □
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23 In your opinion what is a groups (for example, NFUS) most important role?
1. Poviding information to members?
2. Representing members interests 
by lobbying?
3. Other
24a How effective are they in achieving this? (PROMPT)
1. very effective go to 24b
2. quite effective □ go to 24 b
3. effective n go to 25
4. not very effective u go to 24c
5. not at all effective □ go to 24c
6. don't know n go to 25
24b I f  very effective/quite effective why do you think so?
24c I f  not very effective/not at all effective why do you think so?

















□  please comment
□
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26 How important do you think public opinion is in influencing policy-makers decision-making? (PROMPT)




3. important d please discuss
4. not very important
r
please discuss
5. not important please discuss
6. don'l know




28 Do you think people in Orkney are as conservation minded at those in the rest o f  the U.K.
1. yes | | please comment
2. no [ | please comment
3. don't know
29 Do you agree or disagree with the following statement: (PROMPT)
The U.K. Government does not have a conserv ation policy.
1. strongly agree □
2. agree □
3. disagree □
4. strongly disagree □
5. don't know n
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The next set of questions are about the designation of SSSIs and their impact.
SECTION THREE: SSSIs specifically
30a For policy-makers, what is the, MAIN A IM  o f  SSSI legislation? Is it; (PROMPT)
1. Conserving natural resources for scientific research U
2. Conserving natural resources for wildlife and plants □
3. Conserving landscapes for people and their leisure □
4. Maintenance of niral incomes □
5. Meeting public demand for nature reserves □
6. Other, please specify




31 What would you say, i f  any, are the main shortcomings o f  the SSSI policy?
hi Do you have an SSSI designated on your farm?
1. Yes | | goto







FARM ERS WITH SSSIs
33 When was the site on your farm designated?
34 For what reason was the site designated?
1. Biological
2. Geological '
3. Biological and 
geological
4. Don't know □
35 Do you have a management agreement?
1 yes I I if yes, how long have you had this agreement?
2. no
36a Has SSSI designation affected your annual farming income?
1 yes | | go to 36b for increase or 36c for decrease (PROMPT)
2. no | | go to 36d
3. don't know
36b Please indicate the amount by which your income has increased :
1. 0-  £5.000
2. £5.001 - £10.000
3. £10.000 - £20.000
4. more than £20,000
36c Please indicate the amount by which your income has decreased:
1.0-£5.000
2. £5.001 -£10,000
3. £10,000 - £20,000











37a Have vou needed to change your fanning activities as a result oj the designation?
go to question 37b 




37b. In what way have you changed your activities?
38a Do vou think designation has affected your stocking levels?





go to question 38c 
go to question 39
38b Generally over the whole period o f  the designation what is the change in stocking rates?




if yes, please comment
39 Which o f  the list o f  Potentially Damaging Operations will/has affected your farming operations?
(PROMPT)





41a Do you carry out any unpaid conservation activities on the farm?  
l..yes | | go to 41b
2. no | | go to 42
41b Please say which conservation activities you do.
1. Heather control
2. Dryslone dyking
3. Creation of ponds
4. Tree planting
5. Other, please specify
□
42a What, i f  anv, aspects o fSSSI designation are beneficial to you/your farming operations? (PROMPT)
1. A new interest in nature conservation. □
2. An increased interest in the farm itself. j |
3. Increased contact with government agencies. | |
4. A potential increase in income | |
5. Other, please specify
42b I f  any, which o f  the above do you fin d  the M O ST beneficial? Please note the number and comment.
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1. Perceived loss of control over your own land
2. Legal disputes about finances or rights on your land
3. The time involved in its administration
4. The potential loss in income 
Other, please specify
43b I f  any, which o f  the above do you fin d  the M O ST difficult? Please note the number and comment.





43a What, i f  any, aspects o fSSSI designation are difficult fo r  you/your farming operations? (PROMPT)
The next section is for farmers without SSSI designation 









FOR THOSE FARM ERS W ITH O U TSSSI DESIGNATION
















45b Which, i f  any o f  the following, would you consider to be beneficial aspects o f  SSSI designation to you/your 
fanning operations? (PROMPT)
1. A chance to develop an interest 
in nature conservation.
2. An increased interest in the farm itself.
3. Increased contact with government agencies.





45c Which, i f  any o f  the following would you consider to be difficult aspects o f  SSSI designation fo r  you/your 
farming operations? (PROMPT)
1. Perceived loss of control over your own land
2. Legal disputes about finances or rights on your land
3. The time involved in its administration
4. The potential loss in income







46a Do vou think SSSI designation would change your annual fanning income?




3. don't know □ go to 47
46b Please indicate the amount by which you think your income would increase.
1. 0-  £5.000
2. £5,001 -£10.000
3 . £ 10.000  - £ 20.000
4. more than £20.000
5. increase but don't know how much
46c Please indicate the amount by which you think your income would decrease.
1.0-£5.000
2. £5.001 -£10,000
3 . £ 10.000  -  £ 20.000
4. more than £20.000
5. decrease but don't know how much














48 Do you think the SSSI designation would change the financial value o f  your land?
1. increased
2. decreased | |
3. stay the same
4. don't know | |
49a Do you carry out any unpaid conservation activités on the farm  ?
1. yes \ ^ \  go to 49b
2. no I I go to 50
49b Please say which conservation activities you do.
1. Heather control
2. Drystone dyking
3. Creation of ponds
4. Tree planting
5. Other
50 Do you think SSSI designation affects the way farmers farm their land outwith the site?
1. intensify | |
2. no change | |
3. extensify | |
4. don't know
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51 As a farmer/landowner which o f  the following statements do you consider to be the most important to you: 
(PROMPT)
1. Maximising your farm business profits U
2. Living and working in the countryside □
3. Being your own boss □
4. Working the land for future generations □
5. Other n
52a Do you think compensation with management agreements varies amongst landowners?
1. yes □ go to 52b
2. no □ go to 53
3. don't know □ go to 53
52b I f  yes, would you say the variation is:
1. a great deal [ |
2. not very much




54 Do you think a voluntary approach is capable o f  achieving :
1. the same
2. more than a legal/regulation approach






55 Given the move towards conservation what mechanisms would you like to see in place? (PROMPT)
1. Land purchase by government
2. Land purchase by voluntary conservation 
organisations
3. Regulation with compensation limited to a 
one-off payment
4. Regulation with compensation for an 
annual payment
5. Voluntary schemes with supervision by 
a government agency
6. Voluntary schemes with no supervision






56 How would you fee l i f  all farming practices were taken under planning controls (such as building
development and access) like other economic activities:
1. leave farming
2. accept it but feel unsatisfied
3. not be bothered
4. other, please comment
57 Do you think there should be an appeals system fo r  all SSSI designations ?
l.yes | please comment
2. no | please comment
3. don't know
58 Existing compensation is calculated on income foregone as a result o f  the designation. Do you think this 
the best way?
1. keep existing method □
2. give a standard payment to all 
landowners/farmers
□
3. some other method, please suggest □
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59 Do you think fanners should have the right to choose between a one-off payment or annual payments 







60 Do you think voluntary consen’ation groups should be allowed to own land fo r  nature reserves?




SECTION FIVE: THE FUTURE FOR CONSERVA TION PO LICY IN  ORKNEY  
AND ELSEW HERE IN  THE U.K.
61 Do you consider yourself to be a conservationist?
1. yes | [ please comment
2. no □
3. don't know
The following questions relate to Environmentally Sensitive Area (ESA) designation - 
62a Have you heard o f  it?
1. yes go to 62
2. no U go to 63
3. don't know □ go to 63
62b Do you think ESA is a good policy
1. yes □ go to 62c
2. no □ go to 63
3. don't know' □ go to 63





3. The 5-10 year plan
□
4. Other
63 In your opinion does prosperous 
farming?
■ farming lead to
1. yes □ Please
2. no □ Please
3. don't know n
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And finally, a few questions about yourself.
64a Do you regard youself as an incomer or a local?
1. incomer □
2. local | |
64b Do vou think this has any effect on how conservation-minded you are?
please comment1. yes
2. no | |
3. don't know
65a What is the total acreage o f  your farm?
65b What acreage o f  this is rough grazing/hill land? 
65c What acreage is in bye?




4. In a limited partnership
3. Of mixed tenureship 
(including leased land)
67 What is the farm-type?
1. Mainly cattle
2. Mainly sheep
3. Sheep and Cattle
4. With arable | |
5. Other, please specify
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69 Do you expect any o f  your fam ily to take over from you in actively farming this land?










71a Did you go on to further education?
1. yes
1 . no
go to question 71b.
71b Was your further education at:
1. College of Further Education
2. University or Polytechnic






Thank you for your help on completing this questionnaire. Your co-operation has been greatly appreciated.




The prompts have been condensed for the purposes of the Appendix.
1 Which o f the following are important sources o f information for your farm business?
1. Scottish Agricultural College (SAC)
2. Scottish Office Department of Agriculture (SOAFD)
3.National Farmers Union for Scotland (NFUS)
4. Farming and Wildlife Advisory Group (FWAG)
5 . Agriculture Training Board (ATB)
6. Scottish Natural Heritage (SNH)
7. Orkney Islands Council (O.I.C.)
8. Orkney Field Club
9. T.V. Radio or journals
10. Other, please specify
3 Which, i f  any, o f the following newspapers do you read regularly, that is, more than once a month?
1. Orcadian
2. Press and Journal
3. Scotsman
4. Farmers Weekly







12. Other, please specify'
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6 What is the single most important way that you keep up to date with new ideas and developments in 
farming and land use?
I.Scottish Agricultural College (SAC)
2. Scottish Office Agriculture Department (SOAFD)
3. National Farmers Union for Scotland (NFUS)
4. Farming and Wildlife Advisory Group (FWAG)
5. Agricultural Training Board (ATB)
6. Scottish Natural Heritage (SNH cx-NCC)
7. Local Agricultural College
8. Media (T.V. Radio and newspapers)
9. Other farmers, neighbours, family or friends.
10. Other
8c Would you say it (Orkney Islands Council) has any bias towards farming or towards conservation 
interests?
1
Definitely Probably Neutral Probably Definitely Don't
farming fanning conservation conservation know
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14a How important do you think farming pressure groups are to policy-makers?
1 2 3 4 5 6
Very Quite Important Not very Not at all Don't
important important important important know
15 Do you think this level o f  importance has changed over the last five  years?
1 2 3 4 5 6
Decreased Decreased No change Increased Increased Don't 
greatly greatly know
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16a How important do you think consen’ation pressure groups are to policy-makers?
1 2 3 4 5 6
Very Quite Important Not very Not at all Don't
important important important important know
17 Do you think this level o f  importance has changed over the last five  years?
1________ 2_____________ 3___________4__________ 5__________ 6_
Decreased Decreased No change Increased Increased Don't 
greatly greatly know
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18 Do you think EU fanning /landowning groups represent local Orkney farming/landowning interests?
I 2___________ 3____________ 4__________ 5
All of Most of Sometimes Never Dont
the time the time know
19 Do you thinkNational farming/landowning groups represent local fanning/land interests?
I 2___________ 3____________ 4__________ 5
All of Most of Sometimes Never Dont
the time the time know
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20 Do you think the conser\>ation interests represented at a national level are typical o f  local conservation 
interests?
1 2 3 4 5
All of Most of Sometimes Never Don't
the time the time know
21 Do vou think the conservation interests represented at an EU level are typical o f  local conservation 
interests?
1 2 3 4 5
All of Most of Sometimes Never Don't
the time the time know
260
24a How effective are they in achieving this?
1 2 3 4 5 6
Not at all Quite Effective Not veiy Very Don't
effective effective effective effective know
25 How important do you think Television and Newspapers are in influencing policy-makers decision­
making?
1 2 3 4 5 6
Very Quite Important Not very Not at all Don't
important important important important know
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26 How important do you think public opinion is in influencing policy-makers decision-making?
1 2 3 4 5 6
Very Quite Important Not very Not at all Don't
important important important important know
29 Do you agree or disagree with the following statement:
The U.K. Government does not have a conservation policy.
1
Stiongly Agree Disagree Stiongly Dont
disagree disagree know
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30a For policy-makers, what is the, MAIN AIM  ofSSSI legislation? Is it;______
1. Conserving natural resources for scientific research
2. Conserving natural resources for wildlife and plants
3. Conserving landscapes for people and their leisure
4. Maintenance of rural incomes
5. Meeting public demand for nature reserves
6. Other, please specify
FOR FARMERS WITH SSI DESIGNATION
36 Please indicate the amount by which your income has been affected:_____
1. 0 -£5 ,000
2. £5,001 -£10.000
3. £10.000 -£20,000
4. more than £20,000
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1. Cultivation.
2. The introduction of grazing and changes in the grazing regime.
3. The introduction of stock feeding and changes in stock feeding practice.
4. Applcation of manure, fertilisers and lime.
5. Application of pesticides, including herbicides (weedkillers).
6. D um ping , spread ing  or d ischarge or any m aterials.
7. Burning and changes in the pattern or frequency of burning, except in the immediate vicinity of 
worked peats banks to facilitate working and drying.
8. Drainage.
9. Modification of the structure of water courses.
10. The changing of the structure of water levels and tables and water utilisation.
11. Infilling of drains, ponds, pools and marshes.
12. Cutting of peat by machine.
13. Construction of roads, tracks, walls, fences, hardstands, banks etc.
14. The use of vehicles or craft likely to damage features of interest.
15. Recreational activities likely to damage peatland. vegetation or birds, including research and 
educational use.
42a What, i f  any, aspects ofSSSI designation are beneficial to you in your farming operations?__________
1. A new interest in nature conservation.
2. An increased interest in the farm itself.
3. Increased contact with government agencies.
4. A potential increase in income
5. Other, please specify
39 Which o f  the list o f  Potentially Damaging Operations will/has affected your fanning operations?
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1. Perceived loss of control over your own land
2. Legal disputes about finances or rights on your land
3. The time involved in its administration
4. The potential loss in income
5. Other, please specify
FOR THOSE FARM ERS WITHOUT SSSI DESIGNA TION
45a How would you feel about an SSSI being designated on your farmland?
43a What, i f  any, aspects o fSSSI designation are difficult fo r  you in your farming operations?
1 2 3 4 5 6
Very Quite Not Quite Very Don't
unhappy unhappy bothered pleased pleased know
45b Which, i f  any o f the following, would you consider to be beneficial aspects ofSSSI designation to you in 
your f arming operations?_______________________________________________________________________________
1. A chance to develop an interest in nature conservation.
2. An increased interest in the farm itself.
3. Increased contact with government agencies.
4. A potential increase in income 
Other, please specify
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45c Which, i f  any o f the following would you consider to be difficult aspects ofSSSI designation for in your 
farming operations?
1. Perceived loss of control over your own land
2. Legal disputes about finances or rights on your land
3. The time involved in its administration
4. The potential loss in income 
Other, please specify
46 Please indicate the amount by which you think your income would change.
1 0 -  £5,000
2. £5,001 - £10.000
3. £10,000 -£20,000
4. more than £20,000
5. increase but don't know how much
FOR ALL FARM ERS
51 .l.v a farmer landowner which o f the following statements do you consider to be the most important to 
vou:
1. Maximising your farm business profits
2. Living and working in the countryside
3. Being your own boss
4. Working the land for future generations
5. Other
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55 Given the move towards conservation what mechanisms would you like to see in place?
1. Land purchase by government
2. Land purchase by voluntary conservation organisations
3. Regulation with compensation limited to a one-off payment
4. Regulation with compensation for an annual payment
5. Voluntary schemes with supervision by a government agency
6. Voluntary schemes with no supervision
7. Don't know 
Other, please specify
The Local Organisation Questionnaire.
Confidential
The local organisation questionnaire was altered according to the respondent. This questionnaire was prepared 
for the RSPB. No prompts were used as respondents were more familiar with the format of questions and the 
subject matter.
SECTION ONE : M EM BERSH IP AND INFORMA TION
1 Which o f  the following are important sources o f information for you in your work associated with land use 
and nature conservation?
1. Scottish Office Department of Agriculture (SOAFD)
2. Orkney Islands Council (OIC)
3. National Farmers Union for Scotland (NFUS)
4. Crofters Commission (CC)
5. Farming and Wildlife Advisory Group (FWAG)
6. Agricultural Training Board (ATB)
7. Scottish Natural Heritage (SNH)
8. Scottish Agricultural College (SAC)
9. Orkney Field Club
10. Television
11. Radio









13. Other, please specify
2 Which o f  the above is the M O ST important source o f information? Please rank the top three sources with










9. Orkney Field Club
10. Television 
11 Radio






13. Other, please specify
3 Where does RSPB obtain information on the application and development o f  National U.K. policies? (tick 
as appropriate).
1. U.K. civil servant
2. U.K. government 
minister
3. House of Lords 
Select Committee

















4 Where does RSPB obtain information on the application and development o f  EU  policies?
1. U.K. civil servant
2. U.K. government 
minister
3. House of Lords 
Select Committee
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7. Member of Euro 
Parliament
□
8. Member of Economic 
and Social Committee
9. E.C. Commission □
10. Euro pressure 
group (which one)
11. Dept, of 
Environment
12. M.A.F.F. | |
13. Journals/news
14. Other, please specify
15. None







4. Crofters Commission | |
5. S.A.C.
5. Farming and Wildlife Advisory Group (FWAG)
6. Agricultural Training Board (ATB) I I
7. Scottish Natural Heritage (SNH ) | |
8. Local Agricultural College | |
9. Television | |
10. Radio
11. Newspapers | |
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12. Other farmers, neighbours, family or friends.
13, Other, please specify
6 What is the local membership o f  the RSPB?
n
This following question is trying to understand the 'network', that is, the linkages between the following local 
organisations.
7a Do you think the following groups are in regular contact with one another? Please indicate by ticking  
the relevant box on the matrix.
7b Please indicate the strongest working relations in your opinion by circling the box. Why do you think 
this is the case?
7c Please indicate by using a cross any difficult relations, i f  any, between the above local organisations. 
Why do you think this is the case?
7d For those which you think have no relationship, please write 'NR'.










SOAFD SAC NFUS C.C. FWAG ATB SNH RSPB OIC
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1 yes please comment
8a Do you think OIC is involved in fanning issues?
2. no
3. don't know
8b Do vou think the OIC is involved in consen’ation issues?
1 Ves please comment
2. no
3. don't know









SECTION TWO: CONSERVATION AND POLICY-MAKING IN  THE U.K.
9 What do you understand by the U.K. governments 'Nature Conservation Policy'?
10 Can you name the organisations which represent fanning interests? 
(National and local)
11 Can you name the organisations which represent landowning interests? 
(National and local)
12 Can you name the organisations which represent consen’ation interests? 
(National and local)
13a How important do you think farming/landowning pressure groups are to policy-makers?
1. very important □ go to 13b
2. quite important n go to 13b
3. important u go to 14
4. not very important □ go to 13c
3. not important r go to 13c
6. don't know go to 14
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13b I f  very important/important why do think this is the case?
13c I f  not very important/not important at all, why do you think this is the case?
14 Do you think this level o f  importance has changed over the last five  years?
1. increased greatly d
2. increased □
3. no change n
4. decreased u
5. decreased greatly □
6. don't know n
15a How important do you think conservation pressure groups are to policy-makers?
1. very important m go to 15b
2. quite important □ go to 15b
3. important d go to 16
4. not very' important □ go to 15c
5. not important □ go to 15c
6. don't know d go to 16
15b I f  very important/important why do think this is the case?
15c I f  not very important/not important, why do you think this is the case?
16 Do you think this has changed over the last five  years?
1. increased greatly □
2. increased □
3. no change □
4. decreased □
5. decreased greatly □
6. don't know □
17 Do you think EU  farming /landowning groups represent local Orkney fanning/landowning interests?
1. all of the time





18 Do you think N ational farm ing/landowning groups represent local farming/land interests?
1. all of the time




19a Do you think, in general, the conservation interests represented at a national level are typical o f  local 
consen’ation interests?
1. all of the time





19b Do you think specifically within your organisation the conservation interests represented at a national 
level are typical o f  local consen’ation interests?
□
1. all of the time | |
2. most of the time
3. sometimes
4. never | |
5. don't know
20 Do you think the conservation interests represented at an EU  level are typical o f  local consen’ation 
interests?
1. all of the time | |




21 Do you think specifically within your organisation the conservation interests represented at an EU  level 
are typical o f  local consen’ation interests?
1. all of the time | |




22 Do vou think different rural interests (i.e. fanning and consen’ation) are represented in a balanced way to 
policy-makers?
1. yes | |
2. no | | please comment
3. don't know | |
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1. providing information to members?
2. representing members interests 
by lobbying?
3. other
23 In your opinion what is a groups (for example, NFUS) most important role?
24a How effective are they in achieving this?
1. not at all effective go to 24b
2. not very effective L_ go to 24b
3. effective d go to 25
4. quite effective □ go to 24c
5. very' effective d go to 24c
6. don't know d go to 25
24b I f  very effective/quite effective why do you think so?
24c I f  not very effective/not at all effective why do you think so?
25 How important do you think Television and Newspapers are in influencing policy-makers decision-
making?
1. very important d please discuss
2. quite important d please discuss
3. important n please discuss
4. not very important u please discuss
5. not important d please discuss




26 How important do you think public opinion is in influencing policy-makers decision-making?
\ . very important □ please discuss
6. don't know
4. not very important
5. not important
3. important









27 Do you personally think conservation issues in the rest o f  the U.K. are the same as those in Orkney?
29 Please list any o f  the following channels whereby, as a branch officer, you are kept in touch with the local 
community views?
1. Letters and telephone calls from individuals (members and non-members included)
2. Community council meeting representations by RSPB.
3. RSPB local meetings.
4. Any other, please specify
30 Do you have any difficulty in representing the interests o f  Orkney within the Scottish Office?
If yes. was this through
1. A lack of interest by the Orkney RSPB in Scottish Office policymaking;
2. A lack of access to. or representation on Scottish Office committees;
3. A lack of formal contacts with Scottish Office officials;
4. A lack of informal contacts with Scottish Office officials;
1. ves □
2. no please comment
3. don't know
28 Do you think people in Orkney are as conservation minded at those in the rest o f  the UK
1. ves please comment
2. no please comment
3. don't know
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5. A lack of available and up-to-date information on Scottish Office nature 
conservation policies;
6. Other, please specify
31 As a geographically remote branch o f  the RSPB do yon consider you have a fa ir  say within the national 
RSPB structure?
I all of the time




32 Please list any o f  the following channels whereby, as a branch officer, you are kept in touch with the local 
community views?
1. Letters and telephone calls from individuals (members and non-members included)
2. Community council meeting representations by RSPB.
3. RSPB local meetings.
4. Any other, please specify
33 Do you have any difficulty> in representing the interests o f  Orkney within the Scottish Office?
If yes. was this through
1. A lack of interest by the Orkney RSPB in Scottish Office policymaking;
2. A lack of access to. or representation on Scottish Office committees;
3. A lack of formal contacts with Scottish Office officials;
4. A lack of informal contacts with Scottish Office officials;
5. A lack of available and up-to-date information on Scottish Office nature 
conservation policies;







34 Do you have any difficulty in representing the interests o f  Orkney at a national (W estminster/W hitehall)
level?
If yes, was this through
1. A lack of interest by the Orkney RSPB in National U.K. policymaking;
2. A lack of access to, or representation on Whitehall committees;
3. A lack of formal contacts with Whitehall officials;
4. A lack of informal contacts with Whitehall officials;
5. A lack of available and up-to-date information on National U.K. nature 
conservation policies;
6. Other, please specify
35 Do you have any difficulty in representing the interests o f  Orkney at an E U  level?
If yes, was this through
1. A lack of interest by the Orkney RSPB in EU policymaking;
2. A lack of access to, or representation on EU select committees;
3. A lack of formal contacts with EU officials;
4. A lack of informal contacts with EU officials;
5. A lack of available and up-to-date information on EU nature 
conservation policies;
6. Other, please specify
36 Following reorganisation o f  the NCC do you think there has been a devolution o f  decision-making to 
local agencies?
1. yes Please comment
2. no Is there likely to be a change in the future?
3. don't know
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The U.K. Government does not have a nature conservation policy.
37 Do you agree or disagree with the following statement:
1. strongly agree U
2. agree □
3. disagree □
4. strongly disagree □
5. don't know □
Please comment
SECTION THREE: SSSIs
The next set of questions are about the designation of SSSIs and their impact.
38 Do you think the M A IN  A IM  o f  SSSIs has been achieved?
1. yes | |
2. no [ | please comment
□3. don't know
39 What would you say, i f  any, are the main shortcomings o f  the SSSI policy?
40 What changes would you like to see made to the exisiting system? (e.g. in the administration or 
compensation)
41 What do you think o f  the idea o f  having sites o f  special scientific interest? (specifically the concept rather 
than the administration or compensation)
42 Do you think LANDOWNERS/F.47?M£'/?5' should be compensated fo r  any loss in income associated with 
an SSSI?
1. yes | |
2. no | | please comment
3. don't know
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SECTION FOUR: PROPERTY RIGHTS
45 Do you think the system o f  compensation fo r  SSSIs is fair?
1. very fair
2. quite fair
3. not very fair
4. not at all fair
5. don't know
46a Do you think compensation with management agreements varies amongst landowners?
1. yes Z go to 45a
2. no □ go to 47














1. a great deal
2. not very much
3. don't know
46b I f  yes, would you say the variation is:
47 Do you think the legal nature o f  SSSIs is detrimental to the aims o f  the policy?
1. yes | | please comment
2. no
3. don't know
48 Do you think a voluntary approach to nature consen>ation is capable o f  achieving
1. the same | |
2. more than a legal/regulation approach
3. less than a legal/regulation approach
4. don't know
49 Given the move towards conservation which, i f  any, o f  the following mechanisms would you like to see in 
place?
1. land purchase by government
2. land purchase by voluntary conservation 
organisations
3. regulation with compensation limited to a 
one-off payment
4. regulation with compensation for an 
annual payment
5. voluntary schemes with supervision by | |
a government agency
6. voluntary schemes with no supervision | |
7. don't know 
Other, please specify
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50 Do you think all fanning practices should be taken under planning controls (such as building development 
and access) like other economic activities:







51 Do you think there should be an appeals system fo r  all SSSI designations?
1. yes | [ please comment
2. no | | please comment
3. don't know
52 Existing compensation is calculated on income foregone as a result o f  the designation. Do you think this 
is the best wav?
1. keep existing method
2. have a standard payment for all 
landowners/farmers
3. some other method, please suggest
53 Do you think farmers should have the right to choose between a one-off payment or annual payments 
related to the loss o f  profits?
1. yes
2. no | |
3. don't know
54 Do you think voluntary consen’ation groups should be allowed to own land fo r  nature reserves?
1. yes | | please comment
2. no | | please comment
3. don't know | |
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SECTIO N FIVE: THE FUTURE FOR CONSERVATION PO LICY IN  ORKNEY AND  ELSEW H ERE IN  
THE U.K.
The following questions relate to Environmentally Sensitive Area (ESA) designation - 
55 Do you think ESA is a good policy
1. yes □ go to 56
2. no □ go to 58
3. don't know □ go to 58






3. the 5-10 year 
plan
4. other
57 Why do you think Orkney missed out on the last round o f  ESA designation?





2. no | |
3. don't know | |
59 Do you think the number o f  incomers to Orkney has any effect on the nature conser\>ation movement in 
Orkney? I f  yes, please comment.
Thank you for your help on completing this questionnaire. Your co-operation has been greatly appreciated.
Do you have any comments you would like to make about any of the issues raised or about the questionnaire 
itself?
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A genda for Policy-m aker In terview s
Confidential
SECTION ONE: INFORMATION
1 Important sources o f information for you in your work associated with land use and nature 
conservation in Scotland?
2 Where do you obtain information on the application and development o f  national UK 
policies?
3 Where do you obtain information on the application and development o f E ll policies?
4 What is the single most important way that you keep up to date with new ideas and 
developments in farming and nature conservation?
SECTION TWO: POLICY-MAKING
5 Please rank the following main arenas o f policy-making in terms o f influence with respect 
to the 1990 reorganisation o f the NCC.
1. Government departments
2. Political parties
3. House o f Commons
4. House o f Lords
5. Interest groups
6. Public arena (media, public opinion)
7. International arena
8. European Union
6 I f  interest groups are considered important please indicate which groups and rank in order 
o f influence.
7 How receptive/accessible are UK and EU government departments to interest groups?
8 Where do the closest links lie - which groups and which departments?
9 What do you perceive to be the trend for the balance o f  power between conservation and 
agriculture interest groups?
10 How does the Treasury allocate its budget fo r  nature conservation ?
1 1 Do you agree or disagree with the following statement:
The UK government does not have a comprehensive nature conservation policy.
12 In your own opinion, what is an interest group's most important role? Discuss their 
effectiveness in this role.
13 How important do you think TV and newspapers are in influencing policy-makers 
decision-making?
14 How important do you think TV and Newspapers in influencing public opinion?
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15 How important do you think public opinion is in influencing policy-makers decision­
making?
SECTION THREE: POLICY REFORM
16 Does the UK government tend to be proactive or reactive to policy change. How does this 
contrast with the ELJ?
17 Do you see any need for reform o f existing nature conservation legislation? I f  so, then 
what reform
18 What do you see as the main constraint to such reform?
19 Where did the push fo r  change come from in the reorganisation o f the NCC?
SECTION FOUR: SSSIs
20 Do you think the main aim o f SSSI legislation has been achieved?
21 Do you think farmers and landowners should be compensated fo r any loss in income 
associated with an SSSI?
22 Do you think SSSI designation changes the financial value o f  farmland?
23 Do you think SSSI designation affects the way farmers farm their land outwith the site?
24 Do you think the system o f compensation fo r SSSIs is fair?
25 Existing compensation is calculated on income foregone as a result o f the designation.
Do you think this is the best way? (Keep existing method; have a standard payment fo r  all 
landowners; some other method).
26 Do you think the legal nature o f SSSIs is detrimental to the aims o f the policy?
27 Do you think a voluntary approach to nature conservation is capable o f achieving the 
same or more or less than a legal approach?
28 Do you think there should be an appeals system for all SSSI designations?
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SECTION FIVE: GENERAL POLICY
29 Do you think all farming practices (such as building development and access) should be 
taken under planning controls?
30 Do you think ESA is a good policy?
SECTION SIX: EUROPEAN DIMENSION
3 1 How significant is the European input into nature conservation policy-making in the UK?
32 Is land use seen as a national issue. To what extent is the EU law on nature conservation 
enforced?
33 What do you anticipate the impact o f the new EU Species and Habitats Directive to be?
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Appendix IV: The Test
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The %  Test
The following table displays how two characteristics depend on each other: farmer income and
2
SSSI designation. To test the null hypothesis of no dependence thej^  test of independence 
can be used.
Table II. 1 Population frequencies for Orkney farmers where income and SSSI designation are
independent 
(Null hypothesis. Ho).
Income SSSI No SSSI Total
frequency
Effect 15 18 33
No effect 22 4 26




Statistical independence means that the perceived effect on income should be the same 
whether the respondent had an SSSI or not.
Multiply the Total column by 0.5 (the relative frequency) since 50% of the observations are
with SSSIs. The expected frequencies E  shown above can thus be obtained and compared to
2
the observed frequencies 0  using the %  statistic.
( o ~ e ):
E
The ^  sign is used twice to indicate that the whole table has been summed. Let c denote the 
number o f columns in the table, and r the number of rows, the degrees of freedom are
d.f. = (c -l)(r-l)
then ^  is referred to Table II. 1 to find the prob-value for the null hypothesis (independence).
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Observed frequencies (O) Expected frequencies (E)
15 18 20.69 12.31
22 4 16.31 9.69
Deviations (O-E) (O-E)i 'E
-5.69 5.69 1.5648188 2.630065
5.69 -5.69 1985046 3.34200
Sum = 9.52
d.f. = (2-1 )(2-1) = 1.
2 2 
From Table II. 1, row 1, the observed %  value of 9.52 lies beyond %  Thus the probvalue
.05.
<
The probvalue is so low (that is, the probability o f dependence occuring by chance is very low) 
that the null hypothesis must be rejected. That is, this test established the dependence of 
Orkney farmer's perceived effect on income, on SSSI designation.
Critical Points, Wonnacott and Wonnacott, 1982. Table VII p.352)
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Interest group Profile
National Farmers Union for Scotland NFUS
National Trust for Scotland NTS
Scottish Conservation Projects SCP
Scottish Crofters Union SCU
Scottish Landowners Federation SLF
Scottish Wildlife and Countryside Link SWCL
Scottish Wildlife Trust SWT
UK groups with a Scottish office
Farming and Wildlife Advisory Group(UK) FWAG(UK)
Friends o f the Earth UK FoE(UK)
Ramblers Association Ramblers
Royal Society for the Protection of Birds RSPB
World Wide Fund for Nature WWF
English or UK interest groups
British Trust for Conservation Volunteers BTCV
Council for the Protection of Rural England CPRE
Countryside Landowners Association CLA
County Wildlife Trusts 
Greenpeace UK
National Farmers Union NFU
National Trust NT
Royal Society for Nature Conservation RSNC
Wildlife and Countryside Link WCL (or W&C Link)
Scottish interest groups Abbreviation
BRITISH TRUST FOR CONSERVATION VOLUNTEERS involves a wide cross 
section o f the community in practical conservation work for both public and private 
landowners in England and Wales. Training courses in conservation skills are run.
COUNTRYSIDE LANDOWNERS ASSOCIATION is the English equivalent of the 
Scottish Landowners Federation. CLA exerts political pressure and provides professional 
advice and services for its landowning members.
COUNCIL FOR PROTECTION OF RURAL ENGLAND seeks to enhance the beauty of 
the countryside by influencing decision-makers in the EU, Parliament, government and local 
authorities. It is a promotional group with semi-official watchdog status to protect the English 
countryside.
COUNTY WILDLIFE TRUSTS promote nature conservation through buying or managing 
nature reserves in England. RSNC is the umbrella organisation for the Trusts and lobbies on 
national issues on their behalf.
FARMING AND WILDLIFE ADVISORY GROUP seeks to promote conservation of 
wildlife and landscape in the farmed countryside to the fullest extent compatible with modern 
farming needs. It acts as an advisory service for farmers and landowners working through 
twelve local advisors in Scotland and 45 in England to make whole farm plans. FWAG is not 
a lobbying group.
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FRIENDS OF THE EARTH is one o f the few international environmental organisations. 
FoE has American roots and is based on promoting fundamental social change to solve mans 
abuses o f the natural environment. FoE is seen to be quite radical and confrontational. The 
organisation is committed to the idea of developing strong, well-informed local groups and 
while each country group is independent they are bound together by a sense o f common 
purpose.
GREENPEACE is one of the largest international environmental groups, characterised for its 
direct action, and is most well known for their work against international whaling. 
Greenpeace has traditionally been seen as radical group with a highly centralised 
administration which distinguishes it from FoE.
NATIONAL FARMERS UNION (for SCOTLAND) The mission o f the NFU(S) is to: 
'watch over, protect and promote the interests o f agriculture in all its branches and to 
encourage the development o f the industry by such means as may from time to time be 
deemed expedient.' The NFU(S) has been described as a trade union whose principal aim is to 
represent the financial interests of their members. The NFUS has become accepted as the 
authoritative voice of the farming industry in Scotland and likewise the NFU in England. The 
two groups are independent although they work together on common issues.
NATIONAL TRUST is one of the oldest conservation groups. The NT was established by 
social reformers in the late 19th century to promote the preservation of places o f historic and 
architectural interest or of natural beauty. It is very centralised; decision-making rests with its 
council o f approximately 50 members, th e  NT is a large landowner and seeks occasionally to 
reform policy. It has 'insider' status with the government because of its landowning status and 
has a conservative approach to conservation with a middle-class and middle-aged membership.
NATIONAL TRUST FOR SCOTLAND NTS is very influential across the board but it 
tends not to openly offer opinions on political issues and hence not seen to be politically active 
or influential.
RAMBLERS ASSOCIATION seeks to safeguard public rights of way and landscapes 
through government legislation, and the decisions of local planning authorities and highway 
authorities. The Ramblers seek to encourage all forms o f rambling and mountaineering, and 
foster care and understanding of the countryside. Within Scotland there are 25 local groups 
and a total membership of approximately 4000 who are lobbying for increased public access to 
the countryside.
ROYAL SOCIETY FOR NATURE CONSERVATION is the umbrella organisation for 
the County Wildlife Trusts in England and has links with Scottish Wildlife Trust, who may 
rely on the RSNC at times to represent its interests at a national level.
ROYAL SOCIETY FOR THE PROTECTION OF BIRDS is concerned with the 
protection o f wild birds and conservation of their habitat. RSPB have been very successful and 
has a narrower remit than, for example, WWF. RSPB is one of the largest conservation 
groups in Europe.
SCOTTISH CONSERVATION PROJECTS seek to promote the involvement of people in 
conserving the wildlife and scenic heritage of Scotland. It involves a wide cross section of the 
community in practical conservation work for both public and private landowners. Training 
courses in conservation skills are run. SCP is becoming more popular with membership now 
totalling 1200.
SCOTTISH CROFTERS UNION represents crofting interests in Scotland with a 
membership of 4500. They have formed a strong relationship with conservation groups, such 
as the RSPB, as a result of the recognition of the contribution crofting can make to 
conservation.
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SCOTTISH LANDOWNERS FEDERATION mission is to 'promote high standards o f  
management and use o f land. To ensure proper communication on matters relating to the 
ownership o f land between its members, other organisations and the wider public. To ensure 
that legislation and government policies affecting land ownership and use are prepared with 
proper consideration fo r  the responsibilities and rights o f landowners, in addition to the well­
being o f rural communities, the environment, and the wider public interest.' SLF has a small 
membership but is influential because of its landowning status.
SCOTTISH WILDLIFE AND COUNTRYSIDE LINK (also known as Scottish Link or 
SWCL) aims to connect the wide range of voluntary wildlife, amenity and environmental 
protection groups in Scotland Scottish Link does not represent anyone as such but rather 
offers a central point of contact and forum Views expressed from within Scottish Link are 
always attributed to named organisations and there is no aim to integrate views or develop a 
consensus. Scottish Link has approximately 30 members. There are growing links between 
SWCL and WCL.
SCOTTISH WILDLIFE TRUST is affiliated to RSNC in England and seeks to protect 
native wildlife and its habitats throughout Scotland. It creates and manages nature reserves 
encouraging public interest in conservation providing education and advising landowners. 
They campaign on wildlife issues and run UK 2000 Employment Training Unit for Scotland. 
SWT tends to rely on RSNC, and WWF and RSPB in Scotland, to relay information about 
political issues in Westminster.
WILDLIFE AND COUNTRYSIDE LINK is an effective network organisation based in 
London, which is older and more established than SWCL.
WORLD WIDE FUND FOR NATURE is a large international organisation which aims to 
generate moral and financial support for the conservation o f nature and the earth's natural 
resources. Although the majority of its funds go abroad it is active in Scotland as an advocate 
of conservation. WWF is generally perceived to be very professional and influential.




Figure VI. 1 illustrates the relative volume of support for the key farming, landowning, 
environmental and conservation interest groups as identified in the literature review in 
Chapter 2 and through interviews with policy-maker respondents.
Figure VI. 1 Membership of key interest groups in Scotland 11993)
30,000 j
RSPB NFUS WW F SW T FoE (Scot) SLF Ramblers FWAG SCP
Interest group
In terms of membership numbers, the RSPB are the most well supported interest 
group in Scotland, followed by the NFUS and WWF. The National Trust for 
Scotland, though considered to be an influential organisation (Evans, 1992) is not 
included as all the above memberships represent Scottish residential membership, 
while the NTS membership figure of 218,343 includes a wider UK membership, (and 
was therefore not a comparable statistic).
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The RSPB is the most well supported group, followed by the County Wildlife Trusts, 
FoE(UK) and WWF outwith Scotland (Figure VI.2).
Figure VI. 3 Income of key interest groups in Scotland (1990)
1 ,200 ,000  - r
70,000
The NFUS, SWT and SCP have the largest incomes of the groups shown above 
(Figure VI.3). RSPB and WWF are not included as their incomes are collected at 
their UK headquarters.
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Figure IV.4 Income of key interest groups in the UK. outwith Scotland (1990)
( U K )  le r s  L i n k
I n t e r e s t  g r o u p
The above diagram illustrates the relative size of interest groups in terms o f income. 
The RSPB and WWF have the largest incomes. Figures VF1 - VF4 illustrate that 
group memberships are in the same order of magnitude as their incomes.
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Figure VI. 5 Geographical distribution o f membership o f key interest groups within
Scotland (1991).
No. of members
Source: RSPB (pers comm 1993), SWT (1990) and NFUS (pers comm).
There exists a relatively even geographical distribution o f NFUS membership (Figure 
VI.5). However, there is a clear concentration of members of SWT and RSPB in 
centres of population such as, Lothian, Strathclyde, Grampian and Tayside. In order 
to account for these concentrations of population the distribution of membership has 
been caculated on a per capita basis. These results are illustrated in Figure VI.6 
below. All three groups were shown to have a relatively even geographical 
distribution of membership per capita.
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Figure VI.6 Geographical distribution o f membership in Scotland 
per capita of RSPB. SWT and NPUS (1991).
Rsrcentage o f  the population
There was a substantially higher proportion of NFUS members per capita in Orkney 
than any other region in Scotland. RSPB has the highest per capita membership for 7 
regions followed by the NFUS which has the highest membership for 5 regions. 
Membership per capita o f SWT remains the lowest, at less than 0.5% of the 
population. The difference between RSPB and SWT membership in Orkney and 
Lothian is 0.4% and 0.2% respectively. This shows that urban residents in Scotland 
were no more likely to be members of environmental and conservation interest groups 
than rural residents. However, there is an absolute concentration of membership in 
urban areas which acts as a locus of influence.
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Figure VI.7 Geographical distribution of UK population and RSPB and Ramblers'
membership per capita (1991)
Geographical distribution of key interest groups outwith Scotland
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The RSPB and the Ramblers were chosen as representative organisations of 
conservation interests in the UK as they are widely recognised groups with very high 
memberships. Figure VL6 illustrates the geographical distribution o f the UK 
population which has a clear concentration in the South East o f England. The 
distribution of membership of RSPB and the Ramblers corresponds with these 
geographical variations in population. However, there is a substantial concentration 
of membership in the South East of England which provides a locus o f influence for 
interest groups. The membership of Ramblers and the RSPB in Scotland is not 
considerably lower than in many areas of England including Yorkshire and 
Humberside, the South West, West Midlands, and it was even higher overall than in 
East Anglia.
In 1991 3% ofR S P B 's1: membership was in Scotland. Distribution within Scotland 
was relatively even, (approximately 0.7% of Scotlands population in each region was 
a member o f RSPB). Approximately 97% of RSPB's membership was in England, 
Wales and NI. Geographical distribution in England is relatively even, (approximately 
1.6% of the rest of the UK's population in each region is a member of RSPB).
These figures imply that the population in Scotland is marginally less likely to be a 
member of conservation and environmental groups than the population outwith 
Scotland.
1 RSPB is used as an indicator group for conservation interests
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The RSPB, WWF, Ramblers, and FWAG all have Scotland offices but remain a part 
of their UK offices. The NFUS, SWT, FoE(S), SLF and SCP were all independent 
organisations although they may have worked together on some common issues with 
their sister groups in England that carry out the same functions. These were the NFU, 
County Wildlife Trusts, FoE(UK), CLA and BTCV respectively. This independent 
development of organisations was perceived by policy-maker respondents to have 
come about as a result o f the economic and social differences between England and 
Scotland, the remoteness of some agricultural and environmental interests from the 
political market and the desire for independent organisations in Scotland.
From interviews with policy-maker respondents (1993) the following points emerged 
as reasons why the conservation movement in Scotland is perceived to be less strong 
than in England.
• "The population distribution in Scotland [means that] 75-80% live in the central 
belt. The big nature conservation issues are not where the people are. There is a 
more even distribution [of the population] south o f the border so concern is more 
evenly distributed" (Policy-maker respondent, 1993).
• "There has been very high unemployment in Scotland for a very long time so 
substantial numbers o f people don't give a fig. There is no large leisurely 
middle-class (not large enough to indulge themselves) so [there exists] only a 
modest basis fo r  influence and support. A small population means the same 
individuals support a number o f organisations which include, fo r  example, NTS, 
SWT and RSPB" (Policy-maker respondent, 1993).
• "In Scotland the perception is that the environment is not under threat. There is 
more countryside per head o f population and therefore the impact on the natural 
environment is relatively less. There is not a similar perception o f 'habitat 
islands' needing protection in the way there is in the more densely populated 
areas in England" (Policy-maker respondent, 1993).
• "The historical tradition o f voluntary organisation in England is much older than 
in Scotland" (Policy-maker respondent, 1993).
Comparison of interest groups between England and Scotland
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• The holistic approach to the environment was perceived to be characteristic of 
Scottish people. This was illustrated in the following quotations:
"Environmental group membership is much lower in Scotland perhaps 
because the Scots have a more holistic view - they couldn't respond to 
something just about nature. The National Trust fo r  Scotland therefore 
has an advantage" (Policy-maker respondent, 1993).
"Scottish people do not separate out culture aspects o f their 
environmental concern. It is more holistic than that which is why the 
National Trust fo r  Scotland gets support. NTS provides a vacuum fo r  the 
sense o f identity in Scotland which is stronger than in the South. There is 
sentimental notion o f the glens and Beinns which does not exist in 
England (Policy-maker respondent, 1993).
• The lower overall membership in Scotland means that there is significantly less 
public pressure in Scotland to achieve conservation or environmental objectives 
and therefore less pressure on farming and landowning groups to accommodate 
conservation and environmental interests. By contrast, the public pressure in 
England comes from a more established environmental movement which further 
contributes to its influence.
• Many respondents believed there is a greater rural empathy with the farming and 
landowning populations in Scotland. This occurs for many social and economic 
reasons but mainly due to a higher, relative dependence on the agriculture industry 
for local employment. (1.2% of the working population in England are employed 
in agriculture; 1.4% of employees of the population in Scotland are in agriculture. 
Therefore the direct employment dependence in Scotland is 18.2% more than in 
England (Source: Regional Trends, 1993 Table 7.7).
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